[[update: see: https://github.com/pbatard/rufus/commit/c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb ]]
Vulnerability Note VU#403768
Akeo Consulting Rufus fails to update itself securely
Akeo Consulting Rufus fails to securely check for and retrieve updates, which an allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system. Akeo Consulting Rufus 2.16 retrieves updates over HTTP. While Rufus does attempt to perform some basic signature checking of downloaded updates, it does not ensure that the update was signed by a trusted certificate authority (CA). This lack of CA checking allows the use of a self-signed certificate. Because of these two weaknesses, an attacker can subvert the update process to achieve arbitrary code execution. An attacker on the same network as, or who can otherwise affect network traffic from, a Rufus user can cause the Rufus update process to execute arbitrary code. The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem. Please consider the following workarounds:
* Don’t use built-in update capabilities
* Because Rufus does not include the ability to securely install updates, any Rufus updates should be obtained from https://rufus.akeo.ie/ directly, using your web browser.
* Avoid untrusted networks
* Avoid using untrusted networks, including public WiFi. Using your device on an untrusted network increases the chance of falling victim to a MITM attack.
Firmware Security 