William has a review of ME Analyzer:
[…]For servers with greater than 24 days of power on time since the last AC power cycle, the first BIOS update will fail because the Intel Management Engine (ME) fails to enter recovery mode for the BIOS update.[…]
Non-Dell OEMs: please also add this to your QA cycle. 🙂
ME Analyzer v1.70.0 adds full parsing & unpacking of all Intel CSE ME/TXE/SPS File Systems (MFS/AFS) based on the amazing initial research by @_Dmit. MEA can now show the FS state and log all low-level details. General CSE firmware analysis also improved.
Vulnerability INTEL-SA-00086 allows to activate JTAG for Intel Management Engine core. We developed our JTAG PoC for the Gigabyte Brix GP-BPCE-3350C platform. Although we recommend that would-be researchers use the same platform, other manufacturers’ platforms with the Intel Apollo Lake chipset should support the PoC as well (for TXE version 126.96.36.1997).[…]
In an effort to continuously improve the robustness of the Intel® Converged Security Management Engine (Intel® CSME), Intel has performed a security review of its Intel® CSME with the objective of continuously enhancing firmware resilience. As a result, Intel has identified security vulnerabilities that could potentially place affected platforms at risk.[…]
PS: I guess ME is now CSME now?
June 14, 2018
The vulnerability allowed exploiting a critical flaw in Intel Management Engine and still can be present in equipment of vendors that use Intel processors. Apple released an update for macOS High Sierra 10.13.4, which fixes the firmware vulnerability CVE-2018-4251 found by Positive Technologies experts Maxim Goryachy and Mark Ermolov. For more details, see Apple Support.[…]
UEFI BIOS and Intel Management Engine Attack Vectors and Vulnerabilities
Alexander Ogolyuk, Andrey Sheglov, Konstantin Sheglov
Saint Petersburg National Research University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics
St. Petersburg, Russia
We describe principles and implementation details of UEFI BIOS attacks and vulnerabilities, suggesting the possible security enhancement approaches. We describe the hidden Intel Management Engine implementation details and possible consequences of its security possible discredit. Described breaches in UEFI and Intel Management Engine could possibly lead to the invention of “invulnerable” malicious applications. We highlight the base principles and actual state of Management Engine (which is a part of UEFI BIOS firmware) and its attack vectors using reverse engineering techniques.
* Disable all SMM code (if possible by patching or other methods)
* Disable any external firmware components (PCI boot)
* Disable S3 Bootscript (after sleep mode)
* SMI transaction Monitor extensive usage (to find malicious SMI calls)
* Enable Secure Boot mode
* Enable BIOS password
* Extensive reverse engineering of vendor’s firmware samples to find and report vulnerabilities
* Code reviews (of open sourced UEFI based systems like Tiano-Core)
Intel updates the advisory pages:
Thursday, January 18, 2018
How to hack a disabled computer or run code in Intel ME
At the recent Black Hat Europe conference, Positive Technologies researchers Mark Ermolov and Maxim Goryachy spoke about the vulnerability in Intel Management Engine 11 , which opens up access to most of the data and processes on the device. This level of access also means that any attacker exploiting this vulnerability, bypassing traditional software-based protection, will be able to conduct attacks even when the computer is turned off. Today we publish in our blog the details of the study.[…]
Intel AMT Security Issue Lets Attackers Bypass Login Credentials in Corporate Laptops
Insecure defaults in Intel AMT allow an intruder to completely bypass user and BIOS passwords and TPM and Bitlocker PINs to backdoor almost any corporate laptop in a matter of seconds.
Helsinki, Finland – January 12, 2018: F-Secure reports a security issue affecting most corporate laptops that allows an attacker with physical access to backdoor a device in less than 30 seconds. The issue allows the attacker to bypass the need to enter credentials, including BIOS and Bitlocker passwords and TPM pins, and to gain remote access for later exploitation. It exists within Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT) and potentially affects millions of laptops globally. The security issue “is almost deceptively simple to exploit, but it has incredible destructive potential,” said Harry Sintonen, who investigated the issue in his role as Senior Security Consultant at F-Secure. “In practice, it can give an attacker complete control over an individual’s work laptop, despite even the most extensive security measures.”[…]
It appears PTSecurity may have a GUI Debugger for Intel ME??
The “Minix Inside” stickers look great, click on the tweet from frdnd.
Hoping CCC staff does the great job they do ever year and get the videos for these events online quickly! 😉
PS: Of course, this isn’t all that is happening at CCC. There are multiple other interesting talks, eg:
The Intel Management Engine
This blog post is based on a research paper I wrote for university. Although my work was mainly reading and summarising, I hope this article helps to bring some clarification about the details of the ME. At the bottom, you will also find some sources I used. Please be aware that since I wrote this report until June 2017, a new generation of ME was deployed, the one running the Minix microkernel on a x86 coprocessor. Nevertheless–to understand the development and architecture of the whole concept, it’s good to understand the details up from 2009.[…]
Intel has updated their advisory again, after a week or so, probably worth re-reading:
Interesting, Pepijn Bruienne is looking at new Apple firmware, and how it uses Intel ME.