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Positive Tech at BlackHat EU: Running Unsigned Code in Intel ME

How to Hack a Turned-Off Computer, or Running Unsigned Code in Intel Management Engine

Intel Management Engine is a proprietary technology that consists of a microcontroller integrated into the Platform Controller Hub (PCH) microchip with a set of built-in peripherals. The PCH carries almost all communication between the processor and external devices; therefore Intel ME has access to almost all data on the computer, and the ability to execute third-party code allows compromising the platform completely. Researchers have been long interested in such “God mode” capabilities, but recently we have seen a surge of interest in Intel ME. One of the reasons is the transition of this subsystem to a new hardware (x86) and software (modified MINIX as an operating system) architecture. The x86 platform allows researchers to bring to bear all the power of binary code analysis tools. Unfortunately, this changing did not go without errors. In a subsystem change that will be detailed in the talk of Intel ME version 11+, a vulnerability was found. It allows an attacker of the machine to run unsigned code in PCH on any motherboard via Skylake+. The main system can remain functional, so the user may not even suspect that his or her computer now has malware resistant to reinstalling of the OS and updating BIOS. Running your own code on ME gives unlimited possibilities for researchers, because it allows exploring the system in dynamics. In our presentation, we will tell how we detected and exploited the vulnerability, and bypassed built-in protection mechanisms.

https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/briefings/schedule/#how-to-hack-a-turned-off-computer-or-running-unsigned-code-in-intel-management-engine-8668

Intel ME is the new Pandora’s Box…

 

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coreboot and Intel ME

https://www.coreboot.org/

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ME_Cleaner updated to set HAP bit

UNTESTED: Set the HAP bit:
Positive Technologies discovered the presence of an undocumented HAP bit in the PCHSTRP0 field of the descriptor which, when set to 1, disables completely Intel ME just after the initialization. This is confirmed both by an analysis of the status of Intel ME after the setting of the bit and by reverse engineering the BUP module.

https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/commit/350903a695851dda20b2be5d6099b58e377653b7

https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner

https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/08/28/ptsecurity-on-intel-me/

 

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PTSecurity on Intel ME

Our team of Positive Technologies researchers has delved deep into the internal architecture of Intel Management Engine (ME) 11, revealing a mechanism that can disable Intel ME after hardware is initialized and the main processor starts. In this article, we describe how we discovered this undocumented mode and how it is connected with the U.S. government’s High Assurance Platform (HAP) program.

Disclaimer: The methods described here are risky and may damage or destroy your computer. We take no responsibility for any attempts inspired by our work and do not guarantee the operability of anything. For those who are aware of the risks and decide to experiment anyway, we recommend using an SPI programmer.[…]

http://blog.ptsecurity.com/2017/08/disabling-intel-me.html

https://github.com/ptresearch/unME11

https://github.com/ptresearch/me-disablement

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Finnbarr on state of Intel ME hacking tools

Finbarr has a new article on Intel ME, in which he’s wondering if current tools are acquiring bitrot:

[…]It seems to me there is little ongoing work to enhance existing ME analysis tools such as me_unpack or the meloader IDA plugin to support ME firmware versions 9.5.X.X or later. Possible reasons for this state of affairs include the lack of available documentation for ME versions above 9, no ROMB-enabled ME firmware later the version 9 in the wild, or simply that the ME tool developers have moved on to other projects.

https://blog.fpmurphy.com/2017/08/has-intel-me-analysis-tool-development-petered-out.html

Also, this post pointed out an Intel ME web site I had not seen before:

http://me.bios.io/Main_Page

It has an invalid HTTPS cert, and appears to have been last updated a few years ago.

PS: Also, if you are using Finnbarr’s UEFI-Utilities, note that he’s recently started including ThinkPwn as one of the binaries, so be careful how you deploy it. CHIPSEC blacklists ThinkPwn as one of handful of known UEFI malware modules.

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