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CHIPSEC gets new MMIO BAR module

Experimental module that may help checking SMM firmware for MMIO BAR hijacking
vulnerabilities described in the following presentation:
`BARing the System: New vulnerabilities in Coreboot & UEFI based systems <http://www.intelsecurity.com/advanced-threat-research/content/data/REConBrussels2017_BARing_the_system.pdf&gt;`_ by Intel Advanced Threat Research team at RECon Brussels 2017
Usage:
  “chipsec_main -m tools.smm.rogue_mmio_bar [-a <smi_start:smi_end>,<b:d.f>]“
 
– “smi_start:smi_end“: range of SMI codes (written to IO port 0xB2)
– “b:d.f“: PCIe bus/device/function in b:d.f format (in hex)
Example:
    >>> chipsec_main.py -m tools.smm.rogue_mmio_bar -a 0x00:0x80
    >>> chipsec_main.py -m tools.smm.rogue_mmio_bar -a 0x00:0xFF,0:1C.0

 

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CHIPSEC gets new UEFI Whitelist command

CHIPSEC already has a Blacklist command. Now there is a UEFI whitelist command.

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McAfee on CHIPSEC, post Vault7

“EFI firmware malware is a new frontier for stealth and persistent attacks which may be used by sophisticated adversaries to penetrate and persist within the organization’s and national infrastructure for very long time. Use open source CHIPSEC to defend from this threat and stay safe.”

https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/business/chipsec-support-vault-7-disclosure-scanning/

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UEFI lab at Cascadia IT Conference in Seattle March 10th

[DISCLAIMER: FirmwareSecurity is my personal blog. I work at PreOS Security.]

PreOs Security is offering a half-day training lab for System Administrators, SRE/DevOps in the Seattle area at Cascadia IT Conference, for those interested in learning about UEFI/ACPI/BIOS/SMM/etc security. Here’s the text for the training:

Defending System Firmware

Target audience: System administrators, SRE, DevOps who work with Intel UEFI-based server hardware

Most enterprises only defend operating system and application software; system and peripheral firmware (eg., BIOS, UEFI, PCIe, Thunderbolt, USB, etc) has many attack vectors. This workshop targets enterprise system administrators responsible for maintaining the security of their systems. The workshop is: an introduction to UEFI system firmware, an overview of the NIST secure BIOS platform lifecycle model of SP-(147,147b,155) and how to integrate that into normal enterprise hardware lifecycle management, and an introduction to the available open source firmware security tools created by security researchers and others, and how to integrate UEFI-based systems into the NIST lifecycle using available tools, to help protect your enterprise. It will be a 3.5 hour presentation, and at the end, you can optionally can run some tests on your laptop: Intel CHIPSEC, Linux UEFI Validation distribution (LUV-live), FirmWare Test Suite live boot distribution (FWTS-live), and a few other tools. Attendees trying to participate in the lab will need to have a modern Intel x86 or x64-based (not AMD), UEFI-based firmware, running Windows or Linux OS software. That means no AMD systems, no Apple Macbooks, no ARM systems. Any system used in the lab must have all data backed up, in case some tool bricks the device. Attendees should understand the basics of system hardware/firmware, be able to use a shell (eg, bash, cmd.exe, UEFI Shell), and able to use Python-based scripts.

https://www.casitconf.org/casitconf17/tutorials/

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CHIPSEC gets UEFI variable fuzzer

The module is fuzzing UEFI Variable interface. The module is using UEFI SetVariable interface to write new UEFI variables to SPI flash NVRAM with randomized name/attributes/GUID/data/size. Note: this module modifies contents of non-volatile SPI flash memory (UEFI Variable NVRAM). This may render system unbootable if firmware doesn’t properly handle variable update/delete operations.
 
Usage:
    “chipsec_main -m tools.uefi.uefivar_fuzz [-a <options>]“
    
Options:        
    “[-a <test>,<iterations>,<seed>,<test_case>]“
    – “test“        which UEFI variable interface to fuzz “(all, name, guid, attrib, data, size)“
    – “iterations“    number of tests to perform (default = 1000)
    – “seed“        RNG seed to use
    – “test_case“    test case # to skip to (combined with seed, can be used to skip to failing test)
    All module arguments are optional
    
Examples:
>>> chipsec_main.py -m tools.uefi.uefivar_fuzz
>>> chipsec_main.py -m tools.uefi.uefivar_fuzz -a all,100000
>>> chipsec_main.py -m tools.uefi.uefivar_fuzz -a data,1000,123456789
>>> chipsec_main.py -m tools.uefi.uefivar_fuzz -a name,1,123456789,94

https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec/blob/master/chipsec/modules/tools/uefi/uefivar_fuzz.py

 

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IGD command added to CHIPSEC

The igd command allows memory read/write operations using igd dma.
>>> chipsec_util igd
>>> chipsec_util igd dmaread <address> [width] [file_name]
>>> chipsec_util igd dmawrite <address> <width> <value|file_name>
Examples:
>>> chipsec_util igd dmaread 0x20000000 4
>>> chipsec_util igd dmawrite 0x2217F1000 0x4 deadbeef

https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec/blob/master/chipsec/utilcmd/igd_cmd.py

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