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Intel-SGX-SSL

The Intel Software Guard Extensions SSL (Intel SGX SSL) cryptographic library is intended to provide cryptographic services for Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enclave applications. The Intel SGX SSL cryptographic library is based on the underlying OpenSSL Open Source project, providing a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The API exposed by the Intel SGX SSL library is fully compliant with unmodified OpenSSL APIs.

https://github.com/01org/intel-sgx-ssl

 

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TaLoS: library that integrates Intel SGX with OpenSSL

TaLoS: Efficient TLS Termination Inside SGX Enclaves for Existing Applications

TaLoS1 is a TLS library that allows existing applications (with an OpenSSL/LibreSSL interface) to securely terminate their TLS connection. For this, TaLoS places security-sensistive code and data of the TLS library inside an Intel SGX enclave, while the rest of the application remains outside. It can then be used as the building block for a wide range of security-critical applications for which the integrity and/or confidentiality of TLS connections must be guaranteed. TaLoS provides good performance by executing enclave transitions asynchronously and leveraging user-level threading inside the enclave. The code is accompanied with a technical report, containing details about the architecture and performance results. In contrast to the SSL add-on for the Intel SGX SDK, TaLoS exposes the OpenSSL/LibreSSL API to untrusted code outside of the enclave. This means that existing applications can use the TaLoS library with no or only minor modifications. The Intel SGX SDK SSL add-on does not expose an outside interface, which means that applications must be modified to use it.[…]

https://github.com/lsds/TaLoS

 

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Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks
Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Stefan Mangard
(Submitted on 28 Feb 2017 (v1), last revised 1 Mar 2017 (this version, v2))
In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on the same physical machine. However, the hypervisor does not protect tenants against the cloud provider and thus the supplied operating system and hardware. Intel SGX provides a mechanism that addresses this scenario. It aims at protecting user-level software from attacks from other processes, the operating system, and even physical attackers. In this paper, we demonstrate fine-grained software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX enclave targeting co-located enclaves. Our attack is the first malware running on real SGX hardware, abusing SGX protection features to conceal itself. Furthermore, we demonstrate our attack both in a native environment and across multiple Docker containers. We perform a Prime+Probe cache side-channel attack on a co-located SGX enclave running an up-to-date RSA implementation that uses a constant-time multiplication primitive. The attack works although in SGX enclaves there are no timers, no large pages, no physical addresses, and no shared memory. In a semi-synchronous attack, we extract 96% of an RSA private key from a single trace. We extract the full RSA private key in an automated attack from 11 traces within 5 minutes.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719

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Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical

Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical
Ferdinand Brasser, Urs Müller, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Kari Kostiainen, Srdjan Capkun, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
(Submitted on 24 Feb 2017)
Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research efforts are actively seeking countermeasures to SGX side-channel attacks. It is widely assumed that SGX may be vulnerable to other side channels, such as cache access pattern monitoring, as well. However, prior to our work, the practicality and the extent of such information leakage was not studied. In this paper we demonstrate that cache-based attacks are indeed a serious threat to the confidentiality of SGX-protected programs. Our goal was to design an attack that is hard to mitigate using known defenses, and therefore we mount our attack without interrupting enclave execution. This approach has major technical challenges, since the existing cache monitoring techniques experience significant noise if the victim process is not interrupted. We designed and implemented novel attack techniques to reduce this noise by leveraging the capabilities of the privileged adversary. Our attacks are able to recover confidential information from SGX enclaves, which we illustrate in two example cases: extraction of an entire RSA-2048 key during RSA decryption, and detection of specific human genome sequences during genomic indexing. We show that our attacks are more effective than previous cache attacks and harder to mitigate than previous SGX side-channel attacks.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.07521

 

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Functional Encryption using Intel SGX

 

{\sc{Iron}}: Functional Encryption using Intel SGX
Ben A Fisch, Dhinakaran Vinayagamurthy, Dan Boneh, Sergey Gorbunov
Functional encryption (FE) is an extremely powerful cryptographic mechanism that lets an authorized entity compute on encrypted data, and learn the results in the clear. However, all current cryptographic instantiations for general FE are too impractical to be implemented. We build {\sc{Iron}}, a practical and usable FE system using Intel’s recent Software Guard Extensions (SGX). We show that {\sc{Iron}} can be applied to complex functionalities, and even for simple functions, outperforms the best known cryptographic schemes. We argue security by modeling FE in the context of hardware elements, and prove that {\sc{Iron}} satisfies the security model.

http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1071

 

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more on SCONE

Re: SCONE, mentioned here: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/01/07/secure-linux-containers-with-intel-sgx/

 

SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX
Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Franz Gregor, Thomas Knauth, Andre Martin, Christian Priebe, Joshua Lind, Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O’Keeffe, Mark L Stillwell, David Goltzsche, Dave Eyers, Rüdiger Kapitza, Peter Pietzuch, Christof Fetzer

In multi-tenant environments, Linux containers managed by Docker or Kubernetes have a lower resource footprint, faster startup times, and higher I/O performance compared to virtual machines (VMs) on hypervisors. Yet their weaker isolation guarantees, enforced through software kernel mechanisms, make it easier for attackers to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of application data within containers. We describe SCONE, a secure container mechanism for Docker that uses the SGX trusted execution support of Intel CPUs to protect container processes from outside attacks. The design of SCONE leads to (i) a small trusted computing base (TCB) and (ii) a low performance overhead: SCONE offers a secure C standard library interface that transparently encrypts/decrypts I/O data; to reduce the performance impact of thread synchronization and system calls within SGX enclaves, SCONE supports user-level threading and asynchronous system calls. Our evaluation shows that it protects unmodified applications with SGX, achieving 0.6✓–1.2✓ of native throughput.[…]

https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi16/technical-sessions/presentation/arnautov

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi16/osdi16-arnautov.pdf

https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/conference/protected-files/osdi16_slides_knauth.pdf

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