Workshop on Security for Embedded and Mobile Systems

Secure and Efficient RNS software implementation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Practical Power Analysis on KCipher-2 Software on Low-End Microcontrollers
Use of simulators for side-channel analysis
Secure positioning: From GPS to IoT
Permutation-based cryptography for embedded and mobile systems
The Curious Case of the Curious Case: Detecting touchscreen events using a smartphone case
Are You Really My Friend? Efficient and Secure Friend-matching in Mobile Social Networks
From Smashed Screens to Smashed Stacks: Attacking Mobile Phones using Malicious Aftermarket Parts



SyScan360 Seattle



Hardware.io 2017 CFP is open

Security Conference is a platform for hardware and security community where researchers showcase and discuss their innovative research on attacking and defending hardware. The objective of the conference revolves around four key concerns in hardware, firmware and related protocols i.e. backdoors, exploits, trust and attacks (BETA).

Training: 19th – 20th Sept 2017
Conference: 21st – 22nd Sept 2017



UEFI lab at Cascadia IT Conference in Seattle March 10th

[DISCLAIMER: FirmwareSecurity is my personal blog. I work at PreOS Security.]

PreOs Security is offering a half-day training lab for System Administrators, SRE/DevOps in the Seattle area at Cascadia IT Conference, for those interested in learning about UEFI/ACPI/BIOS/SMM/etc security. Here’s the text for the training:

Defending System Firmware

Target audience: System administrators, SRE, DevOps who work with Intel UEFI-based server hardware

Most enterprises only defend operating system and application software; system and peripheral firmware (eg., BIOS, UEFI, PCIe, Thunderbolt, USB, etc) has many attack vectors. This workshop targets enterprise system administrators responsible for maintaining the security of their systems. The workshop is: an introduction to UEFI system firmware, an overview of the NIST secure BIOS platform lifecycle model of SP-(147,147b,155) and how to integrate that into normal enterprise hardware lifecycle management, and an introduction to the available open source firmware security tools created by security researchers and others, and how to integrate UEFI-based systems into the NIST lifecycle using available tools, to help protect your enterprise. It will be a 3.5 hour presentation, and at the end, you can optionally can run some tests on your laptop: Intel CHIPSEC, Linux UEFI Validation distribution (LUV-live), FirmWare Test Suite live boot distribution (FWTS-live), and a few other tools. Attendees trying to participate in the lab will need to have a modern Intel x86 or x64-based (not AMD), UEFI-based firmware, running Windows or Linux OS software. That means no AMD systems, no Apple Macbooks, no ARM systems. Any system used in the lab must have all data backed up, in case some tool bricks the device. Attendees should understand the basics of system hardware/firmware, be able to use a shell (eg, bash, cmd.exe, UEFI Shell), and able to use Python-based scripts.



6th RISC-V Workshop: call for papers

Registration and the call for presentations / posters is open for the 6th RISC-V Workshop, co-hosted by NVIDIA and the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) in Shanghai China on May 8-11, 2017.  As with past workshops, our goals for these events are to bring the RISC-V community together to share information about recent activity in the various RISC-V projects underway around the globe, and build consensus on the future evolution of the instruction set. This will be a four day event broken down as follows[…]



Black Hat Asia: The UEFI Firmware Rootkits: Myths and Reality

The UEFI Firmware Rootkits: Myths and Reality
Alex Matrosov  |  Principal Research Scientist, Cylance
Eugene Rodionov  |  Senior Specialized Software Engineer, ESET

In recent days, the topic of UEFI firmware security is very hot. There is a long list of publications that have appeared over the last few years discussing disclosed vulnerabilities in UEFI firmware. These vulnerabilities allows an attacker to compromise the system at one of the most privileged levels and gain complete control over the victim’s system. In this presentation, authors will take a look at the state of the art attacks against UEFI firmware from practical point of view and analyze applicability of disclosed attacks in real life scenarios: whether these vulnerabilities can be easily used in real-world rootkits (OS->SMM->SPI Flash).

In the first part of the presentation, the authors will dive into different types of vulnerabilities and attacks against UEFI firmware to summarize and systematize known attacks: whether the vulnerability targets one specific firmware vendor, whether an attacker needs physical access to the victims platform and so on. Such a classification is useful to understand possibilities of an attacker. The authors will also look at the attacks and determine whether it can be converted into a real-world rootkit or the possibilities of the attacker are very limited and the attack vector cannot make it beyond the PoC.

In the second part of the presentation, the authors will look at defensive technologies and how can one reduce severity of some attacks. In modern Intel-based platforms implemented different methods and mitigation technologies against firmware and boot process attacks. The Boot Guard – hardware-based integrity protection technology that provided new levels of configurable boot: Measured Boot and Verified Boot (supported from MS Windows 8). The technologies responsible for platform flash memory protection from malicious modifications not a new trend. As example BIOS Write Enable bit (BIOSWE) has been introduced long time ago for made read-only access of flash memory. Another protection technology is BIOS Lock Enable bit (BLE) which is control every privileged code execution from System Management Mode (SMM) on each attempt to change BIOSWE bit. Also SMM based write protection (SMM_BWP) protects an entire BIOS region from unprivileged code (non-SMM) modifications attempts. One of the latest security technologies is SPI Protected Ranges (PRx) which can be configured to protect memory ranges of flash memory on the BIOS/platform developers side. The BIOS Guard (delivered since Skylake CPU) – is the most recent technology for platform armoring protection from firmware flash storage malicious modifications. Even if an attacker has access for modifying flash memory BIOS Guard can prevent execution of malicious code and protect flash memory from malicious modifications. Authors will analyse how these technologies can counteract existing firmware vulnerabilities and attacks.