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VisualUEFI udpated

https://github.com/ionescu007/VisualUefi

http://www.windows-internals.com/pages/training-services/windows-uefi-development/

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Clarification of new Windows UEFI/SMM security feature

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/09/05/new-windows-uefi-security-protections-deciphered/

Here’s authoritative information from Jeremiah Cox of Microsoft:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/minimum/device-guard-and-credential-guard

Someone at Microsoft: please write a Technical Support KB article based on Jeremiah’s tweets.

 

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Uncategorized

new Windows UEFI security protections deciphered

Microsoft added some new UEFI protections to Windows, but it is not well-documented, so the firmware security researcher community is guessing at what it does:

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SigThief: PE signature tool

I’ve noticed during testing against Anti-Virus over the years that each is different and each prioritize PE signatures differently, whether the signature is valid or not. There are some Anti-Virus vendors that give priority to certain certificate authorities without checking that the signature is actually valid, and there are those that just check to see that the certTable is populated with some value. It’s a mess. So I’m releasing this tool to let you quickly do your testing and feel free to report it to vendors or not. In short it will rip a signature off a signed PE file and append it to another one, fixing up the certificate table to sign the file. Of course it’s not a valid signature and that’s the point![…]

https://github.com/secretsquirrel/SigThief

 

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Rufus: insecure online behavior

[[update: see: https://github.com/pbatard/rufus/commit/c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb ]]

 

 

Vulnerability Note VU#403768
Akeo Consulting Rufus fails to update itself securely

Akeo Consulting Rufus fails to securely check for and retrieve updates, which an allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system. Akeo Consulting Rufus 2.16 retrieves updates over HTTP. While Rufus does attempt to perform some basic signature checking of downloaded updates, it does not ensure that the update was signed by a trusted certificate authority (CA). This lack of CA checking allows the use of a self-signed certificate. Because of these two weaknesses, an attacker can subvert the update process to achieve arbitrary code execution. An attacker on the same network as, or who can otherwise affect network traffic from, a Rufus user can cause the Rufus update process to execute arbitrary code. The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem. Please consider the following workarounds:
* Don’t use built-in update capabilities
* Because Rufus does not include the ability to securely install updates, any Rufus updates should be obtained from https://rufus.akeo.ie/ directly, using your web browser.
* Avoid untrusted networks
* Avoid using untrusted networks, including public WiFi. Using your device on an untrusted network increases the chance of falling victim to a MITM attack.

https://github.com/pbatard/rufus

https://rufus.akeo.ie/

http://pete.akeo.ie/

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Ulf: Attacking UEFI over DMA

Attacking UEFI:
Unlike macs many PCs are likely to be vulnerable to pre-boot Direct Memory Access (DMA) attacks against UEFI. If an attack is successful on a system configured with secure boot – then the chain of trust is broken and secure boot becomes insecure boot. If code execution is gained before the operating system is started further compromise of the not yet loaded operating system may be possible. As an example it may be possible to compromise a Windows 10 system running Virtualization Based Security (VBS) with Device Guard. This have already been researched by Dmytro Oleksiuk. This post will focus on attacking UEFI over DMA and not potential further compromises of the system.[…]

https://github.com/ufrisk/pcileech

http://blog.frizk.net/2017/08/attacking-uefi.html

 

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