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ltmdm64_poc

Windows 7 SP1 x64 Code Integrity Bypass POC using ltmdm64.sys
Bug was found in ltmdm64.sys!DriverEntry driver incorrectly uses RtlQueryRegistryValues API it also lacks security cookies across entire binary except GsDriverEntry function. This PoC was created back in 2014 and submitted later to MSRC they were not able to located the driver authors but also didn’t take any action on fixing the problem. ltmdm64.sys is shipped since Windows Vista and present in digitally signed catalog files. This PoC is detected by Windows Defender as Exploit:Win64/Ropero.A

https://github.com/int0/ltmdm64_poc

 

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MemoryMonRWX: Windows hypervisor to detect rootkits

Modern malware and spyware platforms attack existing antivirus solutions and even Microsoft PatchGuard. To protect users and business systems new technologies developed by Intel and AMD CPUs may be applied. To deal with the new malware we propose monitoring and controlling access to the memory in real time using Intel VT-x with EPT. We have checked this concept by developing MemoryMonRWX, which is a bare-metal hypervisor. MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap all types of memory access: read, write, and execute. MemoryMonRWX also has the following competitive advantages: fine-grained analysis, support of multi-core CPUs and 64-bit Windows 10. MemoryMonRWX is able to protect critical kernel memory areas even when PatchGuard has been disabled by malware. Its main innovative features are as follows: guaranteed interception of every memory access, resilience, and low performance degradation.

http://igorkorkin.blogspot.com/2017/03/memorymonrwx-detect-kernel-mode.html

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Absolute seeks OEM Business Development Director

It is an exciting time for the Absolute and Microsoft partnership!  Absolute’s placement in Windows device firmware provides a truly unique position within the Microsoft partner ecosystem. We continue to strengthen this relationship by opening new doors of engagement through our recent product integration announcements. To further support the relationship, we are looking for a tenured Business Development Director[…]

http://jobs.jobvite.com/absolute/job/oarf5fwF

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modzero Security: keylogger in HP audio driver

[EN] Keylogger in Hewlett-Packard Audio Driver
Security reviews of modern Windows Active Domain infrastructures are – from our point of view – quite sobering. Therefore, we often look left and right, when, for example, examining the hardening of protection mechanisms of a workstation. Here, we often find all sorts of dangerous and ill-conceived stuff. We want to present one of these casually identified cases now, as it’s quite an interesting one: We have discovered a keylogger in an audio driver package by Hewlett-Packard. A keylogger is a piece of software for which the case of dual-use can rarely be claimed. This means there are very few situations where you would describe a keylogger that records all keystrokes as ‘well-intended’. A keylogger records when a key is pressed, when it is released, and whether any shift or special keys have been pressed. It is also recorded if, for example, a password is entered even if it is not displayed on the screen.[…]There is no evidence that this keylogger has been intentionally implemented. Obviously, it is a negligence of the developers – which makes the software no less harmful. If the developer would just disable all logging, using debug-logs only in the development environment, there wouldn’t be problems with the confidentiality of the data of any user[…]

https://www.modzero.ch/modlog/archives/2017/05/11/en_keylogger_in_hewlett-packard_audio_driver/index.html

https://www.modzero.ch/advisories/MZ-17-01-Conexant-Keylogger.txt

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Windows Internals new edition out

http://www.alex-ionescu.com/?p=335

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/microsoft_press/2017/05/09/new-book-windows-internals-seventh-edition-part-1/

https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/store/windows-internals-part-1-system-architecture-processes-9780735684188

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wow, this book has gone a long way from “Inside Windows NT” by Helen Custer, the original author:

http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=138407

https://archive.org/details/insidewindowsnt00solo

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Microsoft Windows 10 UEFI training video

Micosoft has a training video for network administrators that includes some UEFI security topics:

https://mva.microsoft.com/en-US/training-courses/windows-10-security-in-real-life-17127?l=Xz1vNy5XD_104300474

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Windows 10 new preboot security features

There’s a few new preboot-related features in recent builds of Microsoft Windows, excerpt of some of them below.

New features in Windows 10, version 1511:
* Credential Guard: Enable Credential Guard without UEFI lock. You can enable Credential Guard by using the registry. This allows you to disable Credential Guard remotely. However, we recommend that Credential Guard is enabled with UEFI lock. You can configure this by using Group Policy.
* Bitlocker: DMA port protection. You can use the DataProtection/AllowDirectMemoryAccess MDM policy to block DMA ports when the device is starting up. Also, when a device is locked, all unused DMA ports are turned off, but any devices that are already plugged into a DMA port will continue to work. When the device is unlocked, all DMA ports are turned back on.

* Bitlocker: New Group Policy for configuring pre-boot recovery. You can now configure the pre-boot recovery message and recover URL that is shown on the pre-boot recovery screen. For more info, see the Configure pre-boot recovery message and URL section in “BitLocker Group Policy settings.”
* New BCD events: Event ID 4826 has been added to track the following changes to the Boot Configuration Database (BCD): DEP/NEX settings, Test signing, PCAT SB simulation, Debug, Boot debug, Integrity Services, Disable Winload debugging menu
* New PNP events:  Event ID 6416 has been added to track when an external device is detected through Plug and Play. One important scenario is if an external device that contains malware is inserted into a high-value machine that doesn’t expect this type of action, such as a domain controller.
* TPM: Key Storage Providers (KSPs) and srvcrypt support elliptical curve cryptography (ECC).
* TPM: The following sections describe the new and changed functionality in the TPM for Windows 10: Device health attestation, Microsoft Passport support, Device Guard support, Credential Guard support […]

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/whats-new/whats-new-windows-10-version-1507-and-1511
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-info

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