As the tweet mentions, there is a disparity for OS-level access to UEFI runtime services.
SpeculationControl is a PowerShell script that summarizes the state of configurable Windows mitigations for various speculative execution side channel vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre variant 2) and CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown). For an explanation on how to interpret the output of this tool, please see Understanding Get-SpeculationControlSettings PowerShell script output.[…]
Everything we know about Campfire, Google’s secretive project to get Windows 10 running on Chromebooks.[…]
Four undocumented registry values vary the default validation of signatures on kernel-mode code such that Windows 10 may allow cross-signed drivers when it is otherwise documented as requiring Microsoft-signed drivers. This may be welcome for running your own drivers on your own computers without having to send them to Microsoft. Or it may be an unwelcome exposure to software that would install drivers by surprise, including to let malware elevate from administrative access to kernel-mode execution. Setting these values requires administrative access. Their action is subject to System Integrity policy, which provides the best defence.[…]
Lots of general debugging skills for Windows USB drivers covered in this blog post.
What is OEM Windows? How It’s Different From Retail Version Of Windows?
[…]The OEM Windows has its product key tied to a particular device. While the retail product key also works on one machine, it can be transferred to another one. Earlier, in the case of laptops, the OEM product key was written on the bottom part of the device. Nowadays, it’s embedded directly into firmware (BIOS or UEFI) of a device and used by Windows when required.[…]
RWeverything is a freeware tool, no source available. It includes a Windows kernel driver. CHIPSEC can be configured to trust and use that driver. It has been many years since I’ve trusted third-party freeware where I didn’t know the third-party author or have many other knowledgeable friends who trust them.
According to my system’s browser:
“rweverything.com uses an invalid security certificate. The certificate expired on January 8, 2018, 3:59:59 PM GMT-8. The current time is July 16, 2018, 3:58 PM.”
Winbagility is a tool that gives you ability to connect WinDbg on non /DEBUG Windows x64 systems. Winbagility simulates a debugged kernel. It retrieves over the STUB for some essentials information (KDBG, KPCR…) and forward these informations to WinDbg over KD.
PyFDP is a Python extension used to communicate with the FDP (Fast Debugging Protocol) hypervisor-based debugging server used in the Winbagility project. Winbagility introduced an instrumented version of VirtualBox which can be used to implement a sthealth debugger via Virtual Machine introspection and runtime analysis. While Winbagility simply connect the FDP server to Windbg in order to debug a Windows VM as if the guest was launch with /DEBUG option activated, anyone can write a FDP client. PyFDP expose the FDP client side by wrapping the DLL’s exports via ctypes, enabling any Python program to script a VM debugging session.
Security Researcher, SpecterOps
Note: I originally scrapped this post because I didn’t like that audit events were only logged once per boot due to caching, however, Casey’s tweet reminded me that I shouldn’t let perfect be the enemy of good. This is still one of the best options that I know of (without requiring a commercial solution) to log all driver loads.[…]
AaronLocker is designed to make the creation and maintenance of robust, strict, AppLocker-based whitelisting rules as easy and practical as possible. The entire solution involves a small number of PowerShell scripts. You can easily customize rules for your specific requirements with simple text-file edits. AaronLocker includes scripts that document AppLocker policies and capture event data into Excel workbooks that facilitate analysis and policy maintenance.[…]
Setting Up Network Debugging of a Virtual Machine – KDNET
This topic describes how to configure a kernel debugging connection to a Hyper-V virtual machine (VM).[…]
Chip vendors controlling the security of OSes should be more transparent in their selection process. They should maintain a list of OSVs that they maintain embargoed fixes. Then uses could determine if they want to trust the OS or not, or try to lobby to try and get the ISA vendor to support their OS. Is the OS on the list, ok then they may have some chance at fixing things. If not on the list I expect to be vulnerable until the embargo ends. There are MANY more OSes than Microsoft Windows, Apple macOS, a limited number of Linux distros, and sometimes FreeBSD.
In some forums, Bryan Cantrill is crafting a fiction. He is saying the FPU problem (and other problems) were received as a leak. He is not being truthful, inventing a storyline, and has not asked me for the facts. This was discovered by guessing Intel made a mistake. We are doing the best for OpenBSD. Our commit is best effort for our user community when Intel didn’t reply to mails asking for us to be included. But we were not included, there was no reply. End of story. That leaves us to figure things out ourselves. Bryan is just upset we guessed right. It is called science.
The latest version of Windows apparently has new protections against PCILeech and related attacks:
An ice-cold Boot to break BitLocker
By Olle Segerdahl & Pasi Saarinen
A decade ago, academic researchers demonstrated how computer memory remanence could be used to defeat popular disk encryption systems. Not much has happened since, and most seem to believe that these attacks are too impractical for real world use. Even Microsoft have even started to play down the threat of memory remanence attacks against BitLocker, using words such as “they are not possible using published techniques”. We will publish techniques that allow recovery of BitLocker encryption keys from RAM on most, if not all, currently available devices. While BitLocker is called out in the title, the same attacks are also valid against other platforms and operating systems.
Olle is a veteran of the IT-security industry, having worked with both “breaking” and “building” security solutions for almost 20 years. During that time, he has worked on securing classified systems, critical infrastructure and cryptographic products as well as building software whitelisting solutions used by industrial robots and medical equipment. He is currently the Swedish Principal Security Consultant with F-Secure’s technical security consulting practice.
Pasi is an experienced security researcher with a background in both software and network security. In previous employment he has worked on a modern framework for white-box fuzz testing of binaries and security standardization of the 5G mobile network. While he has a very Finnish name, he plays for team Sweden in F-Secure’s technical security consulting practice.