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Bad Ducky: Rubber Ducky compatible clone based on CJMCU BadUSB HW

The below articles point to related tools, besides the Hak5 Rubber Ducky.

https://github.com/mharjac/bad_ducky

https://www.kitploit.com/2018/04/bad-ducky-rubber-ducky-compatible-clone.html

https://www.digitalmunition.me/2018/04/bad-ducky-rubber-ducky-compatible-clone-based-cjmcu-badusb-hw/

See-also:

https://ducktoolkit.com/viewscript/all/

https://github.com/hak5darren/USB-Rubber-Ducky/wiki/Payloads

USB Rubber Ducky

 

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list of 29 USB-based attacks

USB-based attacks
Nir Nissim, Ran Yahalom, Yuval Elovici
Attackers increasingly take advantage of innocent users who tend to use USB peripherals casually, assuming these peripherals are benign when in fact they may carry an embedded malicious payload that can be used to launch attacks. In recent years, USB peripherals have become an attractive tool for launching cyber-attacks. In this survey, we review 29 different USB-based attacks and utilize our new taxonomy to classify them into four major categories. These attacks target both individuals and organizations; utilize widely used USB peripherals, such as keyboards, mice, flash drives, smartphones etc. For each attack, we address the objective it achieves and identify the associated and vulnerable USB peripherals and hardware.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.002
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404817301578

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/heres-a-list-of-29-different-types-of-usb-attacks/

USB attacks

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X41 D-Sec GmbH browser security whitepaper: WebUSB, WebBluetooth, WebSMM

This white paper provides a technical comparison of the security features and attack surface of Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Internet Explorer. We aim to identify which browser provides the highest level of security in common enterprise usage scenarios, and show how differences in design and implementation of various security technologies in modern web browsers might affect their security. Comparisons are done using a qualitative approach since many issues regarding browser security cannot easily be quantified. We focus on the weaknesses of different mitigations and hardening features and take an attacker’s point of view. This should give the reader an impression about how easy or hard it is to attack a certain browser. The analysis has been sponsored by Google. X41 D-Sec GmbH accepted this sponsorship on the condition that Google would not interfere with our testing methodology or control the content of our paper. We are aware that we could unconsciously be biased to produce results favorable to our sponsor, and have attempted to eliminate this by being as transparent as possible about our decision-making processes and testing methodologies.

https://browser-security.x41-dsec.de/X41-Browser-Security-White-Paper.pdf

https://www.x41-dsec.de/#about

https://www.x41-dsec.de/security/report/whitepaper/2017/09/18/whitepaper-x41-browser-security/

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Inside a low budget consumer hardware espionage implant

Wow, amazing!

Inside a low budget consumer hardware espionage implant
Analysis of the S8 data line locator
mich @0x6d696368

The following analysis was performed on a S8 data line locator […]A while back Joe Fitz tweeted about the S8 data line locator1. He referred to it as “Trickle down espionage” due to its reminiscence of NSA spying equipment. The S8 data line locator is a GSM listening and location device hidden inside the plug of a standard USB data/charging cable. It supports the 850, 900, 1800 and 1900 MHz GSM frequencies. Its core idea is very similar to the COTTONMOUTH product line by the NSA/CSS [1] in which an RF device is hidden inside a USB plug. Those hidden devices are referred to as implants. The device itself is marketed as a location tracker usable in cars, where a thief would not be able to identify the USB cable as a location tracking device. Its malicious use-cases can, however, not be denied. Especially since it features no GPS making its location reporting very coarse (1.57 km deviation in my tests). It can, e.g., be called to listen to a live audio feed from a small microphone within the device, as well as programmed to call back if the sound level surpasses a 45 dB threshold. The fact that the device can be repackaged in its sliding case, after configuring it, i.e. inserting a SIM, without any noticeable marks to the packaging suggests its use-case: covert espionage.[…]
I was not able yet to write new firmware via flashrom because I was not able to disable block protection on the flash, yet. Maybe a different avenue for flashing new firmware could be the SPFlash tool4 and/or the Flash tool. However, that would not be open source. If know something about the weird FAT12 file system used in the device or are able to flash your S8 data line locator please contact me with details![…]
No writeup would be complete without at least one fuck up. So here it is: While using the S8 data line locator with OpenBTS I provisioned imaginary numbers. When switching SIM cards I forgot to turn of the voice activated callback. So long story short, some guy with the number 3333333 listend in on me for 2 minutes:

Provider call log fail.Provider call log fail. I did not notice this until I reviewed the logs! So my resume on these little hardware espionage implants: They are stealthy and dangerous as fuck![…]

https://ha.cking.ch/s8_data_line_locator/

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Many vulnerabilities found in Linux kernel USB subsystem by syzkaller

Andrey Konovalov posted a bunch of Linux USB vulnerabilities to the OSS-Security list, found using the syzkaller Linux system call fuzzer.

Hi! Below are the details for 14 vulnerabilities found with syzkaller in the Linux kernel USB subsystem. All of them can be triggered with a crafted malicious USB device in case an attacker has physical access to the machine. There’s quite a lot more similar bugs reported [1] but not yet fixed.[…]

The first message had 14 vulns:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/11/06/8
This second message has 8 more:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/11/08/2

https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/found_bugs_usb.md
https://github.com/google/syzkaller
https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/02/24/google-syzkaller-linux-syscall-fuzzer/

 

 

 

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