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Linaro Connect Vancouver BC: CfP open

 

Call for Proposals: opened 8 May 2018
Deadline to submit proposals: ends 23 July 2018

 

http://connect.linaro.org/cfp/
http://connect.linaro.org/

PS: Resources from last Linaro Connect:

http://connect.linaro.org/hkg18/resources/

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U-Boot gets Android Verified Boot (AVB) 2.0

Igor Opaniuk of Linaro posted a patch to the U-Boot list, adding Android Verified Boot 2.0 support:

This series of patches introduces support of Android Verified B oot 2.0,which provides integrity checking of Android partitions on MMC. It integrates libavb/libavb_ab into the U-boot, provides implementation of AvbOps, subset of `avb` commands to run verification chain (and for debugging purposes), and it enables AVB2.0 verification on AM57xx HS SoC by default. Currently, there is still no support for verification of A/B boot slots and no rollback protection (for storing rollback indexes there are plans to use eMMC RPMB). Libavb/libavb_ab will be deviated from AOSP upstream in the future, that’s why minimal amount of changes were introduced into the lib sources, so checkpatch may fail. For additional details check [1] AVB 2.0 README and doc/README.avb2, which is a part of this patchset.[…]

https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2018-April/326562.html

 

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Leif Lindholm on GNU-EFI (and blog site changed)

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/01/06/leif-on-qemu-and-usb-host-device-pass-through/

Leif Lindholm of Linaro has moved his blog, from http://blog.eciton.net/ to https://station.eciton.net/

I think his RSS feed follows the transition: https://station.eciton.net/index.rss

His most recent post is on using GNU-EFI:

https://station.eciton.net/fun-and-games-with-gnu-efi.html

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LAVA 2018.2 released

Neil Williams of Linaro announced the 2018.2 release of LAVA. Here’s 3 changes excerpted from the announcement below:

* Bootloader support changes: Better detect errors in the bootloader – this adds support to distinguish between a bootloader failure and a kernel failure to detect problems when the bootloader tries to start the kernel. This has an important effect on how some test jobs run – see Quiet Kernels below. The parallel change (7a2b3a68 Change the flow of bootloader commands so they are executed individually) supports detecting failures to download artifacts as distinct from failures to execute once downloaded.

* Bootloader action optimisations: To support the better error detection, several bootloader actions have been optimised. This means that different actions may be used, changing the names you may be using for timeouts. e.g.
https://staging.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/209814/definition#defline10
The timeout name was u-boot-interrupt – now it is bootloader-interrupt. The UI shows you which actions have been assembled into the pipeline.
e.g.: bootloader-interrupt: Wait for prompt Hit any key to stop autoboot (timeout 00:02:00)

* Quiet Kernels: The bootloader support changes wait for an indication that the bootloader has completed and that the kernel has started, by watching for a kernel_start_message. If your kernel is configured to be quiet, then each test job using that kernel *must* clear the kernel_start_message:
   context:
   kernel_start_message: ”
In most cases, the test job should not use ‘quiet’ as this hides important debugging information from the kernel boot process.
[…]

https://lists.linaro.org/pipermail/lava-announce/2018-February/000048.html
https://www.linaro.org/initiatives/lava
https://validation.linaro.org/
https://wiki.linaro.org/LAVA
https://github.com/search?q=org%3ALinaro+lava

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David Brown at Linaro Connect: Digital signatures and the beginning of the world (on ARM bootloaders)

From Linaro Connect 2017 in San Francisco:

Digital signatures and the beginning of the world – SFO17-306
David Brown
The bootloader is where it all begins. This session sums up our experiences with various signature types, data formats, implementations and how to choose.

http://connect.linaro.org/resource/sfo17/sfo17-306/

 

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ARM (Linaro) on Meltdown and Spectre

Spoiler alert:

[…]This is the first part in a series of blog posts about Meltdown and Spectre. The intention here was to penetrate the whitepapers and give an easy to grasp overview of the attacks. In the upcoming blog post we will talk more about individual components, like OP-TEE, Linux kernel and other firmware.

https://www.linaro.org/blog/meltdown-spectre/

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