About this time last year, reports surfaced about security attacks on today’s most popular microprocessors (μPs). Researchers called them Meltdown, Spectre gaining widespread attention. Today, however, the industry and especially μP vendors have made some progress toward stemming these vulnerabilities. Here is my analysis as we enter into 2019.[…]
Training by Ass.Prof. Dr. Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz (TU Graz)
With the beginning of 2018, microarchitectural attacks received a lot of attention by the computer security community and other fields. Meltdown and Spectre break isolation between processes and security domains on a hardware level. In this training, we provide a hands-on experience on microarchitectural attacks. Starting with the basics, we first learn how caches work and then implement three very basic microarchitectural side-channel attacks. We start with Flush+Reload and use it to implement two different attacks; one on a cryptographic algorithm and one template attack. We also see how performance counters can reveal interesting information for microarchitectural attacks. After having learned how to mount Flush+Reload attacks on shared libraries, we go one step further and get rid of the requirement of shared memory step by step. For this purpose, we learn how to build eviction sets and implement an Evict+Reload attack. Continuing from there, we implement Prime+Probe, an attack which does not require any shared memory. Finally, we implement a Meltdown and a Spectre attack, based on the Flush+Reload implementation we already have implement in the first third of the course. This course teaches attendees where microarchitectural attack surface is created and how it can be exploited. This provides engineers with valuable knowledge for building more secure hardware and software resilient to these attacks.
by Omri Misgav & Udi Yavo on October 26, 2018 –
The mitigation for Meltdown created a new part in the kernel which PatchGuard left unprotected, making hooking of system calls and interrupts possible, even with HVCI enabled.[…]
Reflections on trusting SGX
by Mark Silberstein
Sep 25, 2018
The security community will remember the year of 2018 as the year of speculative execution attacks. Meltdown and Spectre, the recent Foreshadow (L1TF in Intel’s terminology), and their variants demonstrate how the immense processor design complexity, perpetual drive for higher performance, and subtle hardware-software interactions — all collude to create a major system security earthquake that is shaking the whole industry. Foreshadow stands out in that it wreaks havoc on Intel SGX, Intel’s recent instruction set extension for building trusted execution environments, which has been envisioned as a stronghold of security in future computing systems. In this blog I highlight the important differences between Foreshadow and other speculative execution attacks, and raise a few questions that require much more than just a technical solution.[…]
A shell script to tell if your system is vulnerable against the several “speculative execution” CVEs that were made public in 2018.
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka ‘Spectre Variant 1’
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka ‘Spectre Variant 2’
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka ‘Meltdown’ aka ‘Variant 3’
CVE-2018-3640 [rogue system register read] aka ‘Variant 3a’
CVE-2018-3639 [speculative store bypass] aka ‘Variant 4’
CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 [L1 terminal fault] aka ‘Foreshadow & Foreshadow-
Initial Release Date: Jun 15, 2018
Last Release Date: Jul 17, 2018
Intel publicly disclosed new variants of the side-channel central processing unit (CPU) hardware vulnerabilities known as Spectre and Meltdown. These variants known as 3A （CVE-2018-3640）and 4 （CVE-2018-3639), local attackers may exploit these vulnerabilities to cause information leak on the affected system. (Vulnerability ID: HWPSIRT-2018-05139 and HWPSIRT-2018-05140).[…]
The latest version of FreeBSD is out, and has a few speculative execution and UEFI changes, including:
[arm64] The bsdinstall(8) installer has been updated to default to UEFI-only boot. [r322254]
(Sponsored by The FreeBSD Foundation)
The efibootmgr(8) utility has been added, which is used to manipulate the EFI boot manager. [r332126]
(Sponsored by Netflix)
The cpucontrol(8) utility has been updated to include a new flag, -e, which is used to re-evaluate reported CPU features after applying firmware updates. [r327871]
Note: The cpucontrol(8) -e flag should only be used after microcode update have been applied to all CPUs in the system, otherwise system instability may be experienced if processor features are not identical across the system.
FreeBSD-SA-18:03.speculative_execution 14 March 2018. Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities
Note: This advisory addresses the most significant issues for FreeBSD 11.x on amd64 CPUs. We expect to update this advisory to include i386 and other CPUs.
Welcome to our second School on Security & Correctness in the Internet of Things 2018, held from 3.-9. September. It is hosted by the research center “Dependable Internet of Things“, located at Graz University of Technology. This school targets graduate students interested in security aspects of tomorrow’s IoT devices. Current advances in technology drive miniaturization and efficiency of computing devices, opening a variety of novel use cases like autonomous transportation, smart cities and health monitoring devices. However, device malfunction could potentially threaten human welfare or even life. Malfunction might not only be caused by design errors but also by intentional impairment. As computing devices are supposed to have high and permanent network connectivity, an attacker finding a vulnerability might easily target millions of devices at once. Moreover, integration of computing devices in everyday items exposes them to a potentially hostile physical environment. A central requirement of tomorrow’s IoT is the ability to execute software dependably on all kinds of devices. IoT devices need to provide security in the presence of network attacks as well as against attackers having physical access to the device. During the five-day school, participants will gain awareness of these IoT-related challenges. Introductory classes are supplemented by advanced courses in the area of system security, cryptography as well as software and hardware side-channels. During spare time participants are invited to enjoy the city of Graz and attend organized events.
See the blog document, not just the short video. 😉
In light of Spectre/Meltdown, we needed to re-think our threat model and defenses for Chrome renderer processes. Spectre is a new class of hardware side-channel attack that affects (among many other targets) web browsers. This document describes the impact of these side-channel attacks and our approach to mitigating them. The upshot of the latest developments is that the folks working on this from the V8 side are increasingly convinced that there is no viable alternative to Site Isolation as a systematic mitigation to SSCAs [speculative side-channel attacks]. In this new mental model, we have to assume that user code can reliably gain access to all data within a renderer process through speculation. This means that we definitely need some sort of ‘privileged/PII data isolation’ guarantees as well, for example ensuring that password and credit card info are not speculatively loaded into a renderer process without user consent. […] In fact, any software that both (a) runs (native or interpreted) code from more than one source; and (b) attempts to create a security boundary inside a single address space, is potentially affected. For example, software that processes document formats with scripting capabilities, and which loads multiple documents from different sources into the same process, may need to take defense measures similar to those described here.[…]
QEMU version 2.12.0 released
24 Apr 2018
This release contains 2700+ commits from 204 authors.
* Spectre/Meltdown mitigation support for x86/pseries/s390 guests.
* Better IPMI support for Platform Events and SEL logging in internal BMC emulation
* SMBIOS support for “OEM Strings”, which can be used for automating guest image activation without relying on network-based querying
[…]A previous post detailed how QEMU/KVM might be affected by Spectre/Meltdown attacks, and what the plan was to mitigate them in QEMU 2.11.1 (and eventually QEMU 2.12). QEMU 2.11.1 is now available, and contains the aforementioned mitigation functionality for x86 guests, along with additional mitigation functionality for pseries and s390x guests (ARM guests do not currently require additional QEMU patches). However, enabling this functionality requires additional configuration beyond just updating QEMU, which we want to address with this post.[…]
More on QEMU and Spectre/Meltdown: