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Wikileaks: Vault 7: Dark Matter

Today, March 23rd 2017, WikiLeaks releases Vault 7 “Dark Matter”, which contains documentation for several CIA projects that infect Apple Mac firmware (meaning the infection persists even if the operating system is re-installed) developed by the CIA’s Embedded Development Branch (EDB). These documents explain the techniques used by CIA to gain ‘persistence’ on Apple Mac devices, including Macs and iPhones and demonstrate their use of EFI/UEFI and firmware malware. Among others, these documents reveal the “Sonic Screwdriver” project which, as explained by the CIA, is a “mechanism for executing code on peripheral devices while a Mac laptop or desktop is booting” allowing an attacker to boot its attack software for example from a USB stick “even when a firmware password is enabled”. The CIA’s “Sonic Screwdriver” infector is stored on the modified firmware of an Apple Thunderbolt-to-Ethernet adapter. “DarkSeaSkies” is “an implant that persists in the EFI firmware of an Apple MacBook Air computer” and consists of “DarkMatter”, “SeaPea” and “NightSkies”, respectively EFI, kernel-space and user-space implants. Documents on the “Triton” MacOSX malware, its infector “Dark Mallet” and its EFI-persistent version “DerStarke” are also included in this release. While the DerStarke1.4 manual released today dates to 2013, other Vault 7 documents show that as of 2016 the CIA continues to rely on and update these systems and is working on the production of DerStarke2.0. Also included in this release is the manual for the CIA’s “NightSkies 1.2” a “beacon/loader/implant tool” for the Apple iPhone. Noteworthy is that NightSkies had reached 1.2 by 2008, and is expressly designed to be physically installed onto factory fresh iPhones. i.e the CIA has been infecting the iPhone supply chain of its targets since at least 2008. While CIA assets are sometimes used to physically infect systems in the custody of a target it is likely that many CIA physical access attacks have infected the targeted organization’s supply chain including by interdicting mail orders and other shipments (opening, infecting, and resending) leaving the United States or otherwise.

https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/?cia

https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/document/SonicScrewdriver_1p0/
https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/document/DerStarke_v1_4_DOC/
https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/document/DerStarke_v1_4_RC1_IVVRR_Checklist/
https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/document/Triton_v1_3_DOC/
https://wikileaks.org/vault7/darkmatter/document/DarkSeaSkies_1_0_URD/

 

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UTTOS: UEFI testing research

A paper from October 2016 that I just noticed:

UTTOS: A Tool for Testing UEFI Code in OS Environment

Unit tests are one of the most widely used tools to assure a minimal level of quality and compliance during development. However, they are not used in many projects where development takes place at low-level contexts. The main reason is that unit test development itself demands more time and becomes expensive in this context and tools that assist test creation are rare or absent. In UEFI development this scenario matches the reality of most teams and unit testing as well as other testing techniques are often not used. To address this fault we propose UTTOS, a tool that parses EDKII build configuration files, mocks the UEFI-specific functions for C development and enables UEFI test suite code to run in the operating system. We show that UTTOS is able to run the test suit in the operating system and save development time.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313074852_UTTOS_A_Tool_for_Testing_UEFI_Code_in_OS_Environment
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307547569_UTTOS_A_Tool_for_Testing_UEFI_Code_in_OS_Environment
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-47443-4_14/fulltext.html

Did not find any source code… 😦 If you do, please leave a Comment!

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LUV announces v2.1-rc2 release

Ricardo Neri of Intel posted a LONG announcement about LUV V2.1-rc2, most of which included here. There are a LOT of new features in this LUV release!

This is to announce the release of LUV v2.1-rc2. It has been a while since the last time of our last release. This is not the ideal release cadence are working to make changes. We will now release more frequently. We aim to release a new version every 4-5 weeks with the content we accumulate over that period of time. Given the large number of new features and changes in this release, it made sense to release it as rc2 of v2.1 to allow for issues to arise and stabilize towards the next release cycle.

This release include the client side of our telemetrics solution. This solution is based on the implementation done for Clear Linux[1]; abiding Intel privacy policies[2]. Please note that telemetrics is an opt-in feature and is disabled by default and only works for systems within Intel networks. We will work now on the server side of the solution.

In this release we have migrated from systemV to systemd, which is inline with most Linux distributions. Also, our telemetrics client needed it to function. Megha Dey did all the heavy lifting to migrate to systemd; which was not an easy task (kudos to her!). She worked on stabilizing network and revamping our splash screen, which now uses plymouth.

Sai Praneeth Prakhya extended our existing implementation to detect illegal access to UEFI Boot Services memory regions after boot. His extension now allows to detect such access to also conventional memory. Likewise, it now detects these acceses at runtime and long after UEFI SetVirtualAddressMap. This has been quite useful recently to detect bugs related to UEFI capsules in certain firmware implementations.

Gayatri Kammela worked on providing tools to make the netboot images more useful. She completed a reference implementation of an HTTP server to collect test results in a test farm. The documentation of this implementation can be found here[2]; we don’t provide collection services. Of course, the client-side implementation of this solution is part of this release. Along with this solution, she wrote a script to customize a netboot binary (an EFI application) to work with her reference implementation[4].

Naresh Bhat updated the kernel configuration for aarch64. He also worked on providing a more clean, unified and structured kernel command line for all the supported CPU architectures. He also enabled support of netboot images for aarch64.

Fathi Boudra kindly reworked the kernel configuration fragments to avoid unnecessary duplications.

Matt Hart added a new luv.poweroff option.

Configuration of LUV has been simplified by moving all the parameters that the user might configure a LUV.cfg file found in the boot partition of the disk image. No more meddling with the grub.cfg configuration file.

We now provide images built for both GPT and MBR partition schemes.

Updated test suites: We include FWTS V17.03.00, CHIPSEC v1.2.5 plus all the changes available as of this week towards the release of v.1.2.6, which should be coming soon. BITS was bumped to v2079. We use Linux v4.10. This release is based on the Morty version of the Yocto Project.

meta-oe and updates to the build process: Our build process changed a bit. We now include certain components from the  meta-oe layer[5]. Such layer has been added to our repository, but it still need to be added locally to the build/conf/bblayers.conf file when building.

Binary images for x86: A announcement to download binary images for x86 will be sent this week.

See rest of announcement for list of Known Issues, and Fixed Issues.

[1] https://clearlinux.org/features/telemetry
[2] http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/privacy/intel-privacy.html
[3] https://github.com/01org/luv-yocto/wiki/Send–LUV-test-results-to-an-HTTP-server
[4] https://github.com/01org/luv-yocto/wiki/Using-LUV-Script-modify_luv_netboot_efi.py
[5] https://layers.openembedded.org/layerindex/branch/master/layer/meta-oe/

Full announcement:
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/luv

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SELoader: Secure EFI Loader

Secure EFI Loader
The SELoader is designed to authenticate the non-PE files which cannot be verified by the MOK verify protocol supplied by shim loader, such as grub configuration, initrd, grub modules and so on. The SELoader employs PKCS7 Verify Protocol available since UEFI Specification version 2.5 to verify the signature to prove the integrity of checked file. If BIOS doesn’t support it, a pre-built Pkcs7VerifyDxe driver is provided. In order to estabilish the chain of trust, the SELoader is required to be signed by a private key corresponding to a DB certificate, the shim certificate, the vendor certificate or a shim MOK certificate. The specifical key is determined by the Secure Boot scheme you will use. Using UEFI Secure Boot, MOK verify protocol and SELoader Secure Boot together, the boot process will be completely trustworthy.

https://github.com/jiazhang0/SELoader

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EFI TBOOT

The EFI TBOOT project is currently under development! EFI TBOOT is mostly a proof of concept at this point. It is not currently functional. It can be built and installed as an EFI boot loader. It only works in conjunction with Xen at the moment. The current development work is being done on Fedora 25 x64. The status as of March 14, 2017 is:
 – EFI TBOOT will boot, but it needs a few key strokes to get going (this is for debugging purposes).
 – EFI TBOOT will relocate itself to EFI runtime memory and setup a shared runtime variable with Xen.
 – EFI related configuration setup is done as well as standard TBOOT pre-launch configuration.
 – Xen is launched and has code to call EFI TBOOT back after EBS.
 – EFI TBOOT then does the SENTER successfully in the callback.
 – The post launch entry point is reached but the switch back to long mode is not working.
[…]
EFI TBOOT needs a number of platform support files used with TXT (called Authenticated Code Modules or ACMs). For convenience the packages can be gotten from the OpenXT mirror:
http://mirror.openxt.org/
[…]

https://github.com/rossphilipson/efi-tboot

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