The paper presents an overview of current attacks on BIOS and Intel ME embedded software of modern Intel-based computers. We describe the results of the analysis of its security for system boards of basic manufacturers. We also allocate classes of attacks that make it possible to create implants whose discovery by traditional methods of searching for undeclared features becomes impossible or extremely difficult.[…]
It costs US$40, I don’t know of a freely-available version of this paper. I wish Aaron Swartz was still alive. 😦
The Trenchboot project focus on boot security has led to the enabling of the Linux kernel to be directly invocable by the x86 Dynamic Launch instruction(s) for establishing a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). The dynamic launch will be initiated by a boot loader with associated support added to it, for example the first targeted boot loader will be GRUB2. An integral part of establishing the DRTM involves measuring everything that is intended to be run (kernel image, initrd, etc) and everything that will configure that kernel to run (command line, boot params, etc) into specific PCRs, the DRTM PCRs (17-22), in the TPM. Another key aspect is the dynamic launch is rooted in hardware. On Intel this is done using the GETSEC instruction set provided by Intel’s TXT and the SKINIT instruction provided by AMD’s AMD-V. Information on these technologies can be readily found online.[…]
The NSFCAC (National Science Foundation Cloud and Autonomic Computing Center) has released a Python script that gathers IPMI/Redfish BMC data:
This project collects metrics from different sources including in-band (via node OS, workload manager, drivers) and out-of-band (OOB) i.e. from baseboard management controller (BMC) via Redfish API and IPMI protocols.
Master Boot Record (MBR) means one thing, in the context of a PC system firmware. MBR is also the name of a heavy metal band. And they have a new album out, “Floppy Disk Overdrive”. The band uses many terms from BIOS and DOS. Song names include “ANSI.SYS”, “FDISK.EXE”, etc. 🙂
When booting a FIT, if ‘bootm’ is used without a specified configuration, U-Boot will use the default one provided in the FIT. But it does not actually check that the signature is for that configuration. This means that it is possible to duplicate a configuration conf-1 to produce conf-2 (with all the signatures intact), set the default configuration to conf-2 and then boot the image. U-Boot will verify conf-2 (in fact since hashed-nodes specifies the conf-1 nodes it will effectively verify conf-1). Then it will happily boot conf-2 even though it might have a different kernel. This series corrects this problem and adds a test to verify it. It also updates fit_check_sign to allow the configuration to be specified. This vulnerability was found by Dmitry Janushkevich and Andrea Barisani of F-Secure, who also wrote the vboot_forge script included here. This is CVE-2020-10648. […]
The Forth programming language is not mainstream these days. But from firmware perspective: OpenFirmware was written in the Forth programming language. And now there’s a Forth compiler that targets UEFI applications. Jonas Hvid has written Jonasforth, a Forth interpreter that is a UEFI application, written in Flat Assembler (FASM). So it works on x64-based Intel UEFI/AMD (but not ARM or RISC-V or non-x64) systems.
Forth aside, this is a FASM-based UEFI application, most FASM-based UEFI apps are ‘hello world’ level, so this gives a more substantial application to study.
It is rare to see a vendor mention “CHIPSEC” in a job posting, maybe once a quarter. Most recent one is SuperMicro.
Supermicro is looking for a Software QA Engineer focusing on Security Penetration Testers with either Firmware, Network and/or Web Application penetration testing experience. You will have to be creative and come with original ideas to build infrastructure for automation and figure out on how to break the software & firmware. […]
Moritz Lipp, Arthur Perais, Vedad Hadžić, Clémentine Maurice, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss
[…]A vulnerability has been found in the ROM of the Intel Converged Security and Management Engine (CSME). This vulnerability jeopardizes everything Intel has done to build the root of trust and lay a solid security foundation on the company’s platforms. The problem is not only that it is impossible to fix firmware errors that are hard-coded in the Mask ROM of microprocessors and chipsets. The larger worry is that, because this vulnerability allows a compromise at the hardware level, it destroys the chain of trust for the platform as a whole.[…]