Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/12/13/embedi-nuclear-explotion/ video is here:
flare-emu marries IDA Pro’s binary analysis capabilities with Unicorn’s emulation framework to provide the user with an easy to use and flexible interface for scripting emulation tasks. It is designed to handle all the housekeeping of setting up a flexible and robust emulator for its supported architectures so that you can focus on solving your code analysis problems. Currently, flare-emu supports the x86, x86_64, ARM, and ARM64 architectures.[…]
It is widely known, that UEFI BIOS security aims at preventing the SPI flash memory tampering in the first place. […] Let’s see how such an update process is implemented in our well-known rolling stone Intel NUC Kit NUC7i3BNH. As we can see from the CHIPSEC framework output below, all the mentioned protections are enabled. […]
Binary Analysis Next Generation (BANG) is a framework for unpacking files (like firmware) recursively and running checks on the unpacked files. Its intended use is to be able to find out the provenance of the unpacked files and classify/label files, making them available for further analysis.
Please leave a Comment on this post if you have more info, other than above.
Intel® QuickAssist Technology for Linux Advisory
Intel® System Defense Utility Vulnerability Advisory
Intel® Parallel Studio Vulnerability Advisory
Intel® Solid State Drive Toolbox File Permissions Advisory
Intel® VTune Amplifier 2018 Update 3 Advisoy
Highlights — from my perspective — include:
* The bsdinstall(8) utility now supports UEFI+GELI as an installation option.
* The bhyve(8) utility is now able to be run withing a jail(8).
PS: There’re a few days left to purchase a FreeBSD 25th Anniversary t-shirt:
The Redfish specification supports event mechanism through which the target redfish devices can send events from different components in the system to an event listener. This project provides an event listener that is create in native PowerShell.
Great! Welcome AMI!
AMI is the world’s largest BIOS firmware vendor, supplying firmware and tools to customers such as Asus, Clevo, Intel, AMD and many others. If you’ve heard of a vendor using Aptio for firmware updates, that means it’s from them. AMI has been testing the LVFS, UpdateCapsule and fwupd for a few months and is now fully compatible.
And a small teaser:
Also, expect another large vendor announcement soon. It’s the one quite a few people have been waiting for.
Welcome to a journey of AArch64 kernel exploitation, from the least privileged, to the most secure privilege level on the ARMv8 platform. For this year’s HITCON CTF, I played with my academic team, Kernel Sanders. When scanning through the problems, I quickly latched on to the Super Hexagon challenge once I heard it involved ARM exploitation.
Hardware implants and supply chain attacks have been in the news recently, but how feasible are they and what can we do about them? In this talk we’ll examine the design of a proof of concept SPI bus hardware implant that has similar capabilities to those described in the Bloomberg/Supermicro article as well as some countermeasures that we can use to try to detect these “modchips” and increase our trust in our systems.
We don’t know how much of the Bloomberg story about hardware implants installed in Supermicro servers shipped to Apple and Amazon is true, nor do we know the story behind the story and the reasons for the vehement denials by all the parties involved.
However, a technical assessment of details of the describe implants reveals that a supply chain attack on the hardware is definitely possible, that the capabilities of the BMC can be used to bypass OS protections, and that there are means to access the BMC that would not necessarily generate readily identified network traffic.
In this talk we’ll examine the design of a proof of concept SPI bus hardware implant that has similar capabilities to those described in the Bloomberg/Supermicro article as well as some countermeasures that we can use to try to detect these “modchips” and increase our trust in our systems.
A simulator for common Redfish service running on x86, with end to end solution for HTTP service, Redfish specification compliant engine, custom implementation of standard/oem schema and utilities serving Redfish schema upgrade and specification update.
9 out of 10 x86_64 firmware vendors will hate this talk!
We’ll give a short introduction what you might find in your machines firmware and tell the story of two hackers that magically found tens of thousands x86_64 firmware images in their backyard as well as their journey to explore common configuration fuckups, update frequencies and potential security risks.
(Let’s hope the publish this repository of images….)
The most severe vulnerability in this section could enable a local attacker to bypass user interaction requirements in order to gain access to additional permissions.