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OpenPOWER firmware updates using ZMODEM

Stewart Smith of IBM has a new blog post about adding ZMODEM support to OpenPOWER firmware.

From checkin: This enables the use of rz/sz to send/receive files using ZMODEM. This enables error detection and correction when using the console to transfer files to/from the host.

From blog:

ZMODEM saves the day! Or, why my firmware for a machine with a CPU from 2017 contains a serial file transfer protocol from the 1980s

Recently, I added the package lrzsz to op-build in this commit. This package provides the rz and sz commands – for receive zmodem and send zmodem respectively. For those who don’t know, op-build builds a firmware image for OpenPOWER machines, and adding this package adds the commands to the petitboot shell (the busybox environment you get when you “exit to shell” from the boot menu).[…]

https://www.flamingspork.com/blog/2017/10/20/zmodem-saves-the-day-or-why-my-firmware-for-a-machine-with-a-cpu-from-2017-contains-a-serial-file-transfer-protocol-from-the-1980s/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZMODEM

 

What’s next, a UEFI runtime service for Kermit, using CKermit? UEFI NNTP Boot, using signed images on alt.binaries.firmware.*? 🙂

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more on Infineon TPM issue (ROCA)

http://blog.ptsecurity.com/2017/10/a-major-flaw-in-popular-encryption.html

ROCA: Vulnerable RSA generation (CVE-2017-15361)

A newly discovered vulnerability in generation of RSA keys used by a software library adopted in cryptographic smartcards, security tokens and other secure hardware chips manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG allows for a practical factorization attack, in which the attacker computes the private part of an RSA key. The attack is feasible for commonly used key lengths, including 1024 and 2048 bits, and affects chips manufactured as early as 2012, that are now commonplace. Assess your keys now with the provided offline and online detection tools and contact your vendor if you are affected. Major vendors including Microsoft, Google, HP, Lenovo, Fujitsu already released the software updates and guidelines for a mitigation. Full details including the factorization method will be released in 2 weeks at the ACM CCS conference as ‘The Return of Coppersmith’s Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli’ (ROCA) research paper.

https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/rsa_ccs17

 

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Where there’s a JTAG, there’s a way: obtaining full system access via USB

WHERE THERE’S A JTAG, THERE’S A WAY: OBTAINING FULL SYSTEM ACCESS VIA USB
Maxim Goryachy and Mark Ermolov
Everyone makes mistakes. These words are certainly true for developers involved in low-level coding, where such common tools as print debugging and software debuggers run into limits. To solve this problem, hardware developers use in-circuit emulators or, if available on the target platform, the JTAG debugging interface (IEEE1149.1 [1]). Such debugging mechanisms first appeared in the 1980s [2]. Over time, microchip vendors extended the functionality of these interfaces. This allowed developers to obtain detailed information on power consumption, find bottlenecks in high-performance algorithms, and perform many other useful tasks. Hardware debugging tools are also of interest to security researchers. These tools grant low-level system access and bypass important security protections, making it easier for researchers to study a platform’s behavior and undocumented features. Unsurprisingly, these abilities have attracted the attention of intelligence services as well.[…]

https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Where-theres-a-JTAG-theres-a-way.pdf

 

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OpenXT

Linux.com has a nice article on Xen, Linux, TPM, and TXT. It also mentions the OpenXT toolkit.

https://www.linux.com/blog/event/elce/2017/10/device-we-trust-measure-twice-compute-once-xen-linux-tpm-20-and-txt

OpenXT is an open-source development toolkit for hardware-assisted security research and appliance integration. Released as Open-Source Software (OSS) in June 2014, OpenXT stands on the shoulders of Xen Project and OpenEmbedded. It is derived from XenClient XT, which was first released in May 2011. It includes hardened Xen VMs that can be configured as a user-facing virtualization appliance, for client devices with Linux and/or Windows guests. It has been used to develop managed software appliances to isolate demanding graphics workloads, untrusted workloads and multiple networks on a single laptop or desktop. OpenXT is optimized for x86 devices with Intel VT-d, TXT (Trusted Execution Technology) and a TPM. OpenXT is being developed to meet the varied needs of the security and virtualization communities, as a toolkit for the configurable disaggregation of operating systems and user workflows. Client appliances developed on OpenXT can contain a mixture of open-source and proprietary software, supporting a range of business models.[…]

https://openxt.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/OD/pages/10747915/What+is+OpenXT

 

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PlayStation4 kernel exploit

2017-10-19
The First PS4 Kernel Exploit: Adieu

Plenty of time has passed since we first demonstrated Linux running on the PS4. Now we will step back a bit and explain how we managed to jump from the browser process into the kernel such that ps4-kexec et al. are usable. Over time, ps4 firmware revisions have progressively added many mitigations and in general tried to lock down the system. This post will mainly touch on vulnerabilities and issues which are not present on the latest releases, but should still be useful for people wanting to investigate ps4 security. As previously explained, we were able to get a dump of the ps4 firmware 1.01 kernel via a PCIe man-in-the-middle attack. Like all FreeBSD kernels, this image included “export symbols” – symbols which are required to perform kernel and module initialization processes. However, the ps4 1.01 kernel also included full ELF symbols (obviously an oversight as they have been removed in later firmware versions). This oversight was beneficial to the reverse engineering process, although of course not a true prerequisite. Indeed, we began exploring the kernel by examining built-in metadata in the form of the syscall handler table – focusing on the ps4-specific entries. After some recovering of structures, we discovered that a large portion of the ps4-specific syscalls are little more than wrappers to what is essentially a hash table API. The API contains the following interface:[…]

https://fail0verflow.com/blog/2017/ps4-namedobj-exploit/

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Linux kernel lockdown patch

David Howells of Red Hat has posted the latest version of the ‘kernel lockdown’ patch to the Linux-EFI mailing list. The latest patch includes a manpage, see the LWN article below for text. For more info, see the full 27-part patch on the linux-efi mailing list.

AFAICT, no Linux distros use this patch. Why?!

The Kernel Lockdown feature is designed to prevent both direct and indirect access to a running kernel image, attempting to protect against unauthorised modification of the kernel image and to prevent access to security and cryptographic data located in kernel memory, whilst still permitting driver modules to be loaded.

Enabling CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL makes lockdown mode available. Enabling CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ will allow a SysRq combination to lift the lockdown. On x86 this is SysRq+x. The keys must be pressed on an attached keyboard. Enabling CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT will cause EFI secure boot to trigger kernel lockdown.

http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=efi-lock-down
http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
https://lwn.net/Articles/736910/

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