DBXtool has support for Microsoft dbxupdate.bin

DBXtool[1] is a tool by Peter Jones of Red Hat. So it works with Fedora, and perhaps other versions of Linux. It is an interesting tool in that it is one of the few tools that look at the UEFI SecureBoot PKI list of blacklisted keys,  that UEFI Forum occassionally updates[2]. Last year there was the Microsoft leaks Golden Keys” story, which was overblown, watch Jeremiah’s video on Youtube from the Fall 2016 UEFI Plugfest for more details. I just noticed that DBXtool has support[3] for a dbxupdate.bin file from Microsoft, separate from the UEFI.org-hosted DBX file, related to this Microsoft Golden Keys incident.

Peter’s comment from that checkin:

Add a new dbxupdate.bin
This is the dbxupdate.bin referenced in CVE-2016-3320 and
It’s for their bootloaders, not ours.

[1] https://github.com/rhboot/dbxtool
[2] http://uefi.org/revocationlistfile
[3] https://github.com/rhboot/dbxtool/commit/1e9334f1287c4703e7dfb40121e00d16d109e903
WordPress mangles Github Gist URLs, so remove the spaces from the next URL to make it work:
https://gist.  github.com/acepace/   df34b5213f1e0fae6529eb703d947187

Some more background on UEFI SB DBX:
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&u=https://habrahabr.ru/post/273497/&prev=search (English translation above Russian document)

Besides Peter’s DBXtool, I’m not aware of many other tools that use the DBX file. There’s this PowerShell script:
Again, WordPress mangles Gist URLs, remove spaces to make this work:
https://gist. github.com/mattifestation/ 991a0bea355ec1dc19402cef1b0e3b6f

I wish I could point to a tool avaialble in each OS/distro that your firmware has the latest blacklist applied…

PS: Peter also works on the Shim. And he’s updated his canary:


Linux kernel lockdown patch

David Howells of Red Hat has posted the latest version of the ‘kernel lockdown’ patch to the Linux-EFI mailing list. The latest patch includes a manpage, see the LWN article below for text. For more info, see the full 27-part patch on the linux-efi mailing list.

AFAICT, no Linux distros use this patch. Why?!

The Kernel Lockdown feature is designed to prevent both direct and indirect access to a running kernel image, attempting to protect against unauthorised modification of the kernel image and to prevent access to security and cryptographic data located in kernel memory, whilst still permitting driver modules to be loaded.

Enabling CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL makes lockdown mode available. Enabling CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT_BY_SYSRQ will allow a SysRq combination to lift the lockdown. On x86 this is SysRq+x. The keys must be pressed on an attached keyboard. Enabling CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT will cause EFI secure boot to trigger kernel lockdown.



CVE-2015-7837: RHEL UEFI Secure Boot


Vulnerability ID 106841
Red Hat Enterprise Linux UEFI Secure Boot privilege escalation

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Red Hat Enterprise Linux (the affected version is unknown). This issue affects an unknown function of the component UEFI Secure Boot. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a privilege escalation vulnerability. Using CWE to declare the problem leads to CWE-269. Impacted is confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The weakness was released 09/19/2017 (oss-sec). The advisory is shared for download at openwall.com. The identification of this vulnerability is CVE-2015-7837 since 10/15/2015. The exploitation is known to be easy. An attack has to be approached locally. No form of authentication is needed for a successful exploitation. Neither technical details nor an exploit are publicly available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $5k-$25k at the moment (estimation calculated on 09/20/2017).[…]


Comments above seem to incidate a 9/19 update, but I can’t find that, only older messages from 2015-2016. Unclear about current status of this.



Red Hat released RHEL 7.4

One new feature that is news to me:

USB Guard, a feature that allows for greater control over how plug-and-play devices can be used by specific users to help limit both data leaks and data injection.





Alex updates smmtestbuildscript for Fedora 26 and QEMU 2.9

A while ago[1], Alex Floyd of PreOS Security wrote a shell script to help codify this wiki article[2] by Laslo Ersek of Red Hat, setting up a UEFI SMM/OVMF testing environment for Fedora-based systems. Recently, Alex updated this script to work with the recently-released Fedora 26. Quoting email from Alex on the changes in this release:

The build script has been updated for Fedora 26 support. It now uses the native QEMU 2.9 library from Fedora 26 and no longer builds a snapshot of QEMU 2.9 which makes some new testing possibilities available.


[1] https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/04/19/shell-script-for-laszlos-smm-test-environment-article/

[2] https://github.com/tianocore/tianocore.github.io/wiki/Testing-SMM-with-QEMU,-KVM-and-libvirt



UEFI/SMM stability and performance improvements in QEMU 2.9 and edk2/OVMF git 296153c5, included with Fedora 26

Fedora 26 just released, and it ships with QEMU v2.9 and an updated OVMF, which adds SMM security improvements. Quoting email from Laszlo Ersek of Red Hat:

QEMU 2.9 is part of Fedora 26. The full changelog for QEMU 2.9 is here:


The broadcast SMI feature is just one tiny line in the huge list (and it only mentions the generic negotiation feature, not the specific broadcast one):

“The q35 machine type offers SMI feature negotiation to interested guest firmware.”

QEMU v2.9 is important for running the SMM driver stack of edk2 — more precisely, machine type “pc-q35-2.9” is important — because it offers negotiable SMI broadcast, i.e., where one VCPU writes to ioport 0xB2, and the SMI is raised synchronously on all VCPUs. See:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1412313 [ovmf]
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1412327 [qemu]

QEMU v2.10 — more precisely, machine type “pc-q35-2.10” — will bring another SMM-related improvement, although not as critical as SMI broadcast. (And I guess it will be available in Fedora 27.) We call it “extended TSEG”, and it allows the QEMU user to specify more than 8MB SMRAM on the cmdline. This is important if you have a huge number of VCPUs, or huge guest RAM (into the TB range) because those things have a linearly growing SMRAM footprint (albeit with small constant factors). See:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1447027 [qemu and ovmf, both committed]
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1469338 [libvirt, under design]

The patches (qemu and ovmf) committed for BZ#1447027 above solve the “many VCPUs” question. The “huge guest RAM” question needs more platform code in OVMF; the patch for that is on edk2-devel, pending review:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1468526 [ovmf, pending review]

More info: