Android Things

Supported hardware: Intel® Edison, Intel® Joule, NXP Pico i.MX6UL, Raspberry Pi





OnePlus bootloader vulnerabilities


Owning a Locked OnePlus 3/3T: Bootloader Vulnerabilities
Feb 08, 2017 • Roee Hay
In this blog post I disclose two vulnerabilities in the OnePlus 3/3T bootloader. The first one, CVE-2017-5626, is a critical severity vulnerability affecting OxygenOS 3.2-4.0.1 (4.0.2 is patched). The vulnerability allows for a physical adversary (or one with ADB/fastboot access) to bypass the bootloader’s lock state, even when Allow OEM Unlocking is disabled, without user confirmation and without triggering a factory reset. This vulnerability allows for kernel code execution (albeit with a 5 seconds warning upon boot). The second vulnerability, CVE-2017-5624, affecting all versions of OxygenOS to date (Feb 10 UPDATE: OxygenOS 4.0.3, released Feb 09, seems to be patched), allows the attacker to disable dm-verity. The combination of the vulnerabilities enables a powerful attack – persistent highly privileged code execution without any warning to the user and with access to the original user’s data (after the victim enters his credentials). Both issues were responsibly disclosed to and acknowledged by OnePlus Security. The first vulnerability, CVE-2017-5626, was reported on January 23rd. It was also found independently by a OnePlus engineer. CVE-2017-5624, reported on January 16th, should be fixed in a future OxygenOS release – the reason for its today’s public disclosure is because someone already published it on January 24th. Disclaimer: I tested the vulnerabilities on OnePlus 3 only, but OnePlus 3T contains the vulnerable code too.[…[





aboot-parser: Android bootloader parser

Script to parse Android bootloader (aboot) images, extract certificates and verify image signature. May not work on aboot from latest devices. Signature verification follows the ‘Secure Boot and Image Authentication Technical Overview’ whitepaper by Qualcomm. Cf.  https://www.qualcomm.com/documents/secure-boot-and-image-authentication-technical-overview/ Aboot header format as described in  http://newandroidbook.com/Articles/aboot.html See above article for more details about aboot. Inspired by https://github.com/kayrus/kc_s701_break_free



IBM on attacking Android Custom Boot Modes

IBM’s SecurityIntelligence has a story on attacking Android’s Custom Boot Modes.

Android Vulnerabilities: Attacking Nexus 6 and 6P Custom Boot Modes
By Roee Hay
Co-authored by Michael Goberman.

In recent months, the X-Force Application Security Research Team has discovered several previously undisclosed Android vulnerabilities. The November 2016 and January 2017 Android Security Bulletins included patches to one high-severity vulnerability, CVE-2016-8467, in Nexus 6 and 6P. Our new paper, “Attacking Nexus 6 & 6P Custom Bootmodes,” discusses this vulnerability as well as CVE-2016-6678.[…]



CyanogenMod dies






Limitations of Android N encryption

The limitations of Android N Encryption
Over the past few years pixelphonewe’ve heard more about smartphone encryption than, quite frankly, most of us expected to hear in a lifetime. We learned that proper encryption can slow down even sophisticated decryption attempts if done correctly. We’ve also learned that incorrect implementations can undo most of that security. In other words, phone encryption is an area where details matter. For the past few weeks I’ve been looking a bit at Android Nougat’s new file-based encryption to see how well they’ve addressed some of those details in their latest release. The answer, unfortunately, is that there’s still lots of work to do. In this post I’m going to talk about a bit of that. […]

The limitations of Android N Encryption