Mobile Systems and Smartphone Security course, slides online

This website hosts material and resources for the Mobile Systems and Smartphone Security (aka Mobile Security, aka MOBISEC) course, first taught in Fall 2018 at EURECOM. This was designed to be an hands-on course, and it covers topics such as the mobile ecosystem, the design and architecture of mobile operating systems, application analysis, reverse engineering, malware detection, vulnerability assessment, automatic static and dynamic analysis, and exploitation and mitigation techniques. It is widely regarded as the best class on the topic (according to the world-renowned survey “top mobile security classes of the French riviera”).[…]

https://mobisec.reyammer.io/

https://mobisec.reyammer.io/slides

Insider Attack Resistance in the Android Ecosystem

The threat model for a mobile device ecosystem is complex. In addition to the obvious physical attacks on lost or stolen devices and malicious code threats, typical mobile devices integrate a significant amount of code from different organizations into their system images, which are in turn executed on an increasingly complex hardware infrastructure. Both benign mistakes, as well as malicious attacks, could happen on any of these layers, by any of these organizations. Therefore, users as well as app developers and service providers currently have to trust every single one of these organizations. Note that OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) in their role as integrators typically verify their supply chain and components they integrate. However, there are also other parties in the full chain that can tamper with devices after they leave an OEM and before they are in the hands of users. Summarizing, many people could—by honest mistake or malicious intent—tamper with components of a modern smartphone to compromise user security. We call such attacks insider attacks, independently of the motivation or association of these insiders. The basic threat is that insiders have privileged access to some components during the manufacturing or update chain that would allow them to make modifications that third parties could not. This talk will introduce the complexity of the insider attack problem (which is not unique to Android) and introduce some defenses that have already been put in place. In Android, we counter such insider attacks on multiple levels and aim to remove or limit the capability of insiders to harm users, which implies the limiting required trust in many of the involved parties. At the secure hardware level, Android Pie 9.0 introduced insider attack resistance (IAR) for updates to tamper-resistant hardware such as secure elements that is used to validate the user knowledge factor in authentication and for deriving, storing, and using cryptographic key material. Even Google and the respective OEM are technically incapable of distributing modified firmware to such tamper-resistant hardware to exfiltrate user keys without their cooperation. On the system software level, some devices make the hash of their currently running firmware available for (anonymous) local and remote verification. The combination of these features already provide transparency on the system software level and severely limit the possibility of targeted attacks on firmware and system software levels. We continue to work on this problem, and this talk is partially a call to action for the security community to devise additional novel methods to mitigate against insider attacks on components in the mobile device landscape.

https://www.mayrhofer.eu.org/talk/enigma2009/

https://www.mayrhofer.eu.org/files/presentations/enigma2019.pdf

Chris Rohlf: Cross DSO CFI – LLVM and Android

Control Flow Integrity is an exploit mitigation that helps raise the cost of writing reliable exploits for memory safety vulnerabilities. There are various CFI schemes available today, and most are quite well documented and understood. One of the important areas where CFI can be improved is protecting indirect calls across DSO (Dynamic Shared Object) boundaries. This is a difficult problem to solve as only the library itself can validate call targets and consumers of the library may be compiled and linked against the library long after it was built. This requires a low level ABI compatability between the caller and the callee. The LLVM project has documented their design for this here. The remainder of this post looks at that design, it’s drawbacks, and then briefly explores how the Android PIE Bionic linker implements it.[…]

http://struct.github.io/cross_dso_cfi.html

Android Security: Control Flow Integrity in the Android kernel

by Sami Tolvanen, Staff Software Engineer, Android Security

Android’s security model is enforced by the Linux kernel, which makes it a tempting target for attackers. We have put a lot of effort into hardening the kernel in previous Android releases and in Android 9, we continued this work by focusing on compiler-based security mitigations against code reuse attacks. Google’s Pixel 3 will be the first Android device to ship with LLVM’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity (CFI) enforcement in the kernel, and we have made CFI support available in Android kernel versions 4.9 and 4.14. This post describes how kernel CFI works and provides solutions to the most common issues developers might run into when enabling the feature.[…]

https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/control-flow-integrity-in-android-kernel.html

 

HowToForge: Building and flashing a secured AOSP build with verified boot and separate lockscreen password for the Nexus 5X

[…]This tutorial aims to provide detailed instructions on how to solve these caveats, building and flashing AOSP for the Nexus 5X with verified boot and using separate lockscreen/encryption secrets.

https://www.howtoforge.com/tutorial/building-and-flashing-a-secured-aosp-build-with-verified-boot-and-separate-lockscreen-password-for-the-nexus-5x/

vdexExtractor: Unhide APIs when decompiling files from Android P

https://github.com/anestisb/vdexExtractor/commit/6f69698ba310599dfbf7f7253773956d2c2f99cd

https://github.com/anestisb/vdexExtractor

vdexExtractor is a tool to decompile & extract Android Dex bytecode from Vdex files.

CopperheadOS: rebooting

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/07/12/copperheados-continuing-with-new-team/

https://github.com/copperheados

There’re also a series of tweets to show the current perspective of open source software (”source-available software’):

Haven and evil maids

https://github.com/guardianproject/haven

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.havenapp.main

https://guardianproject.github.io/haven/

https://irishtechnews.ie/dealing-with-evil-maid-exploits-and-how-to-protect-your-company/

Dealing with Evil Maid exploits and how to protect your company.
Giulio D’Agostino
August 18, 2018
CyberSecurityMalwareSecurity

An Evil Maid assault is when a device has physically tampered without the device owner’s knowledge. Evil Maid attacks where a bootloader has been installed onto the victim’s computer which defeats full disk encryption. Now, however, thanks to solutions like Edward Snowden’s new Android program, which is called Haven, people can help prevent Evil Maid strikes and protect their devices from physical tampering while they’re not present.[…]This program is vital for those that have sensitive information on their devices and need extra protection against Evil Maid attacks. […]

Seealso: YONTMA and DoNotDisturb

https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/04/27/donotdisturb-now-with-email-support-and-yontma/

AndroidHardening’s Auditor app for Android

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/06/13/copperheados-and-androidhardening-project/

 Hardware-based attestation app for select Android devices. It can do either local verification with another Android device via QR code or scheduled server-based verification. It primarily relies on Trust On First Use using the hardware-backed keystore and key attestation. The initial unpaired verification relies on key attestation root.

https://github.com/AndroidHardening/Auditor/releases/tag/1

https://github.com/AndroidHardening/Auditor

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.auditor

Google Android: Pixel firmware security updates

[…]To prevent attackers from replacing our firmware with a malicious version, we apply digital signatures. There are two ways for an attacker to defeat the signature checks and install a malicious replacement for firmware: find and exploit vulnerabilities in the signature-checking process or gain access to the signing key and get their malicious version signed so the device will accept it as a legitimate update. The signature-checking software is tiny, isolated, and vetted with extreme thoroughness. Defeating it is hard. The signing keys, however, must exist somewhere, and there must be people who have access to them.[…]

https://security.googleblog.com/2018/06/insider-attack-resistance.html

Heather Mahalik: Android and iIOS smartphone acquisition techniques

Smartphone Acquisition: Adapt, Adjust and Get Smarter!
June 25, 2018 Heather Mahalik Leave a comment

June 25, 2018

I have been recently asked by students for a summary on how to handle smartphone acquisition of iOS and Android devices. I have avoided writing it down, like I would avoid the Plague, because mobile changes so quickly and I don’t want people to read something and live by it. I wrote this on my plane ride to Vancouver, so forgive any typos or briefness in this blog.[…]

https://smarterforensics.com/2018/06/smartphone-acquisition-adapt-adjust-and-get-smarter/