[…]These changes will begin with our next-generation Intel® Xeon® Scalable processors (code-named Cascade Lake) as well as 8th Generation Intel® Core™ processors expected to ship in the second half of 2018.[…]
This release is the result of the community’s work over the past six months, including: retpoline Spectre variant 2 mitigation, significantly improved CodeView debug info for Windows, GlobalISel by default for AArch64 at -O0, improved scheduling on several x86 micro-architectures, Clang defaults to -std=gnu++14 instead of -std=gnu++98, support for some upcoming C++2a features, improved optimizations, new compiler warnings, many bug fixes, and more.
March 1, 2018 10:00 am
Update on Spectre and Meltdown security updates for Windows devices
By John Cable / Director of Program Management, Windows Servicing and Delivery
SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution
Guoxing Chen, Sanchuan Chen, Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin, Ten H. Lai
(Submitted on 25 Feb 2018)
This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by programs outside the enclave, the control flow of the enclave program can be temporarily altered to execute instructions that lead to observable cache-state changes. An adversary observing such changes can learn secrets inside the enclave memory or its internal registers, thus completely defeating the confidentiality guarantee offered by SGX. To demonstrate the practicality of our SgxPectre Attacks, we have systematically explored the possible attack vectors of branch target injection, approaches to win the race condition during enclave’s speculative execution, and techniques to automatically search for code patterns required for launching the attacks. Our study suggests that any enclave program could be vulnerable to SgxPectre Attacks since the desired code patterns are available in most SGX runtimes (e.g., Intel SGX SDK, Rust-SGX, and Graphene-SGX).
MeltdownPrime and SpectrePrime: Automatically-Synthesized Attacks Exploiting Invalidation-Based Coherence Protocols
Caroline Trippel, Daniel Lustig, Margaret Martonosi
The recent Meltdown and Spectre attacks highlight the importance of automated verification techniques for identifying hardware security vulnerabilities. We have developed a tool for synthesizing microarchitecture-specific programs capable of producing any user-specified hardware execution pattern of interest. Our tool takes two inputs: a formal description of (i) a microarchitecture in a domain-specific language, and (ii) a microarchitectural execution pattern of interest, e.g. a threat pattern. All programs synthesized by our tool are capable of producing the specified execution pattern on the supplied microarchitecture. We used our tool to specify a hardware execution pattern common to Flush+Reload attacks and automatically synthesized security litmus tests representative of those that have been publicly disclosed for conducting Meltdown and Spectre attacks. We also formulated a Prime+Probe threat pattern, enabling our tool to synthesize a new variant of each—MeltdownPrime and SpectrePrime. Both of these new exploits use Prime+Probe approaches to conduct the timing attack. They are both also novel in that they are 2-core attacks which leverage the cache line invalidation mechanism in modern cache coherence protocols. These are the first proposed Prime+Probe variants of Meltdown and Spectre. But more importantly, both Prime attacks exploit invalidation-based coherence protocols to achieve the same level of precision as a Flush+Reload attack. While mitigation techniques in software (e.g., barriers that prevent speculation) will likely be the same for our Prime variants as for original Spectre and Meltdown, we believe that hardware protection against them will be distinct. As a proof of concept, we implemented SpectrePrime as a C program and ran it on an Intel x86 processor, averaging about the same accuracy as Spectre over 100 runs—97.9% for Spectre and 99.95% for SpectrePrime.
The XSA on Spectre/Meltdown has been updated again, with more info on ARM firmware:
Xen Security Advisory CVE-2017-5753,CVE-2017-5715,CVE-2017-5754 / XSA-254
Information leak via side effects of speculative execution
UPDATES IN VERSION 12:
Corrections to ARM SP2 information:
* ARM 32-bit requires new firmware on some CPUs.
* Provide link to the ARM firmware page, accordingly.
* ARM 32-bit mitigations are complete for Cortex-A CPUs.
We do not have information for other ARM CPUs at this time.
Systems running all versions of Xen are affected. For SP1 and SP2, both Intel and AMD are vulnerable. Vulnerability of ARM processors to SP1 and SP2 varies by model and manufacturer. ARM has information on affected models on the following website. For SP3, only Intel processors are vulnerable. (The hypervisor cannot be attacked using SP3 on any ARM processors, even those that are listed as affected by SP3.) Furthermore, only 64-bit PV guests can exploit SP3 against Xen. PVH, HVM, and 32-bit PV guests cannot exploit SP3.
Meltdown and Spectre Vulnerabilities (Update D)
Original release date: January 11, 2018 | Last revised: February 20, 2018