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more on SCONE

Re: SCONE, mentioned here: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/01/07/secure-linux-containers-with-intel-sgx/

 

SCONE: Secure Linux Containers with Intel SGX
Sergei Arnautov, Bohdan Trach, Franz Gregor, Thomas Knauth, Andre Martin, Christian Priebe, Joshua Lind, Divya Muthukumaran, Dan O’Keeffe, Mark L Stillwell, David Goltzsche, Dave Eyers, Rüdiger Kapitza, Peter Pietzuch, Christof Fetzer

In multi-tenant environments, Linux containers managed by Docker or Kubernetes have a lower resource footprint, faster startup times, and higher I/O performance compared to virtual machines (VMs) on hypervisors. Yet their weaker isolation guarantees, enforced through software kernel mechanisms, make it easier for attackers to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of application data within containers. We describe SCONE, a secure container mechanism for Docker that uses the SGX trusted execution support of Intel CPUs to protect container processes from outside attacks. The design of SCONE leads to (i) a small trusted computing base (TCB) and (ii) a low performance overhead: SCONE offers a secure C standard library interface that transparently encrypts/decrypts I/O data; to reduce the performance impact of thread synchronization and system calls within SGX enclaves, SCONE supports user-level threading and asynchronous system calls. Our evaluation shows that it protects unmodified applications with SGX, achieving 0.6✓–1.2✓ of native throughput.[…]

https://www.usenix.org/conference/osdi16/technical-sessions/presentation/arnautov

https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi16/osdi16-arnautov.pdf

https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/conference/protected-files/osdi16_slides_knauth.pdf

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Rootkits and Bootkits book update

https://www.nostarch.com/rootkits

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Observing Rootkit Infections
Chapter 2: What’s in a Rootkit: The TDL3 Case Study (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 3: Festi Rootkit: The Most Advanced Spam Bot (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 4: Bootkit Background and History (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 5: Operating System Boot Process Essentials (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 6: Boot Process Security (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 7: Bootkit Infection Techniques (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 8: Static Analysis of a Bootkit Using IDA Pro (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 9: Bootkit Dynamic Analysis: Emulation and Virtualization (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 10: Evolving from MBR to VBR Bootkits: Olmasco (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 11: IPL Bootkits: Rovnix & Carberp (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 12: Gapz: Advanced VBR Infection (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 13: Rise of MBR Ransomware (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 14: UEFI Boot vs. the MBR/VBR Boot Process (NOW AVAILABLE)
Chapter 15: Contemporary UEFI Bootkits
Chapter 16: UEFI Firmware Vulnerabilities
Chapter 17: How Secure Boot Works
Chapter 18: HiddenFsReader: Bootkits Forensic Approaches
Chapter 19: CHIPsec: BIOS/UEFI Forensics

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Booting an Intel System Architecture

This is a 2015 paper that I just noticed.

Booting an Intel System Architecture:
Taking many little steps walking a path is a good analogy for understanding the Intel Architecture boot flow. The bare minimum firmware requirements for making an Intel architecture platform operational and for booting an OS are presented in this article in a particular order. For most of the system designs, the order of these steps are sufficient for a full or cold boot, from a state where the power is off to the handoff to the operating system. Depending on the architecture of the BIOS, there may be multiple software phases to jump through with different sets of rules, but the sequence for actually engaging the hardware is very much the same.

 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295010710_Booting_an_Intel_System_Architecture

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Tianocore BIOS setup authentication password patch

Jiewen Yao of Intel posted a V2 patch to the EDK2-devel list, adding new user authentication to Tianocore, including SMM interaction.

==== V2 ====
1) Add SmmCommunicationBufferProtocol dependency.
2) Cleanup header file and copyright to 2017.
3) Add missing UserAuthenticationSmm.uni.
4) Rename KeyLib.h/c to KeyService.h/c to avoid confusing.

This series patch adds password support in EDKII. This password based user authentication is to verify user when a user
wants to enter BIOS setup page. The detail information is added in [PATCH 5/6].

CryptoPkg:SmmCryptLib: Add real Pkcs5Pbkdf2.c.
SecurityPkg/dec: Add PcdPasswordCleared.
SecurityPkg/include: Add PlatformPasswordLib lib class.
SecurityPkg/PlatformPasswordLibNull: Add PlatformPasswordLib instance.
SecurityPkg/Password: Add Password based UserAuthentication modules.
SecurityPkg/dsc: add Password authentication module.

24 files changed, 2768 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

More info:
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel

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Lenovo: AMI BIOS SMM vulnerability

Lenovo Security Advisory: LEN-4710
Potential Impact:  Execution of code in SMM by an attacker with administrative access
Severity: Medium
Scope of impact: Industry-wide

Summary Description: System Management Mode (SMM) is the most privileged execution mode of the x86 processor. Software System Management Interrupt (SWSMI) handlers are used by software to call on BIOS functions that reside within the SMM. A vulnerability has been identified in one of the SWSMI handlers in the BIOS code from American Megatrends Inc. (AMI) used on some Lenovo systems. This could allow a malicious attacker with administrative access to execute code in the SMM and bypass some BIOS security mechanisms and install software with bootkit functionality. Mitigation Strategy for Customers (what you should do to protect yourself): Update your BIOS level to the latest version by following the instructions in the readme file. This issue only affects Lenovo products with BIOS firmware from AMI. Brands not listed, such as ThinkPad, do not use AMI firmware and are not affected by this vulnerability. Lenovo thanks Bruno Pujos of Sogeti ESEC R&D for reporting this issue.[…]

More info:

http://esec-lab.sogeti.com/posts/2016/05/30/smm-unchecked-pointer-vulnerability.html

https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/len_4710

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