Google Fuchsia






Google: exploiting Broadcom’s Wi-Fi

Google ProjectZero has an excellent blog post on Broadcom WiFi firmware.

[…]In this two-part blog series, we’ll explore the exposed attack surface introduced by Broadcom’s Wi-Fi SoC on mobile devices. Specifically, we’ll focus our attention on devices running Android, although a vast amount of this research applies to other systems including the same Wi-Fi SoCs. The first blog post will focus on exploring the Wi-Fi SoC itself; we’ll discover and exploit vulnerabilities which will allow us to remotely gain code execution on the chip. In the second blog post, we’ll further elevate our privileges from the SoC into the the operating system’s kernel. Chaining the two together, we’ll demonstrate full device takeover by Wi-Fi proximity alone, requiring no user interaction. We’ll focus on Broadcom’s Wi-Fi SoCs since they are the most common Wi-Fi chipset used on mobile devices. A partial list of devices which make use of this platform includes the Nexus 5, 6 and 6P, most Samsung flagship devices, and all iPhones since the iPhone 4. For the purpose of this blog post, we’ll demonstrate a Wi-Fi remote code execution exploit on a fully updated (at the time, now fixed) Nexus 6P, running Android 7.1.1 version NUF26K.  All the vulnerabilities in the post have been disclosed to Broadcom. Broadcom has been incredibly responsive and helpful, both in fixing the vulnerabilities and making the fixes available to affected vendors. For a complete timeline, see the bug tracker entries. They’ve also been very open to discussions relating to the security of the Wi-Fi SoC. I would like to thank Thomas Dullien (@halvarflake) for helping boot up the research, for the productive brainstorming, and for helping search the literature for any relevant clues. I’d also like to thank my colleagues in the London office for helping make sense of the exploitation constraints, and for listening to my ramblings. […]






I do not look forward to the day that most Redfish implementations are WiFi-based. 😦


U-Root: firmware solution written in Go

From 2015, something I missed because I didn’t know Go then. ;-(

U-root: A Go-based, Firmware Embeddable Root File System with On-demand Compilation
Ronald G. Minnich, Google; Andrey Mirtchovski, Cisco

U-root is an embeddable root file system intended to be placed in a FLASH device as part of the firmware image, along with a Linux kernel. The program source code is installed in the root file system contained in the firmware FLASH part and compiled on demand. All the u-root utilities, roughly corresponding to standard Unix utilities, are written in Go, a modern, type-safe language with garbage collection and language-level support for concurrency and inter-process communication. Unlike most embedded root file systems, which consist largely of binaries, U-root has only five: an init program and 4 Go compiler binaries. When a program is first run, it and any not-yet-built packages it uses are compiled to a RAM-based file system. The first invocation of a program takes a fraction of a second, as it is compiled. Packages are only compiled once, so the slowest build is always the first one, on boot, which takes about 3 seconds. Subsequent invocations are very fast, usually a millisecond or so. U-root blurs the line between script-based distros such as Perl Linux and binary-based distros such as BusyBox; it has the flexibility of Perl Linux and the performance of BusyBox. Scripts and builtins are written in Go, not a shell scripting language. U-root is a new way to package and distribute file systems for embedded systems, and the use of Go promises a dramatic improvement in their security.

Video and audio on first URL.





Android Things

Supported hardware: Intel® Edison, Intel® Joule, NXP Pico i.MX6UL, Raspberry Pi





Google on fuzzing PCIe

Fuzzing PCI express: security in plaintext
By Julia Hansbrough, Software Engineer

Google recently launched GPUs on Google Cloud Platform (GCP), which will allow customers to leverage this hardware for highly parallel workloads. These GPUs are connected to our cloud machines via a variety of PCIe switches, and that required us to have a deep understanding of PCIe security. Securing PCIe devices requires overcoming some inherent challenges. For instance, GPUs have become far more complex in the past few decades, opening up new avenues for attack. Since GPUs are designed to directly access system memory, and since hardware has historically been considered trusted, it’s difficult to ensure all the settings to keep it contained are set accurately, and difficult to ensure whether such settings even work. And since GPU manufacturers don’t make the source code or binaries available for the GPU’s main processes, we can’t examine those to gain more confidence. You can read more about the challenges presented by the PCI and PCIe specs here. With the risk of malicious behavior from compromised PCIe devices, Google needed to have a plan for combating these types of attacks, especially in a world of cloud services and publicly available virtual machines. Our approach has been to focus on mitigation: ensuring that compromised PCIe devices can’t jeopardize the security of the rest of the computer. Fuzzing to the rescue[…]



Matthew Garrett leaves CoreOS, joins Google

Matthew Garrett is leaving CoreOS and has gone to Google!




Google documents internals firmware usage

Worth reading:

Secure Boot Stack and Machine Identity

Google server machines use a variety of technologies to ensure that they are booting the correct software stack. We use cryptographic signatures over low-level components like the BIOS, bootloader, kernel, and base operating system image. These signatures can be validated during each boot or update. The components are all Google-controlled, built, and hardened. With each new generation of hardware we strive to continually improve security: for example, depending on the generation of server design, we root the trust of the boot chain in either a lockable firmware chip, a microcontroller running Google-written security code, or the above mentioned Google-designed security chip. Each server machine in the data center has its own specific identity that can be tied to the hardware root of trust and the software with which the machine booted. This identity is used to authenticate API calls to and from low-level management services on the machine. Google has authored automated systems to ensure servers run up-to-date versions of their software stacks (including security patches), to detect and diagnose hardware and software problems, and to remove machines from service if necessary.