Uncategorized

Trust Issues: Exploiting TrustZone TEEs

by Gal Beniamini, Project Zero

Mobile devices are becoming an increasingly privacy-sensitive platform. Nowadays, devices process a wide range of personal and private information of a sensitive nature, such as biometric identifiers, payment data and cryptographic keys. Additionally, modern content protection schemes demand a high degree of confidentiality, requiring stricter guarantees than those offered by the “regular” operating system. In response to these use-cases and more, mobile device manufacturers have opted for the creation of a “Trusted Execution Environment” (TEE), which can be used to safeguard the information processed within it. In the Android ecosystem, two major TEE implementations exist – Qualcomm’s QSEE and Trustonic’s Kinibi (formerly <t-base). Both of these implementations rely on ARM TrustZone security extensions in order to facilitate a small “secure” operating system, within which “Trusted Applications” (TAs) may be executed. In this blog post we’ll explore the security properties of the two major TEEs present on Android devices. We’ll see how, despite their highly sensitive vantage point, these operating systems currently lag behind modern operating systems in terms of security mitigations and practices. Additionally, we’ll discover and exploit a major design issue which affects the security of most devices utilising both platforms. Lastly, we’ll see why the integrity of TEEs is crucial to the overall security of the device, making a case for the need to increase their defences. […]

 

https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/07/trust-issues-exploiting-trustzone-tees.html

Standard
Uncategorized

Google NERF: Non-Extensible Reduced Firmware

 

Open Source Summit North America 2017
September 11-14, 2017 – Los Angeles, CA
Replace Your Exploit-Ridden Firmware with Linux – Ronald Minnich, Google

With the WikiLeaks release of the vault7 material, the security of the UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) firmware used in most PCs and laptops is once again a concern. UEFI is a proprietary and closed-source operating system, with a codebase almost as large as the Linux kernel, that runs when the system is powered on and continues to run after it boots the OS (hence its designation as a “Ring -2 hypervisor”). It is a great place to hide exploits since it never stops running, and these exploits are undetectable by kernels and programs. Our answer to this is NERF (Non-Extensible Reduced Firmware), an open source software system developed at Google to replace almost all of UEFI firmware with a tiny Linux kernel and initramfs. The initramfs file system contains an init and command line utilities from the u-root project (http://u-root.tk/), which are written in the Go language.

https://ossna2017.sched.com/event/BCsr/replace-your-exploit-ridden-firmware-with-linux-ronald-minnich-google?iframe=no&w=100%&sidebar=yes&bg=no

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/open-hardware-servers-step-forward-jean-marie-verdun

https://www.coreboot.org/images/6/66/Denver_2017_coreboot_u-root.pdf

https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/02/21/u-root-firmware-solution-written-in-go/

https://linuxfr.org/news/un-pas-en-avant-pour-les-serveurs-libres-le-projet-nerf

Standard
Uncategorized

initroot: Bypassing Nexus 6 Secure Boot through Kernel Command-line Injection

initroot: Bypassing Nexus 6 Secure Boot through Kernel Command-line Injection
By Roee Hay (@roeehay)
In the May 2017 Android Security Bulletin, Google released a patch to a critical and unique vulnerability CVE-2016-10277 in the Nexus 6 bootloader we had found and responsibly disclosed. By exploiting the vulnerability, a physical adversary or one with authorized-ADB/fastboot USB access to the (bootloader-locked) device (such as PC malware awaiting for an ADB-authorized developer’s device to be hooked via USB) could break the Secure/Verified Boot mechanism, allowing him to gain unrestricted root privileges, and completely own the user space (which may also lead much more), by loading a tampered or malicious initramfs image. Moreover, exploitation does not lead to a factory reset hence user data remains intact (and still encrypted). It should be noted that we do not demonstrate an untethered attack. During this research we also uncovered a 18-year-old Linux Kernel bug (not affecting Nexus 6 and probably does not affect any Android device): CVE-2017-1000363[…]

https://alephsecurity.com/2017/05/23/nexus6-initroot/

Standard
Uncategorized

Google Fuchsia

https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/
https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/magenta/
https://github.com/fuchsia-mirror

http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/software/a-modern-os-from-google
http://www.osdrawer.net/fuchsia-googles-new-operating-system/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Fuchsia

https://firmwaresecurity.com/2016/08/15/uefi-bootloader-for-google-fuchsia/

 

Standard
Uncategorized

Google: exploiting Broadcom’s Wi-Fi

Google ProjectZero has an excellent blog post on Broadcom WiFi firmware.

[…]In this two-part blog series, we’ll explore the exposed attack surface introduced by Broadcom’s Wi-Fi SoC on mobile devices. Specifically, we’ll focus our attention on devices running Android, although a vast amount of this research applies to other systems including the same Wi-Fi SoCs. The first blog post will focus on exploring the Wi-Fi SoC itself; we’ll discover and exploit vulnerabilities which will allow us to remotely gain code execution on the chip. In the second blog post, we’ll further elevate our privileges from the SoC into the the operating system’s kernel. Chaining the two together, we’ll demonstrate full device takeover by Wi-Fi proximity alone, requiring no user interaction. We’ll focus on Broadcom’s Wi-Fi SoCs since they are the most common Wi-Fi chipset used on mobile devices. A partial list of devices which make use of this platform includes the Nexus 5, 6 and 6P, most Samsung flagship devices, and all iPhones since the iPhone 4. For the purpose of this blog post, we’ll demonstrate a Wi-Fi remote code execution exploit on a fully updated (at the time, now fixed) Nexus 6P, running Android 7.1.1 version NUF26K.  All the vulnerabilities in the post have been disclosed to Broadcom. Broadcom has been incredibly responsive and helpful, both in fixing the vulnerabilities and making the fixes available to affected vendors. For a complete timeline, see the bug tracker entries. They’ve also been very open to discussions relating to the security of the Wi-Fi SoC. I would like to thank Thomas Dullien (@halvarflake) for helping boot up the research, for the productive brainstorming, and for helping search the literature for any relevant clues. I’d also like to thank my colleagues in the London office for helping make sense of the exploitation constraints, and for listening to my ramblings. […]

https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air-exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1046#c2

http://www.wi-fi.org/product-finder-results?sort_by=default&sort_order=desc&categories=1,2,4,6,7,5,9,3&certifications=38

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14034092

https://arstechnica.com/security/2017/04/wide-range-of-android-phones-vulnerable-to-device-hijacks-over-wi-fi/

I do not look forward to the day that most Redfish implementations are WiFi-based. 😦

Standard
Uncategorized

U-Root: firmware solution written in Go

From 2015, something I missed because I didn’t know Go then. ;-(

U-root: A Go-based, Firmware Embeddable Root File System with On-demand Compilation
Ronald G. Minnich, Google; Andrey Mirtchovski, Cisco

U-root is an embeddable root file system intended to be placed in a FLASH device as part of the firmware image, along with a Linux kernel. The program source code is installed in the root file system contained in the firmware FLASH part and compiled on demand. All the u-root utilities, roughly corresponding to standard Unix utilities, are written in Go, a modern, type-safe language with garbage collection and language-level support for concurrency and inter-process communication. Unlike most embedded root file systems, which consist largely of binaries, U-root has only five: an init program and 4 Go compiler binaries. When a program is first run, it and any not-yet-built packages it uses are compiled to a RAM-based file system. The first invocation of a program takes a fraction of a second, as it is compiled. Packages are only compiled once, so the slowest build is always the first one, on boot, which takes about 3 seconds. Subsequent invocations are very fast, usually a millisecond or so. U-root blurs the line between script-based distros such as Perl Linux and binary-based distros such as BusyBox; it has the flexibility of Perl Linux and the performance of BusyBox. Scripts and builtins are written in Go, not a shell scripting language. U-root is a new way to package and distribute file systems for embedded systems, and the use of Go promises a dramatic improvement in their security.

Video and audio on first URL.

https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc15/technical-session/presentation/minnich

https://github.com/u-root/u-root

http://u-root.tk/

Standard