[…]Death Metal is a toolkit designed to exploit AMT’s legitimate features, as the AMT framework’s functionality, designed for innocent system administration purposes, inadvertently allows these features to be used by hackers for surreptitious persistence. This is because many of the legitimate features violate the expectations of sysadmins and endpoint protection software. I liken AMT to “lolbins,” which is a short form of “living off the land binary,” but instead of operating at a software level, Death Metal operates from a hardware level. With the Death Metal suite, we are essentially misusing and abusing mainstream commercial functionality in unexpected ways. Within the information security community, attacks against AMT itself are not news; however, Death Metal will introduce new ways to begin attacking the AMT framework in a practical, red-team fashion.[…]
In an effort to continuously improve the robustness of the Intel® Converged Security Management Engine (Intel® CSME), Intel has performed a security review of its Intel® CSME with the objective of continuously enhancing firmware resilience. As a result, Intel has identified security vulnerabilities that could potentially place affected platforms at risk.[…]
Intel has a new AMT command line tool — not a GUI! — for Windows and Linux:
Intel Active Management Technology MEBx Access Control Bypass
Scope of Impact: Industry-wide
Lenovo Security Advisory: LEN-19568
Potential Impact: Remote access and control
Intel has issued an advisory for Intel vPro Active Management Technology (AMT) to all system manufacturers. The Intel AMT default configuration has weak security around the Management Engine BIOS Extension (MEBx) password.[…]
ThinkPad – Updates coming soon
Intel AMT Security Issue Lets Attackers Bypass Login Credentials in Corporate Laptops
Insecure defaults in Intel AMT allow an intruder to completely bypass user and BIOS passwords and TPM and Bitlocker PINs to backdoor almost any corporate laptop in a matter of seconds.
Helsinki, Finland – January 12, 2018: F-Secure reports a security issue affecting most corporate laptops that allows an attacker with physical access to backdoor a device in less than 30 seconds. The issue allows the attacker to bypass the need to enter credentials, including BIOS and Bitlocker passwords and TPM pins, and to gain remote access for later exploitation. It exists within Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT) and potentially affects millions of laptops globally. The security issue “is almost deceptively simple to exploit, but it has incredible destructive potential,” said Harry Sintonen, who investigated the issue in his role as Senior Security Consultant at F-Secure. “In practice, it can give an attacker complete control over an individual’s work laptop, despite even the most extensive security measures.”[…]
Meshcommander is an Intel AMT tool from Intel. Previously, I thought it was a Windows-only thing, but the current release has Linux and Mac support as well as Windows!
Intel has released an updated version of MeshCentral2, an Intel AMT-based management tool for Windows. New version has “server peering” support, which I confess I don’t yet understand what that means, but sounds signficant, something to learn about…
[…]MeshCentral2 is a free open source web-based remote computer management solution allowing administrators to setup new servers in minutes and start remotely controlling computers using both software agent and Intel® AMT. The server works both in a LAN environment and over the Internet in a WAN setup. Now, I just released a new version with support for server-to-server peering allowing for improved fail-over robustness and scaling. Some technical details:
* Servers connect to each-other using secure web sockets on port 443. This is just like browsers and Mesh agents, so you can setup a fully working peered server installation with only port 443 being open.
* Server peering and mesh agent connections use a secondary authentication certificate allowing the server HTTPS public certificate (presented to browser) to be changed. This allows MeshCentral2 peer servers to be setup with different HTTPS certificates. As a result, MeshCentral2 can be setup in a multi-geo configuration.
* All of the peering is real-time. As servers peer together and devices connect to the servers, users see a real-time view on the web page of what devices are available for management. No page refresh required.
* MeshCentral2 supports TLS-offload hardware for all connections including Intel® AMT CIRA even when peering. So, MeshCentral2 servers can benefit from the added scaling of TLS offload accelerators.
* Fully support server peering for Browsers, Mesh Agents and Intel® AMT connections.
* The server peering system does not use the database at all to exchange state data. This boosts the efficiency of the servers because the database is only used for long term data storage, not real time state.
* There is no limit to how many servers you can peer, however I currently only tested a two server configuration.
Intel has updated documentation on developing for Intel AMT:
Intel AMT® Upgradable to Vulnerable Firmware
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00082
Product family: Intel AMT®
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Moderate
Original release: Sep 05, 2017
Last revised: Sep 05, 2017
Intel® Active Management Technology, Intel® Standard Manageability, and Intel® Small Business Technology firmware versions 126.96.36.19901 and 188.8.131.5200 can be upgraded to firmware version 11.6.x.1xxx which is vulnerable to CVE-2017-5689 and can be performed by a local user with administrative privileges.This version of firmware can potentially impact Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT), Intel® Standard Manageability (ISM) or Intel® Small Business Technology (SBT). Consumer PCs with consumer firmware and data center servers using Intel® Server Platform Services are not affected by this vulnerability. Intel recommends that users contact their system manufacturers for updated firmware which mitigates this issue. This issue was discovered during Intel internal validation.[…]
Intel AMT authentication bypass example: This is a Proof-of-Concept code that demonstrates the exploitation of the CVE-2017-5689 vulnerability. It is essentialy a mitmproxy script that simply blanks an Authorization header “response” field. Example usage:
mitmdump -p 8080 -dd –no-http2 -s blank_auth_res
Look here for presentation and white paper links:
GIGABYTE Updating BIOS for Q270 and Q170 Series Motherboards in Response to Intel Updates
Taipei, Taiwan, July 12th, 2017 – GIGABYTE TECHNOLOGY Co. Ltd., a leading manufacturer of motherboards and graphics cards, announces that it is in the process to update BIOS for Q270, Q170, and X170-WS ECC Series Motherboards. Based on latest Intel ME firmware updates, GIGABYTE will update BIOS for Q270 and models of previous chipsets accordingly to ensure the models meet latest security standards. GIGABYTE updated the BIOS for X170, X150, B150 and B250 models that are already available on GBT website. On the other hand, GIGABYTE is also updating Q87, Q85, B85, and other impacted models. The updates will be available shortly on the GBT website. For updates to these Motherboards please visit their respective product pages or speak with your technical support team for assistance. GIGABYTE strives to make sure users receive the best-in-class performance while maintaining the upmost security for all products.
Now that Intel® AMT 11.6 is released, it’s finally time to circle back and highlight a big new feature of 11.6 that has been in the works for a long time: Web Storage and the ability for the default Intel® AMT web UI to be replaced. Ever since the start, Intel® AMT has always had a basic web page you could access with any browser. Because it’s all out-of-band, you could access the web page from a browser even if the target computer was soft-off, sleeping or had a non-functioning operating system. Over the last 10 years, the web has come a long way. The built-in Intel® AMT web page offers basic capabilities, but we can do a lot better now with HTML5 and WebSockets.[…]
A few days ago, Paul English of PreOS Security wrote a blog post giving an brief overview of the recent Intel AMT vulnerability.
[Note: We’re going to try and post a blog entry for major firmware vulnerabilities that impact enterprises, and the recent Intel AMT vulnerability seems like a good place to start.]
[Disclaimer: I work with Paul, at PreOS Security.]
Siemens has updated their products for Intel AMT vulnerability:
Today Intel announced a NEW AMT security advisory:
Intel® AMT Clickjacking Vulnerability
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00081
Product family: Intel® Active Management Technology
Impact of vulnerability: Information Disclosure
Severity rating: Moderate
Original release: Jun 05, 2017
Insufficient clickjacking protection in the Web User Interface of Intel® AMT firmware versions before 184.108.40.206, 220.127.116.112, 10.0.0.50.1004 and 18.104.22.1685 potentially allowing a remote attacker to hijack users’s web clicks via attacker’s crafted web page. Affected products: Intel AMT firmware versions before 22.214.171.124, 126.96.36.1992, 10.0.0.50.1004 and 188.8.131.525. Intel highly recommends that users update to the latest version of firmware available from their equipment manufacturer. Intel would like to thank Lenovo for reporting this issue and working with us on coordinated disclosure.[…]
After the recent Microsoft mention of AMT being used by malware, there is a bit more on the press on AMT:
If you thought the recent Intel AMT security issues was just theoretical, here’s an example of malware using AMT.
During the initial Intel AMT bug report, Xeno of Apple tweeted that Apple didn’t use AMT.
Recently, Microsoft has also stated that the Surface devices don’t use AMT: