Intel-SA-00112: Q1’18 AMT 9.x/10.x/11.x Security Review Cumulative Update

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/07/11/intel-releases-a-dozen-new-security-advisories/

In an effort to continuously improve the robustness of the Intel® Converged Security Management Engine (Intel® CSME), Intel has performed a security review of its Intel® CSME with the objective of continuously enhancing firmware resilience. As a result, Intel has identified security vulnerabilities that could potentially place affected platforms at risk.[…]

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00112.html

 

Lenovo: Intel AMT MEBx Access Control Bypass

Intel Active Management Technology MEBx Access Control Bypass
2018-02-08
Initial Release

Scope of Impact: Industry-wide
Lenovo Security Advisory: LEN-19568

Potential Impact: Remote access and control
Severity: Critical

Intel has issued an advisory for Intel vPro Active Management Technology (AMT) to all system manufacturers. The Intel AMT default configuration has weak security around the Management Engine BIOS Extension (MEBx) password.[…]

ThinkPad – Updates coming soon
ThinkServer- Researching

https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-19568

https://sintonen.fi/advisories/intel-active-management-technology-mebx-bypass.txt

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000020917/software/manageability-products.html

https://www.intel.com/content/dam/support/us/en/documents/technologies/Intel_AMT_Security_Best_Practices_QA.pdf

http://thinkdeploy.blogspot.com/2016/08/the-think-bios-config-tool.html

 

 

F-Secure: new Intel AMT security issue

Intel AMT Security Issue Lets Attackers Bypass Login Credentials in Corporate Laptops

Intel AMT Security Issue Lets Attackers Bypass Login Credentials in Corporate Laptops
Insecure defaults in Intel AMT allow an intruder to completely bypass user and BIOS passwords and TPM and Bitlocker PINs to backdoor almost any corporate laptop in a matter of seconds.

Helsinki, Finland – January 12, 2018: F-Secure reports a security issue affecting most corporate laptops that allows an attacker with physical access to backdoor a device in less than 30 seconds. The issue allows the attacker to bypass the need to enter credentials, including BIOS and Bitlocker passwords and TPM pins, and to gain remote access for later exploitation. It exists within Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT) and potentially affects millions of laptops globally. The security issue “is almost deceptively simple to exploit, but it has incredible destructive potential,” said Harry Sintonen, who investigated the issue in his role as Senior Security Consultant at F-Secure. “In practice, it can give an attacker complete control over an individual’s work laptop, despite even the most extensive security measures.”[…]

 

Intel MeshCommander (AMT tool): now available for Mac and Linux (not just Windows)

Meshcommander is an Intel AMT tool from Intel. Previously, I thought it was a Windows-only thing, but the current release has Linux and Mac support as well as Windows!

https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2018/01/08/meshcommander-for-npm-linux-osx-windows

http://www.meshcommander.com/meshcentral2

http://www.meshcommander.com/meshcommander

https://www.npmjs.com/package/meshcommander

https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/f1/ca/NPM-MC-MultiOS.png

Intel MeshCentral2 updated with Load Balancer & Peering Support

Intel has released an updated version of MeshCentral2, an Intel AMT-based management tool for Windows. New version has “server peering” support, which I confess I don’t yet understand what that means, but sounds signficant, something to learn about…

[…]MeshCentral2 is a free open source web-based remote computer management solution allowing administrators to setup new servers in minutes and start remotely controlling computers using both software agent and Intel® AMT. The server works both in a LAN environment and over the Internet in a WAN setup. Now, I just released a new version with support for server-to-server peering allowing for improved fail-over robustness and scaling. Some technical details:

* Servers connect to each-other using secure web sockets on port 443. This is just like browsers and Mesh agents, so you can setup a fully working peered server installation with only port 443 being open.
* Server peering and mesh agent connections use a secondary authentication certificate allowing the server HTTPS public certificate (presented to browser) to be changed. This allows MeshCentral2 peer servers to be setup with different HTTPS certificates. As a result, MeshCentral2 can be setup in a multi-geo configuration.
* All of the peering is real-time. As servers peer together and devices connect to the servers, users see a real-time view on the web page of what devices are available for management. No page refresh required.
* MeshCentral2 supports TLS-offload hardware for all connections including Intel® AMT CIRA even when peering. So, MeshCentral2 servers can benefit from the added scaling of TLS offload accelerators.
* Fully support server peering for Browsers, Mesh Agents and Intel® AMT connections.
* The server peering system does not use the database at all to exchange state data. This boosts the efficiency of the servers because the database is only used for long term data storage, not real time state.
* There is no limit to how many servers you can peer, however I currently only tested a two server configuration.

https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2017/09/21/meshcentral2-load-balancer-peering-support

http://www.meshcommander.com/meshcentral2

https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/ce/37/MeshCentral2-DualServer.png

 

Intel AMT Upgradable to Vulnerable Firmware

Intel AMT® Upgradable to Vulnerable Firmware
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00082
Product family: Intel AMT®
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Moderate
Original release: Sep 05, 2017
Last revised: Sep 05, 2017

Intel® Active Management Technology, Intel® Standard Manageability, and Intel® Small Business Technology firmware versions 11.0.25.3001 and 11.0.26.3000 can be upgraded to firmware version 11.6.x.1xxx which is vulnerable to CVE-2017-5689 and can be performed by a local user with administrative privileges.This version of firmware can potentially impact Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT), Intel® Standard Manageability (ISM) or Intel® Small Business Technology (SBT). Consumer PCs with consumer firmware and data center servers using Intel® Server Platform Services are not affected by this vulnerability. Intel recommends that users contact their system manufacturers for updated firmware which mitigates this issue. This issue was discovered during Intel internal validation.[…]

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00082&languageid=en-fr

 

Intel AMT PoC for CVE-2017-5698

 

Intel AMT authentication bypass example: This is a Proof-of-Concept code that demonstrates the exploitation of the CVE-2017-5689 vulnerability. It is essentialy a mitmproxy script that simply blanks an Authorization header “response” field. Example usage:

mitmdump -p 8080 -dd –no-http2 -s blank_auth_res

https://github.com/embedi/amt_auth_bypass_poc

Look here for presentation and white paper links:
https://www.embedi.com/news/intel-amt-some-new-stealth-vector-attacks-and-good-old-vulnerabilities

Gigabyte update for Intel AMT vulnerability

https://www.gigabyte.com/Press/News/1562

 

GIGABYTE Updating BIOS for Q270 and Q170 Series Motherboards in Response to Intel Updates

2017/07/12

Taipei, Taiwan, July 12th, 2017 – GIGABYTE TECHNOLOGY Co. Ltd., a leading manufacturer of motherboards and graphics cards, announces that it is in the process to update BIOS for Q270, Q170, and X170-WS ECC Series Motherboards. Based on latest Intel ME firmware updates, GIGABYTE will update BIOS for Q270 and models of previous chipsets accordingly to ensure the models meet latest security standards. GIGABYTE updated the BIOS for X170, X150, B150 and B250 models that are already available on GBT website. On the other hand, GIGABYTE is also updating Q87, Q85, B85, and other impacted models. The updates will be available shortly on the GBT website. For updates to these Motherboards please visit their respective product pages or speak with your technical support team for assistance. GIGABYTE strives to make sure users receive the best-in-class performance while maintaining the upmost security for all products.

http://techreport.com/news/32237/gigabyte-begins-rolling-out-bios-updates-to-close-intel-amt-hole

https://www.eteknix.com/gigabyte-bios-fix-intel-mangeability/

Intel AMT and JavaScript

Now that Intel® AMT 11.6 is released, it’s finally time to circle back and highlight a big new feature of 11.6 that has been in the works for a long time: Web Storage and the ability for the default Intel® AMT web UI to be replaced. Ever since the start, Intel® AMT has always had a basic web page you could access with any browser. Because it’s all out-of-band, you could access the web page from a browser even if the target computer was soft-off, sleeping or had a non-functioning operating system. Over the last 10 years, the web has come a long way. The built-in Intel® AMT web page offers basic capabilities, but we can do a lot better now with HTML5 and WebSockets.[…]

https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2017/02/13/meshcommander-v044-released

https://software.intel.com/en-us/search/site/language/en?query=AMT

Siemens updates for Intel AMT

Siemens has updated their products for Intel AMT vulnerability:

https://www.siemens.com/cert/pool/cert/siemens_security_advisory_ssa-874235.pdf

https://threatpost.com/siemens-patches-critical-intel-amt-flaw-in-industrial-products/126652/
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/03/intel_amt_bug_bit_siemens_industrial_pcs/

Intel AMT Clickjacking Vulnerability (INTEL-SA-00081)

Today Intel announced a NEW AMT security advisory:

Intel® AMT Clickjacking Vulnerability
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00081
Product family: Intel® Active Management Technology
Impact of vulnerability: Information Disclosure
Severity rating: Moderate
Original release: Jun 05, 2017

Insufficient clickjacking protection in the Web User Interface of Intel® AMT firmware versions before 9.1.40.100, 9.5.60.1952, 10.0.0.50.1004 and 11.0.0.1205 potentially allowing a remote attacker to hijack users’s web clicks via attacker’s crafted web page. Affected products: Intel AMT firmware versions before 9.1.40.100, 9.5.60.1952, 10.0.0.50.1004 and 11.0.0.1205. Intel highly recommends that users update to the latest version of firmware available from their equipment manufacturer. Intel would like to thank Lenovo for reporting this issue and working with us on coordinated disclosure.[…]

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00081&languageid=en-fr

 

More on malware use of Intel AMT

After the recent Microsoft mention of AMT being used by malware, there is a bit more on the press on AMT:

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-uses-obscure-intel-cpu-feature-to-steal-data-and-avoid-firewalls/

Microsoft on malware use of Intel AMT

If you thought the recent Intel AMT security issues was just theoretical, here’s an example of malware using AMT.

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/06/07/platinum-continues-to-evolve-find-ways-to-maintain-invisibility/?platform=hootsuite

Intel AMT, continued

Matthew Garrett has a new tool to check for AMT on Linux:

If AMT is enabled and provisioned and the AMT version is between 6.0 and 11.2, and you have not upgraded your firmware, you are vulnerable to CVE-2017-5689. Disable AMT in your system firmware.

https://github.com/mjg59/mei-amt-check

A little bird told me some info about Intel AMT and Linux:

* Some BMC/IPMI devices also listen on port 623 because they support the same asf-rmcp protocol. So if you are using nmap to scan networks you may see false positives from these devices.

* The Intel OpenAMT tool can be used on Linux to determine if AMT is enabled. The procedure is something like:
  * build with: ./configure;make
  * on the system to test, load the mei modules with: modprobe mei-me
  * run the src/lms binary (only uses standard libraries, no need to ‘make install’)
  * check daemon.log, not enabled should be something like “LMS: Cannot connect to Intel AMT via MEI driver”
  * clean up by killing the running lms process, removing the lms binary, and unloading the mei modules: rmmod mei-me mei
https://sourceforge.net/projects/openamt/

* On Linux, blacklisting the mei-me/mei modules will prevent local access to AMT, but doesn’t help if it’s already enabled.