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NXP: designing IoT devices with secure boot

NXP has a webinar for IoT makers, talking about secure booting. ‘Webinar’ scared me, but there’s no registration required. 🙂

Watch this on-demand presentation to learn how to:
* Manage the life cycle of an IoT edge node from development to deployment.
* Leverage hardware and software offerings available with the Kinetis MCU portfolio that can help you protect against attacks.
* Ease the burden of secure IoT edge node development using new processors and architectures from ARM.

https://community.arm.com/processors/trustzone-for-armv8-m/b/blog/posts/designing-secure-iot-devices-starts-with-a-secure-boot

http://www.nxp.com/video/designing-secure-iot-devices-starts-with-a-secure-boot:DESIGNING-SECURE-IOT-DEVICES

slides: https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/supporting-information/Designing-Secure-IoT-Devices-Starts-with-a-Secure-Boot.pdf

http://www.nxp.com/docs/en/supporting-information/Designing-Secure-IoT-Devices-Starts-with-a-Secure-Boot.pdf

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Matthew on improving UEFI Secure Boot on Linux with TPMs

http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/48897.html

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IBM OpenPower secure and trusted boot, Part 2

OpenPOWER secure and trusted boot, Part 2
Protecting system firmware with OpenPOWER secure boot
Making your system safe against boot code cyberattacks
Dave Heller and Nageswara Sastry
Published on June 05, 2017

This content is part 2 of 2 in the series: OpenPOWER secure and trusted boot. IBM® OpenPOWER servers offer two essential security features, trusted boot and secure boot, to help ensure the integrity of your server and safeguard against a boot code cyberattack. Trusted boot works by creating secure recordings, or measurements, of executable code as the system boots. Using a process known as remote attestation, you can retrieve these measurements securely and use them to verify the integrity of your firmware or target operating system (OS). Secure boot helps ensure the integrity of your OS and firmware as well. But rather than taking measurements for later examination, secure boot performs the validation in place, during boot, and will halt the boot process if the validation fails. These two features are complementary and work together to provide comprehensive protection of platform boot code. This article explores the secure boot method, with particular focus on protection of system firmware.[…]

https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/library/l-protect-system-firmware-openpower/

Part 1 is from Feburary:

https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-trusted-boot-openPOWER-trs/index.html?ca=drs-

 

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sicherboot: systemd Secure boot integration

systemd Secure boot integration

sicher*boot automatically installs systemd-boot and kernels for it into the ESP, signed with keys generated by it. The signing keys are stored unencrypted and only protected by the file system permissions. Thus, you should make sure that the file system they are stored (usually /etc) in is encrypted. After installing sicherboot, you can adjust a number of settings in /etc/sicherboot.conf and should set a kernel commandline in /etc/kernel/cmdline. Then run ‘sicherboot setup’ to get started.

 

https://github.com/julian-klode/sicherboot

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Mike on Windows Config Mgr and Secure Boot

Mike Terrill has 2 blog posts on Windows Configuration Manager and UEFI Secure Boot:

BIOS and Secure Boot State Detection during a Task Sequence
With all of the security issues and malware lately, BIOS to UEFI for Windows 10 deployments is becoming a pretty hot topic (unless you have been living under a rock, UEFI is required for a lot of the advanced security functions in Windows 10). In addition, with the Windows 10 Creators Update, Microsoft has introduced a new utility called MBR2GPT that makes the move to UEFI a non-destructive process. If you have already started deploying Windows 10 UEFI devices, it can be tricky to determine what state these devices are in during a running Task Sequence. The Configuration Manager Team introduced a new class called SMS_Firmware and inventory property called UEFI that helps determine which computers are running in UEFI in Current Branch 1702. This can be used to build queries for targeting and reports, but it would be nice to handle this plus Secure Boot state (and CSM) during a running Task Sequence. We do have the Task Sequence variable called _SMSTSBootUEFI that we will use, but we need to determine the exact configuration in order to execute the correct steps.[…]

https://miketerrill.net/2017/05/13/bios-and-secure-boot-state-detection-during-a-task-sequence/

https://miketerrill.net/2017/05/30/bios-and-secure-boot-state-detection-during-a-task-sequence-part-2/

 

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UEFI-SecureBoot-SignTool

Aneesh Neelam has written UEFI-SecureBoot-SignTool, a script to sign external Linux kernel modules for UEFI Secure Boot.


UEFI Secure Boot sign tool

The default signed Linux kernel on Ubuntu (>=16.04.x), Fedora (>=18) and perhaps on other distributions as well, won’t load unsigned external kernel modules if Secure Boot is enabled on UEFI systems. Hence, any external kernel modules like the proprietary Nvidia kernel driver, Oracle VM VirtualBox’s host/guest kernel driver etc. won’t work. External kernel modules must be signed for UEFI Secure Boot using a Machine Owner Key (MOK). You can use the UEFI Secure Boot Sign Tool to sign kernel modules. This is useful if you can’t or don’t wish to disable Secure Boot on your UEFI-enabled system.[…]

https://github.com/aneesh-neelam/UEFI-SecureBoot-SignTool

 

 

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Secure Boot BOF at DebConf17

Helen Koike of Collabora has proposed a BOF on UEFI Secure Boot at DebConf17, this August:

DebConf17 – BoF proposal to discuss secure boot
I want to send a BoF proposal to DebConf17 so we can meet there and discuss about secure boot. I would like to know if you are interested in attending and also which topics you suggest for discussion. I would appreciate if you could put your name and suggestions in this form in case you are interested https://goo.gl/forms/lHoEibY1H6FmSHSJ2 , or just reply to this email thread.

For full message, see the debian-efi mailing list archives.

https://lists.debian.org/debian-efi/2017/05/threads.html

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdtHYNy9212iXP26tkjbb6XvgVSMjJzn2DYoAilFT1l89vemw/viewform?c=0&w=1

https://debconf17.debconf.org/

 

 

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