Two more BadUSB-related articles

http://blog.sevagas.com/?Advanced-USB-key-phishing

https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-tick-group-weaponized-secure-usb-drives-target-air-gapped-critical-systems/

WooKey: USB Devices Strike Back

WooKey: USB Devices Strike Back
Date : 13 juin 2018 à 17:15 — 30 min.

The USB bus has been a growing subject of research in recent years. In particular, securing the USB stack (and hence the USB hosts and devices) started to draw interest from the academic community since major exploitable flaws have been revealed by the BadUSB threat. The work presented in this paper takes place in the design initiatives that have emerged to thwart such attacks. While some proposals have focused on the host side by enhancing the Operating System’s USB sub-module robustness, or by adding a proxy between the host and the device, we have chosen to focus our efforts on the device side.

https://www.sstic.org/2018/presentation/wookey_usb_devices_strike_back/

https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2018/SSTIC-actes/wookey_usb_devices_strike_back/SSTIC2018-Slides-wookey_usb_devices_strike_back-michelizza_lefaure_renard_thierry_trebuchet_benadjila_WUAopX7.pdf

 

CIRCLean: USB Sanitizer

https://www.circl.lu/projects/CIRCLean/

Malware regularly uses USB sticks to infect victims, and the abuse of USB sticks is a common vector of infection (as an example Lost USB keys have 66% chance of malware). CIRCLean is an independent hardware solution to clean documents from untrusted (obtained) USB keys / USB sticks. The device automatically converts untrusted documents into a readable but disarmed format and stores these clean files on a trusted (user owned) USB key/stick. The focus of CIRCLean is to establish document exchange even if the used transport layer (the USB stick) cannot be trusted or if there is a suspicion about whether the contained documents are free of malware or not. In the worst case, only the CIRCLean would be compromised, but not the computer reading the target (trusted) USB key/stick. The code runs on a Raspberry Pi (a small hardware device), which also means it is not required to plug the original USB key into a computer. CIRCLean can be seen as a kind of air gap between the untrusted USB key and your operational computer. CIRCLean does not require any technical prerequisites of any kind and can be used by anyone. CIRCLean is free software which can be audited and analyzed by third-parties. We also invite all organizations to actively reuse CIRCLean in their own products or contribute to the project.[…]

CIRCLean logo

more on WebUSB and recent YubiCo vuln

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/06/14/yubico-vs-security-researchers/

here’s a bit more on WebUSB and recent YubiKey vuln, latter blog post has great background on WebUSB tech.

http://pwnaccelerator.github.io/2018/webusb-yubico-disclosure.html

https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/webusb/

https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2016/03/access-usb-devices-on-the-web

From intro paragraph of Google’s intro to WebUSB (emphasis theirs):

“[…]But most importantly this will make USB safer and easier to use by bringing it to the Web.”

LOL

PS: Anyone here a Wikipedia editor? This page needs an entry for WebUSB:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:USB

and perhaps a dedicated page for WebUSB not just:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Chrome

Besides WebUSB and Wireless USB, what other scary OOB interfaces to USB exist?! I really need to spend more time learning USB properly…

Un-Sexy Headline: USB Restricted Mode Will Improve iPhone User Security

By Riana Pfefferkorn on June 14, 2018 at 4:01 pm

In the upcoming version of the Apple iPhone iOS operating system, iOS 12, the phone’s Lightning cable port (used for charging and data transmission) will be disabled an hour after the phone is locked. The device will still charge, but transferring data to or from the device via the Lightning cable will require entering the device’s password first. Connecting to the data port via Lightning cable is what third-party forensic devices called Cellebrite and GrayKey rely upon to extract data from locked, encrypted iPhones. These tools (made, respectively, by the eponymous Cellebrite and a company called Grayshift) are employed by U.S. law enforcement agencies at federal, state, and local levels. Unsurprisingly, just about everybody covering the story is framing Apple’s move as one that will thwart law enforcement.[…]

https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2018/06/un-sexy-headline-usb-restricted-mode-will-improve-iphone-user-security

USB Hub Bug Hunting and Lessons Learned

In this article I’ll show how a protocol analyzer is used, how my instincts turned out to be very wrong, and along the way dive into arcane USB details you probably won’t see explained anywhere else.[…]

https://www.pjrc.com/usb-hub-bug-hunting-lessons-learned/

USB Reverse Engineering: A Universal Guide

USB Reverse Engineering: A Universal Guide
by: Ben James
May 25, 2018

[Glenn ‘devalias’ Grant] is a self-proclaimed regular rabbit hole diver and is conscious that, between forays into specific topics, short-term knowledge and state of mind can be lost. This time, whilst exploring reverse engineering USB devices, [Glenn] captured the best resources, information and tools – for his future self as well as others. His guide is impressively comprehensive, and covers all the necessary areas in hardware and software.[…]

USB Reverse Engineering: A Universal Guide

 

The Evil Mouse Project

Conclusion: Never trust USB devices (and not only storage devices…)

https://blog.rootshell.be/2018/05/22/evil-mouse-project/

The Evil Mouse

Spoofing Cell Networks with a USB to VGA Adapter

Spoofing Cell Networks with a USB to VGA Adapter

Bad Ducky: Rubber Ducky compatible clone based on CJMCU BadUSB HW

The below articles point to related tools, besides the Hak5 Rubber Ducky.

https://github.com/mharjac/bad_ducky

https://www.kitploit.com/2018/04/bad-ducky-rubber-ducky-compatible-clone.html

https://www.digitalmunition.me/2018/04/bad-ducky-rubber-ducky-compatible-clone-based-cjmcu-badusb-hw/

See-also:

https://ducktoolkit.com/viewscript/all/

https://github.com/hak5darren/USB-Rubber-Ducky/wiki/Payloads

USB Rubber Ducky

 

list of 29 USB-based attacks

USB-based attacks
Nir Nissim, Ran Yahalom, Yuval Elovici
Attackers increasingly take advantage of innocent users who tend to use USB peripherals casually, assuming these peripherals are benign when in fact they may carry an embedded malicious payload that can be used to launch attacks. In recent years, USB peripherals have become an attractive tool for launching cyber-attacks. In this survey, we review 29 different USB-based attacks and utilize our new taxonomy to classify them into four major categories. These attacks target both individuals and organizations; utilize widely used USB peripherals, such as keyboards, mice, flash drives, smartphones etc. For each attack, we address the objective it achieves and identify the associated and vulnerable USB peripherals and hardware.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.08.002
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404817301578

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/heres-a-list-of-29-different-types-of-usb-attacks/

USB attacks

X41 D-Sec GmbH browser security whitepaper: WebUSB, WebBluetooth, WebSMM

This white paper provides a technical comparison of the security features and attack surface of Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Internet Explorer. We aim to identify which browser provides the highest level of security in common enterprise usage scenarios, and show how differences in design and implementation of various security technologies in modern web browsers might affect their security. Comparisons are done using a qualitative approach since many issues regarding browser security cannot easily be quantified. We focus on the weaknesses of different mitigations and hardening features and take an attacker’s point of view. This should give the reader an impression about how easy or hard it is to attack a certain browser. The analysis has been sponsored by Google. X41 D-Sec GmbH accepted this sponsorship on the condition that Google would not interfere with our testing methodology or control the content of our paper. We are aware that we could unconsciously be biased to produce results favorable to our sponsor, and have attempted to eliminate this by being as transparent as possible about our decision-making processes and testing methodologies.

https://browser-security.x41-dsec.de/X41-Browser-Security-White-Paper.pdf

https://www.x41-dsec.de/#about

https://www.x41-dsec.de/security/report/whitepaper/2017/09/18/whitepaper-x41-browser-security/

Inside a low budget consumer hardware espionage implant

Wow, amazing!

Inside a low budget consumer hardware espionage implant
Analysis of the S8 data line locator
mich @0x6d696368

The following analysis was performed on a S8 data line locator […]A while back Joe Fitz tweeted about the S8 data line locator1. He referred to it as “Trickle down espionage” due to its reminiscence of NSA spying equipment. The S8 data line locator is a GSM listening and location device hidden inside the plug of a standard USB data/charging cable. It supports the 850, 900, 1800 and 1900 MHz GSM frequencies. Its core idea is very similar to the COTTONMOUTH product line by the NSA/CSS [1] in which an RF device is hidden inside a USB plug. Those hidden devices are referred to as implants. The device itself is marketed as a location tracker usable in cars, where a thief would not be able to identify the USB cable as a location tracking device. Its malicious use-cases can, however, not be denied. Especially since it features no GPS making its location reporting very coarse (1.57 km deviation in my tests). It can, e.g., be called to listen to a live audio feed from a small microphone within the device, as well as programmed to call back if the sound level surpasses a 45 dB threshold. The fact that the device can be repackaged in its sliding case, after configuring it, i.e. inserting a SIM, without any noticeable marks to the packaging suggests its use-case: covert espionage.[…]
I was not able yet to write new firmware via flashrom because I was not able to disable block protection on the flash, yet. Maybe a different avenue for flashing new firmware could be the SPFlash tool4 and/or the Flash tool. However, that would not be open source. If know something about the weird FAT12 file system used in the device or are able to flash your S8 data line locator please contact me with details![…]
No writeup would be complete without at least one fuck up. So here it is: While using the S8 data line locator with OpenBTS I provisioned imaginary numbers. When switching SIM cards I forgot to turn of the voice activated callback. So long story short, some guy with the number 3333333 listend in on me for 2 minutes:

Provider call log fail.Provider call log fail. I did not notice this until I reviewed the logs! So my resume on these little hardware espionage implants: They are stealthy and dangerous as fuck![…]

https://ha.cking.ch/s8_data_line_locator/

Many vulnerabilities found in Linux kernel USB subsystem by syzkaller

Andrey Konovalov posted a bunch of Linux USB vulnerabilities to the OSS-Security list, found using the syzkaller Linux system call fuzzer.

Hi! Below are the details for 14 vulnerabilities found with syzkaller in the Linux kernel USB subsystem. All of them can be triggered with a crafted malicious USB device in case an attacker has physical access to the machine. There’s quite a lot more similar bugs reported [1] but not yet fixed.[…]

The first message had 14 vulns:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/11/06/8
This second message has 8 more:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/11/08/2

https://github.com/google/syzkaller/blob/master/docs/linux/found_bugs_usb.md
https://github.com/google/syzkaller
https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/02/24/google-syzkaller-linux-syscall-fuzzer/

 

 

 

Positive Technologies: JTAG in each house: full access via USB

It is amazing to see the Intel ME research coming out of Positive Technologies!

From Google Translate:

JTAG in each house: full access via USB

Researchers at Positive Technologies have activated hardware debugging (JTAG) for Intel Management Engine, which allows full access to all PCH devices (Platform Controller Hub) using Intel DCI technology (via USB interface). We plan to share the details at one of the nearest conferences. And how to activate this interface, but for the main processor, we will tell below.[…]

https://habrahabr.ru/company/pt/blog/341946/

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&u=https://habrahabr.ru/company/pt/blog/341946/

Intel ME is the new “Pandora’s Box”, defenders are going to need bigger (better) tools… 😦

ChipEasy

Apparently there’s a Windows binary called ChipEasy that helps diagnose USB devices. I can’t find the source code, and am not sure of the official home page. 😦 It appears to be closed source, so take extra care if you dare to risk running freeware these days. Please leave a Comment on this blog post if you can point out a better tool, hopefully something open source.

http://www.upan.cc/tools/test/ChipEasy_EN.html

 

Dmitry on macOS and external USB drives

http://www.grivet-tools.com/blog/2016/target-disk-mode-firmware-password/