Click to access BHASIA_2017_final.pdf
Black Hat Asia: The UEFI Firmware Rootkits: Myths and Reality
Kees has a new blog post with a list of interesting new security features in the Linux kernel:
The Free Software Foundation has a new announcement, reminding you to pre-order a Talos II by Raptor Engineering before Septembert 15th deadline. The FSF includes the Talos II in their Respects Your Freedom hardware certification program.
Support the Talos II, Respects Your Freedom certification candidate: pre-order by 9/15
Raptor Engineering is now taking pre-orders for the Talos II until September 15th. The Talos II is a powerful system built from the ground up with freedom in mind. We’ve previously [supported] the work of the folks at Raptor Engineering. This time, rather than a crowdfunding effort, we are asking you to support their work by pre-ordering the [Talos II]. The system comes in a variety of forms to meet your needs, from a workstation to rack-mounted to the board by itself. Raptor Engineering has put in a great deal of effort researching and prototyping this system, and now it is ready for prime time. The Talos II is great for any hacker who needs a powerful machine, perfect for developing even more free software.[…]
There is a new tutorial on UEFI, for C programmers. It is only 1 day old, and not yet finished:
Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/09/08/u-boot-aes-cbc-encryption-multiple-vulnerabilities/
I asked on the U-Boot mailing list for more information on this issue. The response from Tom Rini of Konsulko:
So, I mentioned this in the patch that migrated the option to Kconfig and marked it deprecated, and I plan to mention it in the release notes on Monday. But, this option has no in-tree users and I plan to remove the code in the near term, if no one with the relevant background steps up to re-implement it. Thanks!
Full post:
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2017-September/305181.html
Golem is a global, open sourced, decentralized supercomputer that anyone can access. It’s made up of the combined power of user’s machines, from personal laptops to entire datacenters. Anyone will be able to use Golem to compute (almost) any program you can think of, from rendering to research to running websites, in a completely decentralized & inexpensive way. The Golem Network is a decentralized sharing economy of computing power, where anyone can make money ‘renting’ out their computing power or developing & selling software.
Click to access Secure%20Computing%20in%20Decentralized%20World.pdf
rust-uefi64:
Rust UEFI crate (64-bit only) for bootloaders and operating systems.
This crate is for supporting UEFI applications such as bootloaders and operating systems.
THIS IS EARLY DAYS, and in particular I have not tested or otherwise used this crate yet myself!
https://github.com/mikedilger/rust-uefi64
Vulnerability Note VU#166743
Das U-Boot AES-CBC encryption implementation contains multiple vulnerabilities
Das U-Boot is a device bootloader that can read its configuration from an AES encrypted file. For devices utilizing this environment encryption mode, U-Boot’s use of a zero initialization vector and improper handling of an error condition may allow attacks against the underlying cryptographic implementation and allow an attacker to decrypt the data.Das U-Boot’s AES-CBC encryption feature uses a zero (0) initialization vector. This allows an attacker to perform dictionary attacks on encrypted data produced by Das U-Boot to learn information about the encrypted data. Devices that make use of Das U-Boot’s AES-CBC encryption feature using environment encryption (i.e., setting the configuration parameter CONFIG_ENV_AES=y) read environment variables from disk as the encrypted disk image is processed. An attacker with physical access to the device can manipulate the encrypted environment data to include a crafted two-byte sequence which triggers an error in environment variable parsing. This error condition is improperly handled by Das U-Boot, resulting in an immediate process termination with a debugging message. The immediate failure can be used as an oracle for a Vaudenay-style timing attack on the cryptography, allowing a dedicated attacker to decrypt and potentially modify the contents of the device. An attacker with physical access to the device may be able to decrypt the device’s contents. The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem.[…]
Lots of changes for Intel/AMD/ARM/MIPS/PowerPC, eg AMD Rhyzen support. And new PDB tool. Clang has new diagnostic/”lint” abilities. The static analyzer uses Microsoft’s Z3 solver. New C and C++ features (wow, C++ is at C++17 already!). Many other changes! I wish I had time to look at it more detail today… 😦
http://releases.llvm.org/5.0.0/docs/ReleaseNotes.html
http://releases.llvm.org/5.0.0/tools/clang/docs/ReleaseNotes.html
http://releases.llvm.org/5.0.0/tools/clang/tools/extra/docs/ReleaseNotes.html
http://lists.llvm.org/pipermail/llvm-announce/2017-September/000075.html
ErikBjorge released this 2 days ago:
New or Updated Modules:
* Added common.spi_access to verify the host processor access rights for different SPI regions
New or Updated Functionality:
* Added ability to search a memory region of a string
* Updated support for the RWE driver
Fixes:
* Added error handling if a register type is not supported
https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec/releases/tag/v1.3.3
https://github.com/chipsec/chipsec/commits/master
Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/09/05/new-windows-uefi-security-protections-deciphered/
Here’s authoritative information from Jeremiah Cox of Microsoft:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/minimum/device-guard-and-credential-guard
Someone at Microsoft: please write a Technical Support KB article based on Jeremiah’s tweets.
Untethered initroot (USENIX WOOT ’17)
By Roee Hay (@roeehay)
August 30, 2017
CVE-2016-10277 ALEPH-2017024
In USENIX WOOT ‘17, that took place earlier this month in Vancouver, we presented our paper, “fastboot oem vuln: Android Bootloader Vulnerabilities in Vendor Customizations”, covering a year’s work in Android bootloaders research. Our paper also includes some previously undisclosed details on CVE-2016-10277, a critical kernel command-line injection vulnerability in the Motorola Android Bootloader (ABOOT) that we had found and blogged about. In the previous couple of blog posts, we demonstrated a tethered unrestricted root exploit against that vulnerability, that we later extended to other Moto devices – G4 & G5. Additional Moto devices have also been confirmed by the community. In the WOOT’17 paper we describe a natural continuation of that exploit – a second stage untethered secure boot & device locking bypass (tested to be working on the vulnerable versions of Nexus 6, Moto G4 & G5). Moreover, we also present in the paper and this blog post other second stage exploits, such as persistent kernel code execution in Nexus 6, the ability to downgrade critical partitions (such as the bootloaders chain and TrustZone), unlocking a re-locked Nexus 6 bootloader, and more. As usual, our PoC exploit is publicly available in our GitHub repo. DISCLAIMER: Unlike the previous ephemeral jailbreak, the one presented today may brick your device. For example, during the development of it, we had to unlock our (luckily unlockable!) Moto G5 device in order to unbrick it.[…]
https://alephsecurity.com/2017/08/30/untethered-initroot/
https://github.com/alephsecurity/initroot
https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot17/workshop-program/presentation/hay
https://alephsecurity.com/2017/05/23/nexus6-initroot/
PNF Software has a series of blog posts on how to use their JEB product to reverse firmware:
Firmware Exploitation with JEB:
In this series of blog posts I will show how JEB’s MIPS decompiler 1 can help you find and exploit software vulnerabilities in embedded devices. To do so, we will use Praetorian’s Damn Vulnerable Router Firmware (DVRF) written by b1ack0wl. DVRF is a custom firmware made to run on a Linksys E1550 router containing a bunch of memory corruption vulnerabilities. The goal of the DVRF is to serve as a playground to learn exploitation on the MIPS architecture. As far as I know, there are no write-ups of the challenges on the Internet. For the readers interested in testing the challenges by themselves, I suggest to follow the DVRF tutorial, and getting a complete MIPSEL Debian QEMU image as it allows the usual exploit development workflow on Linux, without any limits on the available tools.[…]
Firmware exploitation with JEB part 3: Reversing the SmartRG’s sr505n
Cool, Insyde Software is releasing some of their tools. It appears they’re older tools, see the readme about restrictions and newer versions of the tools.
https://twitter.com/NikolajSchlej/status/905204898366709762
Insider_BIOS_Tools
BIOS tools for Insyde Insiders! (release approved by the management of Insyde Software Japan)
We believe that the commercial value of our outdated BIOS developer tools is quite low. As a gesture of good will towards the BIOS modding community and IT community in general, we have decided to release some of our outdated BIOS developer tools – which are a part of this GitHub repository.[…]
Includes:
* H20EZE: Easy BIOS Editor that helps edit binaries in the BIOS, including Option ROMs, driver binaries, logos, and Setup values.
* H20FFT: Firmware Flash Tool assists in quickly and easily updates flash devices with new BIOS firmware.
* H20SDE: SMBIOS Data Editor that facilitates easy modification of any SMBIOS (DMI) field by GUI and Command Line, with support for a wide variety of OS environments.
* H20UVE: UEFI Variable Editor
https://github.com/s-sosnitskiy80/Insider_BIOS_Tools
In Android 8.0, Keymaster 3 transitioned from the old-style C-structure Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) to the C++ HAL interface generated from a definition in the new Hardware Interface Definition Language (HIDL). As part of the change, many of the argument types changed, though types and methods have a one-to-one correspondence with the old types and the HAL struct methods.[…]
https://source.android.com/security/keystore/
https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/
https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation
https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation.html
https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/hidl/
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/tools/hidl/
This flew under our radar back at I/O, but it’s big news. On compatible devices, the new Verified Boot changes in Android 8.0 Oreo will prevent a device from booting should it be rolled back to an earlier firmware. The new feature is called Rollback Protection. So if your phone is flashed with older software, you (and your data) are protected from whatever potential security vulnerabilities may have been present in earlier versions. For 99% of users, the new Rollback Protection is great news. If a phone is lost or stolen, it further decreases the number of potential attacks which could be used to gain access, providing better safety for your data.[…]
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/#Rollback-Protection
QuarksLab has a new blog post with an introduction to dumping flash chips:
https://blog.quarkslab.com/flash-dumping-part-i.html
This reminds me of a talk by CryptoMonkey from DEF CON 24:
https://github.com/CryptoMonkey/Conference-Presentations
He re-gave the talk at Black Lodge Research a few months ago. I can’t find it now, but if you’re good at searching, the video of his DEF CON talk is online.
Intel has updated documentation on developing for Intel AMT:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/developing-for-intel-active-management-technology-amt
http://www.meshcommander.com/meshcommander
https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/26375/Intel-Manageability-Commander
Microsoft added some new UEFI protections to Windows, but it is not well-documented, so the firmware security researcher community is guessing at what it does:
https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/904849903934873600
Intel AMT® Upgradable to Vulnerable Firmware
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00082
Product family: Intel AMT®
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Moderate
Original release: Sep 05, 2017
Last revised: Sep 05, 2017
Intel® Active Management Technology, Intel® Standard Manageability, and Intel® Small Business Technology firmware versions 11.0.25.3001 and 11.0.26.3000 can be upgraded to firmware version 11.6.x.1xxx which is vulnerable to CVE-2017-5689 and can be performed by a local user with administrative privileges.This version of firmware can potentially impact Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT), Intel® Standard Manageability (ISM) or Intel® Small Business Technology (SBT). Consumer PCs with consumer firmware and data center servers using Intel® Server Platform Services are not affected by this vulnerability. Intel recommends that users contact their system manufacturers for updated firmware which mitigates this issue. This issue was discovered during Intel internal validation.[…]
https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00082&languageid=en-fr
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Discover the Desktop
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
News from coreboot world
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
Just another WordPress.com site
Hastily-written news/info on the firmware security/development communities, sorry for the typos.
You must be logged in to post a comment.