Intel ‘patch Tuesday’: 8 new security advisories

INTEL-SA-00199
Intel® RAID Web Console 3 Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00199.html

INTEL-SA-00198
Intel® Ready Mode Technology File Permissions Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00198.html

INTEL-SA-00197
Intel® Media Server Studio for Windows® Vulnerability Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00197.html

INTEL-SA-00196
Intel® RAID Web Console 3 for Windows Authentication Bypass Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00196.html

INTEL-SA-00188
Intel® PROSet/Wireless WiFi Software Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00188.html

INTEL-SA-00187
Intel® Driver & Support Assistant Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00187.html

INTEL-SA-00180
Intel® Trace Analyzer 2018 Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00180.html

INTEL-SA-00153
Intel® Rapid Store Technology Installer Advisory
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00153.html

ISA Semantics for ARMv8-A, RISC-V, and CHERI-MIPS

https://twitter.com/daniel_bilar/status/1061679196194377731

Proc. 46th ACM SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages

Architecture specifications notionally define the fundamental interface between hardware and software: the envelope of allowed behaviour for processor implementations, and the basic assumptions for software development and verification. But in practice, they are typically prose and pseudocode documents, not rigorous or executable artifacts, leaving software and verification on shaky ground. In this paper, we present rigorous semantic models for the sequential behaviour of large parts of the mainstream ARMv8-A, RISC-V, and MIPS architectures, and the research CHERI-MIPS architecture, that are complete enough to boot operating systems, variously Linux, FreeBSD, or seL4. Our ARMv8-A models are automatically translated from authoritative ARM-internal definitions, and (in one variant) tested against the ARM Architecture Validation Suite. We do this using a custom language for ISA semantics, Sail, with a lightweight dependent type system, that supports automatic generation of emulator code in C and OCaml, and automatic generation of proof-assistant definitions for Isabelle, HOL4, and (currently only for MIPS) Coq. We use the former for validation, and to assess specification coverage. To demonstrate the usability of the latter, we prove (in Isabelle) correctness of a purely functional characterisation of ARMv8-A address translation. We moreover integrate the RISC-V model into the RMEM tool for (user-mode) relaxed-memory concurrency exploration. We prove (on paper) the soundness of the core Sail type system. We thereby take a big step towards making the architectural abstraction actually well-defined, establishing foundations for verification and reasoning.

https://alastairreid.github.io/papers/POPL_19/

https://github.com/rems-project/sail

Keystone: Open-source Secure Hardware Enclave

Keystone is an open-source project for building trusted execution environments (TEE) with secure hardware enclaves, based on the RISC-V architecture. Our goal is to build a secure and trustworthy open-source secure hardware enclave, accessible to everyone in industry and academia.

https://keystone-enclave.org/

PentestHardware: Kinda useful notes collated together publicly [WIP]

PentestHardware: Kinda useful notes collated together publicly

NB – this is very much a work in progress, released early for comments and feedback. Hoping to complete first full version by XMas 2018. 🙂

https://github.com/unprovable/PentestHardware

 

Daax: virtualization hypervisor series: part 3 now available

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/10/31/virtualization-hypervisor-blog-series-part-1-of-6-introduction-to-virtualization-type-definitions-and-support-testing/

Part 3 is out, and I also neglected to mention part 2.

https://revers.engineering/day-2-entering-vmx-operation/

Day 3: The VMCS, Component Encoding, and Multiprocessor Initialization

https://revers.engineering/

Umap2: USB host security assessment tool

This is not a new release, but I’m catching up with USB security tools for this blog.

Umap2 is the second revision of NCC Group’s python based USB host security assessment tool. Umap2 is developed by NCC Group and Cisco SAS team.

Features:
* USB device emulation
* USB host scanning for device support
* USB host OS detection (no implemented yet)
*  USB host fuzzing
* USB host fuzzing uses kitty as fuzzing engine

https://github.com/nccgroup/umap2

Fall 2018 UEFI Plugfest, presentations uploaded

The slides from the last UEFI Forum plugfest are now online.

* State of the UEFI – Dong Wei (UEFI Forum Vice President)
* Increasing Risks to UEFI Firmware Due to Growing Attack Surfaces – Glenn Plant (Phoenix)
* UEFI Updates and Secure Software Isolation on Arm – Dong Wei (Arm)
* UEFI and the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) – Trevor Western (Insyde)
* Advanced Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Usage – HPBird Chen (AMI)
* Building Customized Tests with Firmware Test Suite – Alex Hung (Canonical)
* System Firmware and Device Firmware Updates Using Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Capsules – Brian Richardson (Intel)
* Capsule Update with MM Mode – Udit Kumar and Meenakshi Aggarwal (NXP)
* How Writing Portable UEFI Drivers Improves Reliability (and Helps Me) – Leif Lindholm (Linaro)
* TianoCore Updates: Tags, Testing & Platforms – Brian Richardson (Intel) and Leif Lindholm (Linaro)

http://www.uefi.org/learning_center/presentationsandvideos

Hopefully the videos will show up here shortly, as they normally do:

https://www.youtube.com/user/UEFIForum

CVE-2018-12037, VU#395981: Self-Encrypting Drives Have Multiple Vulnerabilities

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/11/06/self-encrypting-deception-weaknesses-in-the-encryption-of-solid-state-drives-ssds/

Microsoft and Samsung have updated information, and US-CERT has some warnings:

https://twitter.com/campuscodi/status/1059886286511767552

https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV180028

https://www.samsung.com/semiconductor/minisite/ssd/support/consumer-notice/

https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/395981/

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2018/11/06/Self-Encrypting-Solid-State-Drive-Vulnerabilities

IDA 7.2 released

We have many news this time, but let us start with the most desired and requested one: support for ARM v8.3 instructions. With the advent of the new iPhone XS many reverse engineers started to stumble on these new instructions. Besides, they include a new security mechanism: Pointer Authentication Code. It makes exploiting software vulnerabilities much more difficult but it requires modifications in our file parsing and analysis methods.[…]

https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/7.2/

Intel: Protection at the Hardware Level [using SGX]

Intel has a new document about hardware security and SGX:

There is tremendous opportunity for application and solution developers to take charge of their data security using new hardware-based controls for cloud and enterprise environments. Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX), available in its second-generation on the new Intel® Xeon® E-2100 processor, offers hardware-based memory encryption that isolates specific application code and data in memory. Intel® SGX allows user-level code to allocate private regions of memory, called enclaves, which are designed to be protected from processes running at higher privilege levels. We believe only Intel offers such a granular level of control and protection. Think about it like a lockbox in your home. Even though you have locks on your doors and a home security system, you may still secure your most sensitive data in a private lockbox with a separate key to provide extra layers of protection even if someone gained unwanted access to your home. Essentially, Intel® SGX is a lockbox inside a system’s memory, helping protect the data while it’s in-use during runtime.[…]

https://itpeernetwork.intel.com/hardware-security-sgx