Intrinsic Rowhammer PUFs: Leveraging the Rowhammer Effect for Improved Security

Intrinsic Rowhammer PUFs: Leveraging the Rowhammer Effect for Improved Security

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have become an important and promising hardware primitive for device fingerprinting, device identification, or key storage. Intrinsic PUFs leverage components already found in existing devices, unlike extrinsic silicon PUFs, which are based on customized circuits that involve modification of hardware. In this work, we present a new type of a memory-based intrinsic PUF, which leverages the Rowhammer effect in DRAM modules – the Rowhammer PUF. Our PUF makes use of bit flips, which occur in DRAM cells due to rapid and repeated access of DRAM rows. Prior research has mainly focused on Rowhammer attacks, where the Rowhammer effect is used to illegitimately alter data stored in memory, e.g., to change page table entries or enable privilege escalation attacks. Meanwhile, this is the first work to use the Rowhammer effect in a positive context – to design a novel PUF. We extensively evaluate the Rowhammer PUF using commercial, off-the-shelf devices, not relying on custom hardware or an FPGA-based setup. The evaluation shows that the Rowhammer PUF holds required properties needed for the envisioned security applications, and could be deployed today.

Chrome OS firmware change may support Verified Boot of Windows?

[…]A recent branch title “firmware-eve-campfire” was discovered in the Chromium gerrit, accompanied by changes referencing “AltOS” and “go/vboot-windows.” That, combined that with the addition of placeholder strings for “Chrome OS” and “AltOS” being added to all languages, suggests that a future Chrome OS device, codenamed “Eve” will have the capability to boot more than one operating system. The commit was found by -nbsp- on Reddit. Obviously, with a name like “vboot-windows,” it is easy to jump to the conclusion that the feature is intended for Microsoft Windows, though little information about this is available. Most of the relevant code is hidden behind the private gerrit for Google employees, making it difficult to ascertain how this works and what it is intended for. According to a post at XDA-developers, it seems possible that this could be used for non-Windows OSes, such as Linux, or whatever Google Fuschia actually is.[…]

https://www.techrepublic.com/article/a-mysterious-chrome-os-commit-could-hint-at-a-chromebook-that-dual-boots-windows/

Lai (Lux ACPI Implementation): AML for Lux, a Unix-like OS

Lux is a new Unix-like operating written for the PC, aiming for high performance with minimal requirements. Lai, the Lux ACPI Implementation, is an implementation of ACPI’s Machine Language (AML) written for use with lux, but with portability in mind. As such, lai is portable and OS-independent. It depends on a few OS-specific functions, and so a small layer is written for each OS lai is to be used with, and this requires no changes to the core code of lai.

https://github.com/omarrx024/lux
https://omarrx024.github.io/

https://github.com/omarrx024/lai
https://omarrx024.github.io/docs/lai.html

Microsoft Azure Sphere

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/azure-sphere/
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/azure-sphere/about/
https://ms-device-contact.com/

Introducing Microsoft Azure Sphere: Secure and power the intelligent edge


https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/azure-sphere/details/
https://www.mediatek.com/products/azureSphere/mt3620

A diagram that shows the MCU architecture. It includes sections for: Microsoft Pluton Security Subsystem, flash, Connectivity, application processor, SRAM, real-time processor, and firewalls.

seL ported to RISC-V

seL, in addition to Intel and ARM, now supports RISC-V!

https://github.com/seL4/seL4/tree/master/include/arch/riscv/arch
https://sel4.systems/pipermail/devel/2018-April/001928.html
https://docs.sel4.systems/Hardware/RISCV
https://sel4.systems/About/seL4/
https://riscv.org/

 

PS: seL is not the only OS porting to RISC-V, here’s the Debian port:
https://groups.google.com/a/groups.riscv.org/forum/#!topic/sw-dev/u4VcUtB9r94

PS: RISC-V is getting active, and has had lots of newsworthy events that I’ve not covered:
https://riscv.org/news/

An Introduction to Counterfeit ICs: Counterfeiting, Detection and Avoidance Methods

An Introduction to Counterfeit ICs: Counterfeiting, Detection and Avoidance Methods
Yahya Tawil
23rd December 2017

 

An Introduction to Counterfeit ICs: Counterfeiting, Detection and Avoidance Methods

Click to access SIA%20Anti-Counterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf

http://www.bunniestudios.com/blog/?page_id=1022

What You Don’t Know about Firmware Might Get You ∅wn3d

Brian Richardson of Intel has an article on firmware security. It even mentions CHIPSEC and NIST 147!

http://eecatalog.com/intel/2018/04/09/what-you-dont-know-about-firmware-might-get-you-own3d/#.WtZPvUZ6xU0.twitter

 

 

 

Intel Security Essentials: A Built-in Foundation with Security at the Core

Intel Threat Detection Technology (TDT) announced at RSA. Includes GPU-powered antivirus code.

https://newsroom.intel.com/editorials/securing-digital-world-intel-announces-silicon-level-security-technologies-industry-adoption-rsa-2018/

https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2018/04/16/intel-security-essentials-a-built-in-foundation-with-security-at-the-core

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security/hardware/hardware-security-overview.html

https://www.engadget.com/2018/04/17/intel-malware-scanner-gpu-processor-cpu-speed/

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/04/intel-microsoft-to-use-gpu-to-scan-memory-for-malware/

https://twitter.com/diodesign/status/986099399104212993

Intel Security Essentials

 

more on INTEL-sa-00087

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/04/03/intel-sa-00087-unsafe-opcodes-exposed-in-intel-spi-based-products/

Lenovo has an advisory now:

https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-16445

Could an Intel chip flaw put your whole computer at risk?

INTEL-SA-00110: BIOS SW SMI Call-Out EoP

Intel® NUC BIOS SW SMI Call-Out

Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00110
Product family: Intel® NUC Kits
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Important
Original release: Apr 17, 2018
Last revised: Apr 17, 2018
Summary:

This update will improve the security of system firmware for the below listed Intel NUC models. Intel has identified a potential vulnerability in Intel NUC kits with insufficient input validation in system firmware that potentially allows a local attacker to elevate privileges to System Management Mode (SMM). Intel highly recommends that users update to the latest firmware version (see table above).

Intel would like to thank Embedi for reporting this issue and working with us on coordinated disclosure.

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00110&languageid=en-fr