The SMM Rootkit Revisited: Fun with USB (from ARES’15)

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6980293/?reload=true&arnumber=6980293

 

System Management Mode (SMM) in x86 has enabled a new class of malware with incredible power to control physical hardware that is virtually impossible to detect by the host operating system. Previous SMM root kits have only scratched the surface by modifying kernel data structures and trapping on I/O registers to implement PS/2 key loggers. In this paper, we present new SMM-based malware that hijacks Universal Serial Bus (USB) host controllers to intercept USB events. This enables SMM root kits to control USB devices directly without ever permitting the OS kernel to receive USB-related hardware interrupts. Using this approach, we created a proof-of-concept USB key logger that is also more difficult to detect than prior SMM-based key loggers that are triggered on OS actions like port I/O. We also propose additional extensions to this technique and methods to prevent and mitigate such attacks.

ARES 2015

The 2015 ARES Conference (the Int’l Conference on Availability, Reliability, and Security), is happening in France later this month. There’s a variety of interesting talks on the schedule: focusing on firmware security, a few jump out, and I’m sure I’ve missed a bunch:

Cold Boot Attacks on DDR2 and DDR3 SDRAM
Simon Lindenlauf, Hans Höfken, Marko Schuba

Hardware Security Evaluation Using Assurance Case Models
Henrique Kawakami, Roberto Gallo, Ricardo Dahab, Erick Nascimento

Virtual Machine Introspection_c_ Techniques and Applications
Yacine Hebbal, Sylvie Laniepce, Jean-Marc Menaud

A Lightweight Framework for Cold Boot Based Forensics on Mobile Devices
Benjamin Taubmann, Manuel Huber, Sascha Wessel, Lukas Heim, Hans Peter Reiser, Georg Sigl

Don’t brick your car: Firmware confidentiality and rollback for vehicles
Hafizah Mansor, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Raja Naeem Akram, Keith Mayes

Watch what you wear: preliminary forensic analysis of smart watches
Ibrahim Baggili, Kyle Anthony, Jeff Oduru, Frank Breitinger, Glenn McGee

Physically Secure Code and Data Storage in Autonomously Booting Systems
Johannes Götzfried, Johannes Hampel, Tilo Müller

Complexity Estimates of a SHA-1 Near-Collision Attack for GPU and FPGA
Stefan Gradinger, Bernhard Greslehner-Nimmervoll, Jürgen Fuß, Robert Kolmhofer