Using SMM to Circumvent OS Security Functions

Using CPU System Management Mode to Circumvent Operating System Security Functions

Loı̈c Duflot, Daniel Etiemble, Olivier Grumelard

Abstract. In this paper we show how hardware functionalities can be misused by an attacker to extend her control over a system. The originality of our approach is that it exploits seldom used processor and chipset functionalities, such as switching to system management mode, to escalate local privileges in spite of security restrictions imposed by the operating system. As an example we present a new attack scheme against OpenBSD on x86-based architectures. On such a system the superuser is only granted limited privileges. The attack allows her to get full privileges over the system, including unrestricted access to physical memory. Our sample code shows how the superuser can lower the “secure level” from highly secure to permanently insecure mode. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that documented processor and chipset functionalities have been used to circumvent operating system security functions.

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Using-CPU-System-Management-Mode-to-Circumvent-Duflot-Etiemble/62beba49b7a9eb50c0a860547cceb2863e994aa2

Alternatives for SMM usage in Intel Platforms

2019 OCP Global Summit:
Case Study: Alternatives for SMM usage in Intel Platforms
Sarathy Jayakumar, Principal Engineer – Firmware, Intel Corporation

The broadcast System Management Mode (SMM) model has been used for many years to manage priority system events but has a number of disadvantages. Overuse of System Management Interrupts (SMI) results in performance degradation, increases latency with higher core counts, and introduces potential race conditions. SMM is also difficult to debug and has access to system resources outside of the OS environment, which makes it target for firmware exploits. This session expands on Intel’s initiative to reduce SMM footprint and provide alternatives for handling runtime platform events. Intel described SMI reduction methods based on Protected Runtime Mechanism (PRM), UEFI Capsule, and the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) at the 2018 OCP Regional Summit. The presentation features a case study and demonstration using Intel® Xeon® Scalable Processors with EDK II firmware.

https://2019ocpglobalsummit.sched.com/event/Jin2/case-study-alternatives-for-smm-usage-in-intel-platforms

https://www.opencompute.org/summit/global-summit

 

SMM disabling and verification techniques

3mdeb points out that there is a patent by Intel with information focused on disabling Intel SMM.

Don’t click on this link if you’re an engineer and are not allowed to view patent information.

 

https://patents.google.com/patent/US20170168844

Embedi: UEFI BIOS holes. So much magic. Don’t come inside.

24 October, 2017
UEFI BIOS holes. So Much Magic. Don’t Come Inside.
In recent years, embedded software security has become a red-hot topic, attracting the attention of high profile security researchers from all around the globe. However, the quality of code is still far from perfect as long as its security is considered. For instance, the CVE-2017-5721 SMM Privilege Elevation vulnerability in the firmware could affect such scope of vendors like Acer, ASRock, ASUS, Dell, HP, GIGABYTE, Lenovo, MSI, Intel, and Fujitsu. This white paper is intended to describe how to detect a vulnerability in a motherboard firmware with the help of the following tools: Intel DAL, UEFITool, CHIPSEC, RWEverything, and how to bypass the patch that fixes this vulnerability.[…]

https://embedi.com/blog/uefi-bios-holes-so-much-magic-dont-come-inside

Scotch: Combining SGX and SMM to Monitor Cloud Resource Usage

First Online: 12 October 2017
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10453)

The growing reliance on cloud-based services has led to increased focus on cloud security. Cloud providers must deal with concerns from customers about the overall security of their cloud infrastructures. In particular, an increasing number of cloud attacks target resource allocation in cloud environments. For example, vulnerabilities in a hypervisor scheduler can be exploited by attackers to effectively steal CPU time from other benign guests on the same hypervisor. In this paper, we present Scotch, a system for transparent and accurate resource consumption accounting in a hypervisor. By combining x86-based System Management Mode with Intel Software Guard Extensions, we can ensure the integrity of our accounting information, even when the hypervisor has been compromised by an escaped malicious guest. We show that we can account for resources at every task switch and I/O interrupt, giving us richly detailed resource consumption information for each guest running on the hypervisor. We show that using our system incurs small but manageable overhead—roughly 1 μ
s every task switch or I/O interrupt. We further discuss performance improvements that can be made for our proposed system by performing accounting at random intervals. Finally, we discuss the viability of this approach against multiple types of cloud-based resource attacks.

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-66332-6_18