more on INTEL-sa-00087

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/04/03/intel-sa-00087-unsafe-opcodes-exposed-in-intel-spi-based-products/

Lenovo has an advisory now:

https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/solutions/LEN-16445

Could an Intel chip flaw put your whole computer at risk?

INTEL-SA-00110: BIOS SW SMI Call-Out EoP

Intel® NUC BIOS SW SMI Call-Out

Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00110
Product family: Intel® NUC Kits
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Important
Original release: Apr 17, 2018
Last revised: Apr 17, 2018
Summary:

This update will improve the security of system firmware for the below listed Intel NUC models. Intel has identified a potential vulnerability in Intel NUC kits with insufficient input validation in system firmware that potentially allows a local attacker to elevate privileges to System Management Mode (SMM). Intel highly recommends that users update to the latest firmware version (see table above).

Intel would like to thank Embedi for reporting this issue and working with us on coordinated disclosure.

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00110&languageid=en-fr

 

Intel, Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law start Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Practices for Hardware

WASHINGTON, April 12, 2018 /PRNewswire/ — Today, the Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law announced a new cybersecurity effort to examine coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and processes specific to hardware.

Coordinated disclosure is widely regarded as the best way to responsibly protect users from security exploits. Led by Ari Schwartz, the Center’s coordinator, the project will bring together business leaders, policymakers and other stakeholders from across the technology sector to identify specific disclosure needs in the hardware ecosystem, assess the current in disclosure policy and practice and describe options for collaboration and improvements. “As recent threats have shown, the need for industrywide coordination and response to new vulnerabilities has never been greater,” said Schwartz. “We are looking forward to engaging with a wide range of players to help improve resiliency in the hardware ecosystem.” […]

https://centerforcybersecuritypolicy.org/

https://blogs.intel.com/policy/2018/04/12/furthering-intels-security-first-pledge-with-cybersecurity-public-policy/

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/center-for-cybersecurity-policy-and-law-to-engage-with-industry-on-coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure-practices-for-hardware-300629040.html

What about the other chip makers beyond Intel?

Intel: Persistent Memory

Intel has 2 new Persistent Memory updates last month, a new dev kit and a white paper on the topic:

https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/enhancing-high-performance-computing-with-persistent-memory-technology

https://software.intel.com/en-us/videos/persistent-memory-programming-tools

https://github.com/pmem/pmdk

 

The Persistent Memory Development Kit (PMDK), formerly known as NVML, is a growing collection of libraries which have been developed for various use cases, tuned, validated to production quality, and thoroughly documented.
chart

Linux UEFI Validation (LUV) v2.3-rc1 released

Megha Dey of Intel has announced the latest release of LUV, with multiple new features and bugfixes by multiple contributors:

Gayatri Kammela (12), Megha Dey (9), Naresh Bhat (3), Ricardo Neri (22),  Sai Praneeth (5)

It mostly includes updates to yocto, meta-oe, various test suites and kernel version and bug fixes. We have also added a feature to display the severity of failed test cases. Since we had the stable v2.2 release 2 months back, it made sense to have this release as rc1 of v2.3 to allow stabilization towards the next release cycle.

Main new feature: Display the severity of failed test cases In this release, Ricardo submitted 2 patchsets to display the severity of failed test cases. This is a valuable addition as LUV now ships with 7 different test suites. Some test suites include hundreds of test cases. Thus, we could possibly have tens of failed test cases, which can be overwhelming. In order to help users to decide on which failed test cases focus their attention, it is useful to indicate the severity of failed test cases.

See the full announcement for list of bugfixes.

https://download.01.org/linux-uefi-validation/v2.3/
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/luv

Intel seeks BIOS/UEFI Tools Developer

BIOS-UEFI Firmware Tools Engineer

As BIOS-UEFI Firmware Tools Engineer you will develop tools and scripts needed for build and test automation infrastructure that is the backbone of the the Continuous Integration process in Intel’s Data Center UEFI firmware BIOS team.[…]

https://jobs.intel.com/ShowJob/Id/1573600/BIOS%20UEFI%20Firmware%20Tools%20Engineer

PS: I need to figure out a way to get some swag/etc from jobs that’re filled via this blog. ;-(

PS: Intel HR: spaces in URLs is generally frowned upon.

 

INTEL-SA-00116: Intel® 2G Firmware Update for Modems using ETWS

Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00116
Product family: Intel® XMM71xx, Intel® XMM72xx, Intel® XMM73xx, Intel® XMM74xx, Sofia 3G, Sofia 3G-R, and Sofia 3G-RW
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Important
Original release: Apr 04, 2018

Buffer overflow in ETWS processing module Intel® XMM71xx, XMM72xx, XMM73xx, XMM74xx and Sofia 3G/R allows remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code via an adjacent network. In late February 2018, external security researchers identified and disclosed to Intel a security vulnerability affecting Intel® 2G Modem firmware. The vulnerability affects Intel® 2G Modem products where the Earthquake Tsunami Warning System (ETWS) feature is enabled in Modem firmware. Devices equipped with an affected modem, when connected to a rogue 2G base station where non-compliant 3GPP software may be operational, are potentially at risk. Intel is making firmware updates available to device manufacturers that protect systems from this vulnerability. End users should check with their device manufacturers and apply any available updates as soon as practical. Intel would like to thank Dr. Ralph Phillip Weinmann and Dr. Nico Golde from Comsecuris for reporting CVE-2018-3624.

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00116&languageid=en-fr

 

INTEL-SA-00122: Intel Remote Keyboard Unauthenticated Keystroke Injection

Intel® Remote Keyboard Unauthenticated Keystroke Injection

Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00122
Product family: Intel® Remote Keyboard
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Critical
Original release: Apr 03, 2018

Intel has issued a Product Discontinuation notice for Intel® Remote Keyboard and recommends that users of the Intel® Remote Keyboard uninstall it at their earliest convenience.

CVE-2018-3641:
Escalation of privilege in all versions of the Intel® Remote Keyboard allows a network attacker to inject keystrokes as a local user. Intel would like to thank @trotmaster99 for reporting this issue and working with us on coordinated disclosure.

CVE-2018-3645:
Escalation of privilege in all versions of the Intel® Remote Keyboard allows a local attacker to inject keystrokes into another remote keyboard session. Intel would like to thank Mark Barnes for reporting this issue and working with us on coordinated disclosure.

 

INTEL-SA-00087: Unsafe Opcodes exposed in Intel SPI based products

Unsafe Opcodes exposed in Intel SPI based products
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00087
Product family: Multiple Generations
Impact of vulnerability: Denial of Service
Severity rating: Important
Original release: Apr 03, 2018

Configuration of SPI Flash in platforms based on multiple Intel CPUs allows a local attacker to alter the behavior of the SPI Flash, potentially leading to a Denial of Service. This issue has been root-caused, and the mitigation has been validated and is available. Intel identified this issue internally. Issue is root-caused, and the mitigation is known and available. To Intel’s knowledge, the issue has not been seen externally. Intel recommends that users always check with their system manufacturer’s support sites to make sure they have the latest, security updates installed.

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00087&languageid=en-fr

Intel FSP reverse engineering: finding the real entry point!

https://puri.sm/posts/intel-fsp-reverse-engineering-finding-the-real-entry-point/

Reversing? I thought that Purism was an Intel FSP source licensee? Oh well.

Apple to make their own processor, replacing Intel?

Quoting Bloomberg:

Apple Inc. is planning to use its own chips in Mac computers beginning as early as 2020, replacing processors from Intel Corp., according to people familiar with the plans. The initiative, code named Kalamata, is still in the early developmental stages, but comes as part of a larger strategy to make all of Apple’s devices — including Macs, iPhones, and iPads — work more similarly and seamlessly together, said the people, who asked not to be identified discussing private information. The project, which executives have approved, will likely result in a multi-step transition.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-02/apple-is-said-to-plan-move-from-intel-to-own-mac-chips-from-2020

https://www.theverge.com/circuitbreaker/2018/4/2/17189372/apple-intel-chip-processors-macs-date

https://www.ft.com/content/1c0637da-36a1-11e8-8eee-e06bde01c544

Intel releases version 066 of the Software Dev Manuals

https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sdm

At present, downloadable PDFs of all volumes are at version 066. The downloadable PDF of the Intel® 64 and IA-32 architectures optimization reference manual is at version 039. Additional related specifications, application notes, and white papers are also available for download.

 

Using Intel C/Fortran to mitigate against Spectre/Meltdown

https://twitter.com/DevZoneBlog/status/977257032364494849

Using Intel® Compilers to Mitigate Speculative Execution Side-Channel Issues
Jennifer J. (Intel)
March 23, 2018

Table of Content:
Disclaimers
Introduction
Mitigating Bounds Check Bypass (Spectre Variant 1)
Mitigating Branch Target Injection (Spectre Variant 2)
How to Obtain the Latest Intel® C++ Compiler and Intel® Fortran Compiler
Conclusion and Further Reading

https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/using-intel-compilers-to-mitigate-speculative-execution-side-channel-issues

https://software.intel.com/en-us/c-compilers
https://software.intel.com/en-us/qualify-for-free-software

INTEL-SA-00117: Intel SGX Elevation of Privilege

Intel® SGX SDK Edger8r and Intel® Software Guard Extensions Platform Software Component
Intel ID: INTEL-SA-00117
Product family: Intel® SGX
Impact of vulnerability: Elevation of Privilege
Severity rating: Important
Original release: Mar 19, 2018

[…]CVE-2018-3626: The Edger8r tool in the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX) Software Development Kit (SDK) before version 2.1.2 (Linux) and 1.9.6 (Windows) may generate code that is susceptible to a side channel attack, potentially allowing a local user to access unauthorized information. CVE-2018-5736: An elevation of privilege in Intel® Software Guard Extensions Platform Software Component before 1.9.105.42329 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code as administrator. CVE-2018-3626: Recently it was reported that the Edger8r Tool, a software component of the Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX) Software Development Kit (SDK), may generate C source code potentially leading to a software based side-channel vulnerability. […]Intel would like to thank Jo Van Bulck, Frank Piessens, and Raoul Strackx of Ku Leuven University for reporting CVE-2018-3626 and working with us on coordinated disclosure.

https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00117&languageid=en-fr

Intel: Implementing MicroPython as a UEFI test framework

https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2018/03/08/implementing-micropython-as-a-uefi-test-framework

MicroPython for UEFI - Stack Overview