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Where there’s a JTAG, there’s a way: obtaining full system access via USB

WHERE THERE’S A JTAG, THERE’S A WAY: OBTAINING FULL SYSTEM ACCESS VIA USB
Maxim Goryachy and Mark Ermolov
Everyone makes mistakes. These words are certainly true for developers involved in low-level coding, where such common tools as print debugging and software debuggers run into limits. To solve this problem, hardware developers use in-circuit emulators or, if available on the target platform, the JTAG debugging interface (IEEE1149.1 [1]). Such debugging mechanisms first appeared in the 1980s [2]. Over time, microchip vendors extended the functionality of these interfaces. This allowed developers to obtain detailed information on power consumption, find bottlenecks in high-performance algorithms, and perform many other useful tasks. Hardware debugging tools are also of interest to security researchers. These tools grant low-level system access and bypass important security protections, making it easier for researchers to study a platform’s behavior and undocumented features. Unsurprisingly, these abilities have attracted the attention of intelligence services as well.[…]

https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Where-theres-a-JTAG-theres-a-way.pdf

 

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Positive Tech at BlackHat EU: Running Unsigned Code in Intel ME

How to Hack a Turned-Off Computer, or Running Unsigned Code in Intel Management Engine

Intel Management Engine is a proprietary technology that consists of a microcontroller integrated into the Platform Controller Hub (PCH) microchip with a set of built-in peripherals. The PCH carries almost all communication between the processor and external devices; therefore Intel ME has access to almost all data on the computer, and the ability to execute third-party code allows compromising the platform completely. Researchers have been long interested in such “God mode” capabilities, but recently we have seen a surge of interest in Intel ME. One of the reasons is the transition of this subsystem to a new hardware (x86) and software (modified MINIX as an operating system) architecture. The x86 platform allows researchers to bring to bear all the power of binary code analysis tools. Unfortunately, this changing did not go without errors. In a subsystem change that will be detailed in the talk of Intel ME version 11+, a vulnerability was found. It allows an attacker of the machine to run unsigned code in PCH on any motherboard via Skylake+. The main system can remain functional, so the user may not even suspect that his or her computer now has malware resistant to reinstalling of the OS and updating BIOS. Running your own code on ME gives unlimited possibilities for researchers, because it allows exploring the system in dynamics. In our presentation, we will tell how we detected and exploited the vulnerability, and bypassed built-in protection mechanisms.

https://www.blackhat.com/eu-17/briefings/schedule/#how-to-hack-a-turned-off-computer-or-running-unsigned-code-in-intel-management-engine-8668

Intel ME is the new Pandora’s Box…

 

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PTSecurity on Disabling Intel Management Engine

N3mes1s points out an article from Maxim Goryachy and Mark Ermolov of PTSecurity, on disabling the Intel Management Engine (ME).

http://ptsecurity.com
https://github.com/ptresearch/
https://github.com/ptresearch/me-disablement/raw/master/How%20to%20become%20the%20sole%20owner%20of%20your%20PC.pdf

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