This project consists of 3 parts.
1) A script (gpu-pt-check.sh) that automatically checks to what extend a computer is compatible with GPU pass-through in its given configuration.
2) A script (setup.sh) that automatically installs and configures your system for GPU pass-through (Only tested on fresh installs of Fedora 28 x64 with Gnome, booted in UEFI mode!)
3) Instructions on how to create a bootable Linux USB stick that automatically runs the gpu-pt-check.sh script when you boot from it without any user interaction required.
The PHY Interface for the PCI Express* (PIPE) Architecture Revision 5.1 is an updated version of the PIPE spec that supports PCI Express, SATA, USB, DisplayPort, and Converged I/O architectures.
The review draft PCI Express* Device Security Enhancements Specification Revision 0.7 defines PCIe* Device Firmware Measurement and PCIe* Device Authentication that enable a Host to query and verify the identity and capability of a PCIe* Device, to improve system security.
Practical DMA attack on Windows 10
Written by Jean-Christophe Delaunay · 2018-05-30 · in Pentest
Among the various security assessments performed by Synacktiv, some involve attacking the security hardening of a laptop or workstation master image that will be massively deployed in an infrastructure. The purpose of this kind of security assessment is to give the client an overview of its level of maturity regarding security concerns and provide him with some recommendations in order to increase his level of security. This post describes how Synacktiv defeated a workstation security measures by using a hardware approach.[…]
Example photo of Evil Maid attacker in their lab: 🙂
PCIe Device Security Enhancements Specification
PCI Express (PCIe) Devices may be composed of hardware (immutable) and firmware (immutable and mutable) components. Presently, Vendor ID/Device ID/Revision ID registers convey the hardware identify of a PCIe* Device and there is no defined mechanism to convey the firmware identity of a PCIe Device. In addition to the Device identity, PCIe specification defines various types of capability structures to convey PCIe Device features capabilities. Both the Device Identity and capability can be spoofed and used maliciously by an advanced adversary. This specification introduces the notion of PCIe* Device Firmware Measurement, a method of exposing the identity of Device firmware. The Device Firmware Measurement mechanism used in isolation, however, is subject to supply chain attacks such as counterfeiting and can also be spoofed by an advanced adversary. Additionally this specification introduces the notion of PCIe Device Authentication, which uses public key cryptography to defend against such attacks and to provide higher assurance about the hardware and firmware identities and capabilities. PCIe Device Authentication adapts the USB Authentication mechanism to PCIe—the new elements are the specific PCIe register interface and the associated mechanisms, plus some details that are necessarily specific to PCIe. PCIe Device Authentication result can be used in various scenarios such as: 1) a data center administrator can ensure all PCIe Devices are running appropriate firmware versions 2) system software can ensure a trusted Device is plugged in before enabling the PCIe Address Translation Services (ATS) for the Device. PCIe Device Authentication provides platforms with a way to make trust decisions about specific Devices. This in turn provides value to Device vendors because the Authentication feature is itself a valuable Device feature, and supports the detection of counterfeit and potentially malicious Devices. This specification details the requirements, interface and protocol for PCIe Device Firmware Measurement and PCIe Device Authentication. It also provides general guidelines for implementing these technologies in practice.
Latest commit: 2 days ago
PCIe Injector Gateware
The PCIe bus is now the main high speed communication bus between a processor and its peripherials. It is used in all PC (sometime encapsulated in Thunderbolt) and now even in mobile phones. Doing security research on PCIe systems can requires very expensive tools (>$50k) and packet generaration for such tools is not a common feature. PCIe Injector provides a such tool at a more reasonable price. Currently, only few attacks were made on PCIe devices. Most of them were done using a Microblaze inside a Xilinx FPGA to send/receive the TLPs, making it hard to really analyze. (Using embedded C software to generate/analyze traffic) An other way is to use USB3380 chip, but it is also not flexible enough (only supporting 32bits addressing) and does not allow debugging the PCIe state machine.
The PCIe injector is based on a Artix7 FPGA from Xilinx connected to a DDR3 and a high speed USB 3.0 FT601 chip from FTDI. It allows:
* Having a full control of the PCIe core.
* Sending/Receiving TLPs through USB 3.0 (or bufferize it to/from DDR3)
* Using flexible software/tools on the Host for receiving/generating/analyzing the TLPs. (Wireshark dissectors, scapy, …)
New or Updated Functionality:
* Updated support for 7th/8th generation Intel processors
* Added ability to undefine a configuration entry
* Added HAL and utilcmd for TPM Event Log
* Added utilcmd for TPM commands
* Added support for Apollo Lake
* added utilcmd to inspect PCI command/control registers
This repository contains a set of tools and proof of concepts related to PCI-E bus and DMA attacks. It includes HDL design which implements software controllable PCI-E gen 1.1 endpoint device for Xilinx SP605 Evaluation Kit with Spartan-6 FPGA. In comparison with popular USB3380EVB this design allows to operate with raw Transaction Level Packets (TLP) of PCI-E bus and perform full 64-bit memory read/write operations. It’s early version of my first much or less complicated FPGA project, so the speed is quite slow (around 1-2 Mb/s), but in upcoming releases it will be significantly increased by connecting PCI-E endpoint to MicroBlaze soft processor with AXI DMA engine. However, even such low speed is more than enough for reliable implementation of various practical attacks over PCI-E bus: to demonstrate applied use cases of the design, there’s a tool for pre-boot DMA attacks on UEFI based machines which allow executing arbitrary UEFI DXE drivers during platform init. Another example shows how to use pre-boot DMA attacks to inject Hyper-V VM exit handler backdoor into the virtualization-based security enabled Windows 10 Enterprise running on UEFI Secure Boot enabled platform. Provided Hyper-V backdoor PoC might be useful for reverse engineering and exploit development purposes, it provides an interface for inspecting of hypervisor state (VMCS, physical/virtual memory, registers, etc.) from guest partition and perform the guest to host VM escape attacks.
Inception has been around since at least 2014, but I just noticed it. 😦
Inception is a physical memory manipulation and hacking tool exploiting PCI-based DMA. The tool can attack over FireWire, Thunderbolt, ExpressCard, PC Card and any other PCI/PCIe interfaces. Inception aims to provide a relatively quick, stable and easy way of performing intrusive and non-intrusive memory hacks against live computers using DMA. Inception’s modules work as follows: By presenting a Serial Bus Protocol 2 (SBP-2) unit directory to the victim machine over a IEEE1394 FireWire interface, the victim operating system thinks that a SBP-2 device has connected to the FireWire port. Since SBP-2 devices utilize Direct Memory Access (DMA) for fast, large bulk data transfers (e.g., FireWire hard drives and digital camcorders), the victim lowers its shields and enables DMA for the device. The tool now has full read/write access to the lower 4GB of RAM on the victim. Once DMA is granted, the tool proceeds to search through available memory pages for signatures at certain offsets in the operating system’s code. Once found, the tool manipulates this code. For instance, in the unlock module, the tool short circuits the operating system’s password authentication module that is triggered if an incorrect password is entered. […] However, vendors generally dismiss DMA attacks as a non-issue, which I hope that the awareness that this tool generates will change. Users deserve secure devices, even when attackers gain physical access.[…]
Dmytro has an interesting 6-part twitter post on PCI-e security:
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