Aleph Security: Secure Boot vuln in Qualcomm OnePlus 2

OnePlus 2 Lack of SBL1 Validation Broken Secure Boot
Aleph Research Advisory
CVE-2017-11105

OnePlus 2 (a 2015 Qualcomm Snapdragon 810 device) successfully boots with a tampered Secondary Bootloader (sbl1) partition although it is digitally-signed, hence it is not validated by its Primary Bootloader (PBL), maybe due to lenient hardware configuration. Attackers capable of tampering with the sbl1 partition can then disable the signature validation of the rest of the bootloader chain and other SBL-validated partitions such as TrustZone and ABOOT.[…]

https://alephsecurity.com/vulns/aleph-2017026
https://alephsecurity.com/2017/05/11/oneplus-ota/
https://oneplus.net/
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-10370
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-8850
https://github.com/OnePlusOSS
https://oneplus.net/2/oxygenos

 

 

Trust Issues: Exploiting TrustZone TEEs

by Gal Beniamini, Project Zero

Mobile devices are becoming an increasingly privacy-sensitive platform. Nowadays, devices process a wide range of personal and private information of a sensitive nature, such as biometric identifiers, payment data and cryptographic keys. Additionally, modern content protection schemes demand a high degree of confidentiality, requiring stricter guarantees than those offered by the “regular” operating system. In response to these use-cases and more, mobile device manufacturers have opted for the creation of a “Trusted Execution Environment” (TEE), which can be used to safeguard the information processed within it. In the Android ecosystem, two major TEE implementations exist – Qualcomm’s QSEE and Trustonic’s Kinibi (formerly <t-base). Both of these implementations rely on ARM TrustZone security extensions in order to facilitate a small “secure” operating system, within which “Trusted Applications” (TAs) may be executed. In this blog post we’ll explore the security properties of the two major TEEs present on Android devices. We’ll see how, despite their highly sensitive vantage point, these operating systems currently lag behind modern operating systems in terms of security mitigations and practices. Additionally, we’ll discover and exploit a major design issue which affects the security of most devices utilising both platforms. Lastly, we’ll see why the integrity of TEEs is crucial to the overall security of the device, making a case for the need to increase their defences. […]

 

https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/07/trust-issues-exploiting-trustzone-tees.html

QSEE TrustZone exploitation

TrustZone Kernel Privilege Escalation (CVE-2016-2431)

In this blog post we’ll continue our journey from zero permissions to code execution in the TrustZone kernel. Having previously elevated our privileges to QSEE, we are left with the task of exploiting the TrustZone kernel itself.

“Why?”, I hear you ask. Well… There are quite a few interesting things we can do solely from the context of the TrustZone kernel. To name a few:
* We could hijack any QSEE application directly, thus exposing all of it’s internal secrets. For example, we could directly extract the stored real-life fingerprint or various secret encryption keys (more on this in the next blog post!).
 * We could disable the hardware protections provided by the SoC’s XPUs, allowing us to read and write directly to all of the DRAM. This includes the memory used by the peripherals on the board (such as the modem).
 * As we’ve previously seen, we could blow the QFuses responsible for various device features. In certain cases, this could allow us to unlock a locked bootloader (depending on how the lock is implemented).

So now that we’ve set the stage, let’s start by surveying the attack surface! […]

https://bits-please.blogspot.com/2016/06/trustzone-kernel-privilege-escalation.html

Qualcomm QSEE

There are some interesting developments in Qualcomm’s Secure Execution Environment (QSEE).

http://bits-please.blogspot.co.il/2016/05/war-of-worlds-hijacking-linux-kernel.html
http://bits-please.blogspot.com/2016/05/qsee-privilege-escalation-vulnerability.html