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U-Boot v2017.09 released

Tom Rini has announced the v2017.09 release of U-Boot. And it clarifies status of VU166743/CVE-2017-3225/CVE-2017-3226, excerpt below:

I’ve released v2017.09 and it’s now live on git and FTP and ACD (along with PGP sig file). There’s a few things I need to headline in this release. First and foremost is https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/166743 (aka CVE-2017-3225 and CVE-2017-3226). If you’re using CONFIG_ENV_AES in your project, you have security implications to worry about and decide the correct path forward in. With respect to the community, I marked it as deprecated for this release, and I plan to remove it for the next release unless someone with relevant background steps up and wants to rewrite the code in question (and make sure the rest of the environment code isn’t going to lead to other issues similar to CVE-2017-3226). Both of the issues in question here could be fixed but the worry is about it being the “tip of the iceberg” in the area. […]

Full announcement:

https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2017-September/305340.html

 

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more on U-Boot encryption vulnerabilties

Re: https://firmwaresecurity.com/2017/09/08/u-boot-aes-cbc-encryption-multiple-vulnerabilities/

I asked on the U-Boot mailing list for more information on this issue. The response from Tom Rini of Konsulko:

So, I mentioned this in the patch that migrated the option to Kconfig and marked it deprecated, and I plan to mention it in the release notes on Monday. But, this option has no in-tree users and I plan to remove the code in the near term, if no one with the relevant background steps up to re-implement it. Thanks!

Full post:

https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2017-September/305181.html

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U-Boot AES-CBC encryption multiple vulnerabilities

Vulnerability Note VU#166743
Das U-Boot AES-CBC encryption implementation contains multiple vulnerabilities

Das U-Boot is a device bootloader that can read its configuration from an AES encrypted file. For devices utilizing this environment encryption mode, U-Boot’s use of a zero initialization vector and improper handling of an error condition may allow attacks against the underlying cryptographic implementation and allow an attacker to decrypt the data.Das U-Boot’s AES-CBC encryption feature uses a zero (0) initialization vector. This allows an attacker to perform dictionary attacks on encrypted data produced by Das U-Boot to learn information about the encrypted data. Devices that make use of Das U-Boot’s AES-CBC encryption feature using environment encryption (i.e., setting the configuration parameter CONFIG_ENV_AES=y) read environment variables from disk as the encrypted disk image is processed. An attacker with physical access to the device can manipulate the encrypted environment data to include a crafted two-byte sequence which triggers an error in environment variable parsing. This error condition is improperly handled by Das U-Boot, resulting in an immediate process termination with a debugging message. The immediate failure can be used as an oracle for a Vaudenay-style timing attack on the cryptography, allowing a dedicated attacker to decrypt and potentially modify the contents of the device. An attacker with physical access to the device may be able to decrypt the device’s contents. The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem.[…]

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/166743

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