Xeno has updated his Timeglider with recent research!
Xeno has updated it again. Look at his current tweets to see the indivual entries added. Xeno is one of the pioneers of firmware security research, and this is basically the canon list of HW/FW issues.
Required reading for anyone reading a blog like this.
I’ll be blunt, I *LOVE* the data, but I wish it was a plain web page, TimeGlider makes the data less useful to me.
Hoping someday the data expands to virtualization-level firmware, in addition to bare-metal.
Apple firmware security researcher Nikolaj Schlej has been working from Europe, and is now moving to the US.
Nice picture of the Xeno, Corey, and Nikolaj in the above tweet.
Most job offers are from headhunters. This one comes from one of the pioneers of firmware security research!
During the initial Intel AMT bug report, Xeno of Apple tweeted that Apple didn’t use AMT.
Recently, Microsoft has also stated that the Surface devices don’t use AMT:
This is the *BEST* index to hardware/firmware attacks for Intel systems. And it has been updated for recent research!!
Low level PC attack papers by Xeno Kovah
It appears Mac OS X 10.12.2 has some firmware-related security updates, with some defense against PCILeech:
macOS FileVault2 Password Retrieval
“macOS FileVault2 let attackers with physical access retrieve the password in clear text by plugging in a $300 Thunderbolt device into a locked or sleeping mac. The password may be used to unlock the mac to access everything on it. To secure your mac just update it with the December 2016 patches. Anyone including, but not limited to, your colleagues, the police, the evil maid and the thief will have full access to your data as long as they can gain physical access – unless the mac is completely shut down. If the mac is sleeping it is still vulnerable. Just stroll up to a locked mac, plug in the Thunderbolt device, force a reboot (ctrl+cmd+power) and wait for the password to be displayed in less than 30 seconds!
Recovering the password is just one of the things that are possible unless the security update is applied. Since EFI memory can be overwritten it is possible to do more evil …
December 13th: Apple released macOS 10.12.2 which contains the security update. At least for some hardware – like my MacBook Air.
Look at recent Tweets from Xeno Kovah, he has multiple posts with information about the 10.12.2 update:
I’ll admit, I didn’t find any firmwaer information in their release:
WOW!!, Nikolaj joins Apple!! First they hired Legbacore, now Nikolaj!
As well, UEFITool has new maintainers, Alex and Dmytro!!
Back in November, Apple hired Legbacore’s hardware/firmware experts to help secure Apple hardware.
Ok, that was months ago. But for the last week, the above URL re-appeared on this blog’s stats as the most visited URL. Then, a few days later, there’s now a slew of stories on this, like it just happened today. Today, this is the top store on Google News for UEFI. Strange, how tech news works.
I am eagerly awaiting to see the results of their work, I hope future macs have a “Legbacore”-ready logo on it, or something so I know it’s better than the older hardware. 🙂
WOW, LegbaCore closes down, Xeno and Corey join Apple!!!!
I expect Apple will shortly have MUCH MORE secure firmware/hardware systems, with their help! Other OEMs should be a little scared today.
At GSEC HITB Singapore 2015, Legbacore gave pre-conference training. As well, they gave a presentation on Thunderstrike. Beyond the presentation slides, the whitepaper is now available!
Apple has announced an EFI securtity update for Mac OS X 10.9.5, apparently due to LegbaCore/MITRE research.
APPLE-SA-2015-10-21-6 Mac EFI Security Update 2015-002
Mac EFI Security Update 2015-002 is now available and addresses the following: EFI
Available for: OS X Mavericks v10.9.5
Impact: An attacker can exercise unused EFI functions
Description: An issue existed with EFI argument handling. This was addressed by removing the affected functions.
CVE-ID: CVE-2015-7035 : Corey Kallenberg, Xeno Kovah, John Butterworth, and Sam Cornwell of The MITRE Corporation, coordinated via CERT
Installation note: Mac EFI Security Update 2015-002 may be obtained from the Mac App Store.
In addition to this EFI update, Apple has released Multiple Security Updates:
They’ve added a 2-day training course on BIOS/SMM, “Advanced x86: Introduction to BIOS & SMM”! The BIOS researchers at MITRE — and half of them now at LebaCore — are one of the main pioneers of BIOS research, and this is one of ther main training sessions. Wow!
“Around 2011, the trustworthy system measurement research project that Xeno Kovah was running at MITRE decided to start digging deeper than the Windows kernel and rootkit detection, to try and detect malicious software at the BIOS level. Xeno & Corey Kallenberg continued to work on Kernel, while team member John Butterworth was tasked with starting to learn about BIOS in parallel. John’s work led to the “BIOS Chronomancy” work (published at both BlackHat and ACM CCS), porting the team’s existing Timing-Based Attestation system from the kernel level down to the BIOS. Xeno then asked John to start making an open source training class to capture his knowledge, the same way that Xeno & Corey had captured their past knowledge on the project and uploaded it to OST. John created a 2 day Intro BIOS class and got it public released from MITRE. The intention originally was that it would cover all basics of BIOS which would be applicable to both legacy BIOS, CoreBoot, or UEFI-based systems. And then it was expected there would be a follow on class digging deeper into the specifics of UEFI. Unfortunately time prohibited the creation of that 2nd 2 days of classes focusing on UEFI, so you can see that some minimal UEFI content was eventually shoehorned into this class, though frequently there isn’t enough time to get to it within 2 days. It is our hope that this Introductory BIOS & SMM class will help demystify how x86 systems work at the low levels, so that people can better understand the BIOS/SMM/SecureBoot vulnerabilities described in the team’s work while at MITRE, and later after Xeno & Corey founded LegbaCore. With this knowledge in hand, hopefully students can fully appreciate and explain to others why it is so critical that BIOS patch management be performed by organizations, to eliminate the vulnerabilities that lurk at this level.
The 2-day agenda:
Introduction to BIOS concepts
General system configuration responsibilities
Security-specific configuration responsibilities
SPI flash chip
Usage of PCI for x86 system internals
Talking to hardware through the PCI configuration space
PCI Option ROMs (and their use in attack)
BIOS access control mechanisms
How they fail
Tools to detect their failure
System Management Mode (SMM)
Why SMM is basically the best place for an attacker to live on an x86 system
Discussion of how the BIOS instantiates SMM from flash chip contents
Discussion of how attackers can break into SMM even without persisting on the flash chip
Introduction to UEFI BIOS
The UEFI phases and security parameters specific to UEFI
UEFI Firmware Filesystem
Reverse engineering UEFI modules
Applying UEFI structure definitions in IDA Pro
How Secure Boot & Measured Boot work
Attacks against Secure Boot
Attacks against Measured Boot
Specific tools useful for performing further firmware security research
The recent Lenovo LSE blunder made most of the world aware of Windows WBPT ACPI table and how the firmware injects an executable into the OS, a feature of Windows that all OEMs are likely using. While the media is wondering about WBPT and why it’s not prominently displayed on many web sites, Xeno of LegbaCore pointed out that Alex Ionescu gave a talk at SyScan 2012 on this specific topic:
ACPI 5.0 Rootkit Attacks Againts Windows 8
This talk will disclose certain new features of the ACPI 5.0 Specification which is now public and was primarily designed to support ACPI on ARM Embedded SoCs for the upcoming release of Windows 8. Some of these new features have important security considerations which have not been traditionally monitored by security products and/or users, specifically in the areas of covert code execution at Ring 0 privileges.
Thanks for reminding us, Xeno!
A while ago, I emailed Corey and Xeno of LegbaCore, and sent them a few questions for an ‘interview’ for this blog. Well, here’s the results (also see EOM for URLs):
Q: This October in Singapore you’re giving 3-days of training at HITB. Besides new Apple EFI skills, can you give us some other new things that’ll be in this training?
A: The course introduces the basics of evaluating firmware and SMM on modern platforms for security vulnerabilities, as well as for potential compromises. Specifically we work through methodologies for identifying whether or not your system contains publically known vulnerabilities (which a great majority of them do). We also introduce a firmware forensic and reverse engineering methodology for identifying potential firmware compromises… so say if you got comprised by something like the hacking team UEFI rootkit, we’d talk about the tools and procedures that would be useful for identifying and analyzing this threat both on one particular system and at scale across your enterprise.
The most important point of the training is it will be focused on real hardware that is deployed in real environments. A large portion of the course will involve evaluating the hardware that students bring with them. This way if you’re in charge of malware detection/response in an enterprise, you’ll walk away with actionable information related to the hardware you are deploying on your network.
Q: You had a Twitter post a few weeks (months?) back, saying that you were going to start releasing information about OEM systems’s vulnerabilities. What’s up with that project, I’m eager to see this data, as Consumer Reports and other computer review sources are useless for this most crucial pre-sales information. Any chance you could give FirmwareSecurity.com a teaser of this information, perhaps one new OEM model released in the last 6 months that’s insecure? 🙂
A: We anticipate that the project to start making some vendors’ firmware security failings more apparent (via a public website) will probably kick off in early 2016. We want to give all vendors that we think may have an interest in improving their security a chance to either talk with us about working with them, or show that they can make measurable security improvements on their own within this timeframe.
Q: You had a Twitter post a few days ago, pointing to a new LegbaCore Github repository for a new Option ROM checking tool. This sounds very interesting! What kinds of Option ROM(s) will it support? What platform(s) will it run on? When can we expect initial release?
A: It will only integrity check the Apple Thunderbolt to Ethernet adapter’s option ROM. It will work in conjunction with a port of the linux tg3 kernel driver to run on Macs to dump the OROM. The “ethtool” command can also be run to dump the OROM on linux systems that have a thunderbolt port and the tg3 driver available. The tool will be released to coincide with the talk at BlackHat, August 6th.
Q: Beyond this new Option ROM checker, does LegbaCore have any additional tool plans in the works? If so, any details to reveal?
A: Our current thinking on tools is that we expect that we will make clean-slate “best effort” tools freely available at some point in the future. These tools would be like all typical security tools, being not particularly trustworthy, and thus vulnerable to attacker subversion. They would mostly be useful for catching attackers as they first enter into the domain, and are not particularly sophisticated. However we will only make those tools available once we have commercial-grade tools available, that have a trust argument for why these paid tools have the ability to stand up to sophisticated and well-resourced adversaries. And in the background we will work with vendors to add capabilities such as SMM Dual Monitor mode, which significantly strengthen the trust arguments
Q: The Copernicus release is mostly Windows-centric, but also includes a cross-platform, bios_diff.py tool in the release. Will the new LegbaCore github tree include a open source bios_diff project, perhaps to get open source patches for improved BIOS parsing beyond EFIPWN, perhaps like that in UEFITool?
A: While bios_diff.py continues to provide the only simple, semantically aware integrity checking capability for BIOS, it has a number of issues. E.g. in the context of our latest work, it simply doesn’t work to integrity check Apple firmware, because Apple firmware update structure does not look the same as the structure on-disk.
Q: Post-October/HITB, what’s the next LegbaCore BIOS/UEFI security training event you’ll be giving?
A: Later in October I’ll be offering a similar training at Ruxcon breakpoint. Beyond that we are fairly busy with private training engagements.
Q: Any hints what kind of new firmware vulnerability research you’re working on, and when we might see some of the results?
A: We are branching out to the security of peripheral devices such as network cards, HDs/SSDs, embedded controllers, GPUs, the Intel Management Engine, etc. We are shooting to have our first talk on one of these topics around December.
Q: Recently Stephan of coreboot mentioned that in the past MITRE said that Chrome OS firmware was more secure than UEFI. Both coreboot+depthcharge’s Verified Boot and UEFI’s Secure Boot both seem pretty similar, in terms of PKI usage. Have you an opinion on the security strength of either of these firmware solutions?
A: We have never evaluated CoreBoot to any level of depth. Hardware-wise, we like the Chromebook requirement to provide physical write protection for the flash chip via a screw. The way that Chromebooks supposedly root their boot trust in the embedded controller hardware, as described to us, sounded like a good idea. But without having actually spent time looking at the platforms, we cannot say much in terms of the security (or lack thereof) relative to UEFI-based systems.
—-[End of interview.]
Thanks Corey and Xeno!
<blink>THEIR OPROM CHECKER IS RELEASED!</blink>
The code was added 5 days ago, and I missed it!
Stephan’s comment on coreboot security:
The pre-conference preview videos are coming out… 🙂 One firmware one that caught my attention:
Thunderstrike 2 “firmworm” for MacBooks Preview Video
In DEF CON is happening shortly, or maybe it’s cancelled, I’m not sure. 🙂 Two talks immediately jump out:
ThunderStrike 2: Sith Strike
Trammel Hudson Vice President, Two Sigma Investments
Xeno Kovah Co-founder, LegbaCore, LLC
Corey Kallenberg Co-Founder, LegbaCore, LLC
The number of vulnerabilities in firmware disclosed as affecting Wintel PC vendors has been rising over the past few years. Although several attacks have been presented against Mac firmware, unlike their PC counterparts, all of them required physical presence to perform. Interestingly, when contacted with the details of previously disclosed PC firmware attacks, Apple systematically declared themselves not vulnerable. This talk will provide conclusive evidence that Mac’s are in fact vulnerable to many of the software only firmware attacks that also affect PC systems. In addition, to emphasize the consequences of successful exploitation of these attack vectors, we will demonstrate the power of the dark side by showing what Mac firmware malware is capable of.
Attacking Hypervisors Using Firmware and Hardware
Yuriy Bulygin Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
Mikhail Gorobets Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
Alexander Matrosov Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Advanced Threat Research, Intel Security
Andrew Furtak Security Researcher
In this presentation, we explore the attack surface of modern hypervisors from the perspective of vulnerabilities in system firmware such as BIOS and in hardware emulation. We will demonstrate a number of new attacks on hypervisors based on system firmware vulnerabilities with impacts ranging from VMM DoS to hypervisor privilege escalation to SMM privilege escalation from within the virtual machines. We will also show how a firmware rootkit based on these vulnerabilities could expose secrets within virtual machines and explain how firmware issues can be used for analysis of hypervisor-protected content such as VMCS structures, EPT tables, host physical addresses (HPA) map, IOMMU page tables etc. To enable further hypervisor security testing, we will also be releasing new modules in the open source CHIPSEC framework to test issues in hypervisors when virtualizing hardware.
And that’s just the ‘tip of the iceberg, for talks… Teddy Reed (author of UEFI Firmware Parser) has a talk. Joe FitzPatrick (of SecuringHardware.com) has a talk. There’s a talk on hardware side-channel attacks, one on BadUSB-like security, one on hardware trust, on medical device security, and a few other firmware-related talks, around 31 hits to ‘firmware’ in the schedule! Amongst the Workshops, there are some fun ones, including: ARM for pentesters, and Embedded System Design. In the Villages, the Hardware Hacking Village and the IoT Village sound interesting.
From the firstname.lastname@example.org announce list, Apple has an EFI update for multiple systems, available from the App Store. Two CVEs are listed:
APPLE-SA-2015-06-30-3 Mac EFI Security Update 2015-001
Mac EFI Security Update 2015-001 is now available and addresses the following:
Available for: OS X Mountain Lion v10.8.5, OS X Mavericks v10.9.5
Impact: A malicious application with root privileges may be able to modify EFI flash memory
Description: An insufficient locking issue existed with EFI flash when resuming from sleep states. This issue was addressed through improved locking.
CVE-2015-3692 : Trammell Hudson of Two Sigma Investments, Xeno Kovah and Corey Kallenberg of LegbaCore LLC, Pedro Vilaca
Available for: OS X Mountain Lion v10.8.5, OS X Mavericks v10.9.5
Impact: A malicious application may induce memory corruption to escalate privileges
Description: A disturbance error, also known as Rowhammer, exists with some DDR3 RAM that could have led to memory corruption. This issue was mitigated by increasing memory refresh rates.
CVE-2015-3693 : Mark Seaborn and Thomas Dullien of Google, working from original research by Yoongu Kim et al (2014)