The GRSecurity post has a few more links as well:
Full disclosure: we have a competing production-ready solution to defend against code reuse attacks called RAP, see [R1], [R2]. RAP isn’t tied to any particular CPU architecture or operating system, and it scales to real-life software from Xen to Linux to Chromium with excellent performance.
In summary, Intel’s CET is mainly a hardware implementation of Microsoft’s weak CFI implementation with the addition of a shadow stack. Its use will require the presence of Intel processors that aren’t expected to be released for several years. Rather than truly innovating and advancing the state of the art in performance and security guarantees as RAP has, CET merely cements into hardware existing technology known and bypassed by academia and industry that is too weak to protect against the larger class of code reuse attacks. One can’t help but notice a striking similarity with Intel’s MPX, another software-dependent technology announced with great fanfare a few years ago that failed to live up to its many promises and never reached its intended adoption as the solution to end buffer overflow attacks and exists only as yet another bounds-checking based debugging technology.