BadUSB 2.0

BadUSB 2.0 USB MITM POC: The advanced uses and capabilities of rogue USB hardware implants for use in cyber espionage activities is still very much an unknown quantity in the industry. Security professionals are in considerable need of tools capable of exploring the threat landscape, and generating awareness in this area. BadUSB2, is a tool capable of compromising USB fixed-line communications through an active man-in-the-middle attack. It is able to achieve the same results as hardware keyloggers, keyboard emulation, and BadUSB hardware implants. Furthermore, BadUSB2 introduces new techniques to defeat keyboard-based one-time-password systems, automatically replay user credentials, as well as acquiring an interactive command shell over USB. […] So how is this any different from existing USB hardware implants like the Rubber Ducky, or keyloggers. Firstly, the devices I’ve seen can only achieve one or two attack classes such as eavesdropping or message fabrication. BadUSB2 can eavesdrop, replay, modify, fabricate, exfiltrate data and BadUSB in one device. Furthermore, when combining these attack classes really interesting attack scenarios begin to surface. Secondly, keyboard emulation devices register as an additional USB device making them easy to detect and block, i.e. why do I now have two keyboards attached!? Yes, such devices can be easily detected and blocked. The same can be said of BadUSB, it often needs to register as a secondary USB device to perform a malicious task. BadUSB2 is an INLINE hardware implant giving it the stealth of a hardware keylogger but far more capabilities as mentioned above. Finally, (law of 3’s), just cos. […] This project builds on the USB-MITM architecture introduced by Rijnard van Tonder and Herman Engelbrecht in their paper titled, “Lowering the USB Fuzzing Barrier by Transparent Two-Way Emulation”. A special thanks to Rijnard for such a brilliant idea. […]

https://github.com/withdk/badusb2-mitm-poc