more on Spectre and Meltdown

Yes, privsec _within_ ME, exactly this!

Remember ME's Dynamically Loaded Applications (DAL)? They are essentially JVM for semi-untrusted code (provided by 3rd parties) – how about trying Meltdown/Spectre from there to steal secrets from the ME's TCB? https://t.co/8rDUkp3V1O

— Joanna Rutkowska (@rootkovska) January 10, 2018

Also, since Intel essentially controls the whole toolchain (i.e. the compiler) for building SGX enclaves, I expect SGX code will be first to get protection against Specre attacks, and best coverage also…?

/cc @lavados @tehjh @misc0110 @anders_fogh

— Joanna Rutkowska (@rootkovska) January 10, 2018

Awesome demo of #Meltdown and how it is mitigated in CentOS 7 #kpti #KAISER https://t.co/w0QwiGtknC

— Daniel Gruss (@lavados) January 10, 2018

This video shows a #Meltdown attack on *uncached* data. The data is not in L1, not in L2, and not in L3 cache. That's what clflush does, it throws the data out of all caches. #Meltdown exploits a race condition and even for uncached data this race can be won. https://t.co/W2CQRS9zmt

— Daniel Gruss (@lavados) January 10, 2018