Intel seeks Offensive Security Researcher

I hadn’t heard of the Intel STORM org before, excerpt of a description from Wired magazine[1]:

Intel’s offensive security research team comprises about 60 people who focus on proactive security testing and in-depth investigations. STORM is a subset, about a dozen people who specifically work on prototyping exploits to show their practical impact.

https://jobs.intel.com/ShowJob/Id/2172583/Offensive%20Security%20Researcher

Apparently this group has a Twitter account but has not tweeted, and has a Github account but has no files:

https://github.com/intelstormteam

[1] https://www.wired.com/story/intel-meltdown-spectre-storm/

Xilinx: Design Advisory for Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC/RFSoC: Encrypt Only Boot Mode – Unauthenticated Boot and Partition Headers

https://blog.f-secure.com/hardware-security-team-says-flawed-secure-boot-schemes-becoming-too-common/

https://www.xilinx.com/support/answers/72588.html

Eclypsium on Windows drivers

https://github.com/eclypsium/Screwed-Drivers

Yep, drivers, in general, are screwed. 🙂 Certified Windows drivers merely mean the drivers passed some basic tests. There are lots of gaps in how drivers are tested on Windows. (If Microsoft has open-sourced these tests, it would be helpful for researchers to find coverage gaps.) The UEFI SCTs are a minimum bar at feature testing, and have no security tests …and CHIPSEC only helps with security testing on Intel systems, not AMD nor ARM vendors. Does Linux have any equivalent tests for drivers, last time I looked into the LTP and some related projects it did not. Does Apple have tests like this for drivers?

Musings on the Microsoft Component Firmware Update (CFU) Protocol

Richard Hughes, of the Linux FWUpd project, has a new blog post about the new Microsoft UEFI update mechanism, CFU (Component Firmware Update):

https://github.com/microsoft/CFU

PS: When you see duplicate URLs in a post, like above, it is because the WordPress web UI for pasting URLs is broken. 😦

System Boot and Security Microconference at Linux Plumbers Conference 2019

The security of computer systems is a very important topic for many years. It has been taken into the account in the OSes and applications for a long time. However, security of the firmware and boot process has not been taken so seriously until recently. Now that is changing. Firmware is more often being designed with security in mind. Boot processes are also evolving. There are many security solutions available there and even some that are now becoming common. However, they are often not complete solutions and solve problems only partially. So, it is good time to integrate various approaches and build full top-down solutions. There is a lot happening in that area right now. New projects arise, e.g. TrenchBoot, and they meet various design, implementation, validation, etc. obstacles. The goal of this microconference is to foster a discussion of the various approaches and hammer out, if possible, the best solutions for the future. Perfect sessions should discuss various designs and/or the issues and limitations of the available security technologies and solutions that were encountered during the development process. […]Expected topics: TPMs, SRTM and DRTM, Intel TXT, AMD SKINIT, attestation, UEFI secure boot, IMA, Intel SGX, boot loaders, firmware, OpenBMC, etc.

https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/page/21-lpc-2019-overview

https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/page/34-accepted-microconferences#security

Some presentation abstracts are online, eg:

Non-UEFI-aware measured boot using coreboot, GRUB and TPM2.0
https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/517/

Secure and Trusted boot in OpenBMC
https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/515/

FIRM-AFL: High-Throughput Greybox Fuzzing of IoT Firmware via Augmented Process Emulation

By: Yaowen Zheng, Ali Davanian, Heng Yin, Chengyu Song, Hongsong Zhu, and Limin Sun

Cyber attacks against IoT devices are a severe threat. These attacks exploit software vulnerabilities in IoT firmware. Fuzzing is an effective software testing technique for vulnerability discovery. In this work, we present FIRM-AFL, the first high-throughput greybox fuzzer for IoT firmware. FIRM-AFL addresses two fundamental problems in IoT fuzzing. First, it addresses compatibility issues by enabling fuzzing for POSIX-compatible firmware that can be emulated in a system emulator. Second, it addresses the performance bottleneck caused by system-mode emulation with a novel technique called augmented process emulation. By combining system-mode emulation and user-mode emulation in a novel way, augmented process emulation provides high compatibility assystem-mode emulation and high throughput as user-mode emulation. Our evaluation results show that (1) FIRM-AFL is fully functional and capable of finding real-world vulnerabilities in IoT programs; (2) the throughput of FIRM-AFL is on average 8.2 times higher than system-mode emulation based fuzzing; and (3) FIRM-AFL is able to find 1-day vulnerabilities much faster than system-mode emulation based fuzzing, and is able to find 0-day vulnerabilities.

https://www.cs.ucr.edu/~heng/pubs/FirmAFL.pdf

https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/zheng

https://github.com/zyw-200/FirmAFL

Coverage-guided fuzzing of embedded firmware with avatar

[Have not found the source code to this; if you do, please put the URL in a Comment to this blog post. Thanks.]

In this work, we present AFLtar, a coverage-guided fuzzer for embedded firmware. AFLtar leverages avatar 2 , an orchestration framework for dynamic analysis, along with the American Fuzzy Lop coverage-guided fuzzer and the AFL-Unicorn CPU emulator. The goal of AFLtar is to reduce the cost of embedded fuzzing by providing a platform that can be used to quickly setup a firmware fuzzing job, while reaping the benefits of modern, feedback-driven fuzzing strategies.

https://siagas.math.unipd.it/siagas/getTesi.php?id=2030

OS/2 to support UEFI

Arca Noae, the company that bought OS/2 from IBM, is adding UEFI support:

https://www.arcanoae.com/arca-noae-progress-report-arcaos-on-uefi-only-hardware/

Going off-topic: When OS/2 was created, IBM wanted to move from the OEM-cloneable IBM PC to the PS/2 system, which had ABIOS, a reentrant protect mode BIOS. Microsoft had to do a clean-room reverse engineering of the IBM PS/2 ABIOS. For Microsoft OEMs, ABIOS was a PITA for OEMs who wanted a full clone of OS/2. IBM did not publish a Technical Manual with the source code to ABIOS, unlike BIOS. 🙂

awesome-embedded-and-iot-security: Awesome List on embedded and IoT security.

From the makers of the FACT firmware tool:

https://github.com/fkie-cad/awesome-embedded-and-iot-security

See-also: https://github.com/PreOS-Security/awesome-firmware-security and
https://github.com/uefitech/resources and
https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/11/25/awesome-uefi/ and


7 new security advisories from Intel

The post-DEF CON/Black Hat queue: 🙂

Intel® Computing Improvement Program Advisory
INTEL-SA-00283
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00283.html

Intel® Processor Identification Utility for Windows* Advisory
INTEL-SA-00281
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00281.html

Intel® Remote Displays SDK Advisory
INTEL-SA-00277
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00277.html

Intel® Driver & Support Assistant Advisory
INTEL-SA-00276
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00276.html

Intel® Authenticate Advisory
INTEL-SA-00275
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00275.html

Intel® NUC Advisory
INTEL-SA-00272
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00272.html

Intel® RAID Web Console 2 Advisory
INTEL-SA-00246
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00246.html

new zine: Paged Out!

https://pagedout.institute/

Click to access PagedOut_001_beta1.pdf

See-also: related zines like Phrack and POC||GTFO.

Firmware_Slap: Discovering vulnerabilities in firmware through concolic analysis and function clustering

Firmware slap combines concolic analysis with function clustering for vulnerability discovery and function similarity in firmware. Firmware slap is built as a series of libraries and exports most information as either pickles or JSON for integration with other tools.

https://github.com/ChrisTheCoolHut/Firmware_Slap

Firmware Slap