FBI: Cyber Actors Use IoT Devices as Proxies for Malicious Cyber Activities

Reboot your IoT Devices regularly!

https://www.ic3.gov/media/2018/180802.aspx

https://www.ic3.gov/media/2017/171017-1.aspx

“Reboot devices regularly, as most malware is stored in memory and removed upon a device reboot. It is important to do this regularly as many actors compete for the same pool of devices and use automated scripts to identify vulnerabilities and infect devices.”

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST17-001

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2018/08/02/FBI-Releases-Article-Securing-Internet-Things

https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST17-001

 

 

CVE-2018-3968: Cisco using outdated U-boot in Cujo

Let’s hope Cisco Talos will let Mitre/NVD about the details soon. No info on the Talos or Cisco security sites, nor even *Twitter*!, AFAICT. 🙂

https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2018-August/336973.html

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3968

——– Forwarded Message ——–
Subject: [U-Boot] Talos Security Advisory (TALOS-2018-0633/CVE-2018-3968 )
Date: Thu, 2 Aug 2018 18:52:03 +0000

Hello,

Cisco Talos team discovered a security issue impacting Cujo product using an outdated version of U-boot. We’ve assigned a CVE for this issue (CVE-2018-3968) and have attached a copy of the security advisory provided to Cujo.

Disclose.io Legal Framework for Security Researchers

Paul again.

As far as I know, this is the first effort to tidy up and standardize the legalities around bug bounty programs. Security research is already legally fraught, particularly in the US. Bug bounty programs that pay meaningful amounts are clearly a great step, but there have already been multiple instances of security researchers attempting to do the right thing, and being thwarted by the process – more, and standardized legal protection should help.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/08/new-open-source-effort-legal-code-to-make-reporting-security-bugs-safer/

Are there any bug bounty programs in the firmware and/or hardware domain directly?

Apple has one that covers their (low SKU) product line, but things get complicated when a shipping system has components from so many distinct providers and a manufacturer makes so many SKUs. Seems like the buck should still stop at the integrated system manufacturer – eg: Dell, Lenovo, HP, Supermicro, etc, and at the component manufacturer for components that can be replaced – HDDs, SSDs, discrete PCIe devices.

 

Duo Security purchased by CISCO

Paul writing again. Soon you’ll learn to check the byline, or notice that I’m a lot more wordy than Lee (Hucktech).

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/cisco-buys-security-start-up.html

Duo Security pays more attention than most to platform firmware security, and have done R&D and released open source software in the space. Previously:

Duo Labs releases: IDAPython, Coretex M Firmware and Amnesia modules

Duo on Apple firmware security (and new EFIgy release)

Notably, EFIgy:

https://github.com/duo-labs/EFIgy/

 

 

 

Blog has second poster: Paul English of PreOS Security

So far, this blog has been my daily education, writing down URLs of things I learn that day. A few people also feed me interesting URLs. Paul English, co-founder of PreOS Security[1], has been giving me more and more links, so I’ve asked him to deal with them, instead of asking me to do posts on those URLs. 🙂

This is Paul’s first post:

Meet Us At Black Hat USA 2018

He’s also trying to help fix the WordPress-based site to be more usable. It looks like the font has already changed.

[1] https://preossec.com/

 

Back Doors for Cross-Signed Windows Drivers

https://twitter.com/geoffchappell/status/1024757182687010818

Four undocumented registry values vary the default validation of signatures on kernel-mode code such that Windows 10 may allow cross-signed drivers when it is otherwise documented as requiring Microsoft-signed drivers. This may be welcome for running your own drivers on your own computers without having to send them to Microsoft. Or it may be an unwelcome exposure to software that would install drivers by surprise, including to let malware elevate from administrative access to kernel-mode execution. Setting these values requires administrative access. Their action is subject to System Integrity policy, which provides the best defence.[…]

http://www.geoffchappell.com/notes/security/whqlsettings/

Meet Us At Black Hat USA 2018

Management here – we’ll be at Black Hat USA 2018.. next week. If you’ll be there, be sure and stop by our Arsenal Tools Demo Wednesday, August 8 | 2:30pm-3:50pm, Station #5.

https://www.blackhat.com/us-18/arsenal/schedule/index.html#firmware-audit-platform-firmware-security-automation-for-blue-teams-and-dfir-11359

We’ll be around before and after, attending talks and available for meetings. If you think your employer should be doing more platform firmware security, we’d love to talk! Email to set up a meeting:

blackhatusa2018@preossec.com

Intel updates 2 security whitepapers

Click to access Managed-Runtime-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf

Click to access 337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf

SMM disabling and verification techniques

3mdeb points out that there is a patent by Intel with information focused on disabling Intel SMM.

Don’t click on this link if you’re an engineer and are not allowed to view patent information.

 

https://patents.google.com/patent/US20170168844

System call dispatching on Windows ARM64

Microsoft recently announced that there will be Windows ARM64 devices. This article briefly documents the system call dispatching mechanism for Windows on ARM64. Readers are assumed to be familiar with ARM64 assembly and system call dispatching on Windows x86/x64.[…]

https://gracefulbits.com/2018/07/26/system-call-dispatching-for-windows-on-arm64/

Installing Coreboot on Lenovo X210

[…]The other fun thing about it is that none of the firmware flashing protection is enabled, including Intel Boot Guard. This means running a custom firmware image is possible, and what would a ridiculous custom Thinkpad be without ridiculous custom firmware? A shadow of its potential, that’s what. So, I read the Coreboot[1] motherboard porting guide and set to.[…]

https://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/50924.html

Lenovo should be giving Matthew a free X210 for this effort:

Debian UEFI Secure Boot report from DebConf

DebConf, the Debian conference is happening, and there’s a EFI Secure Boot talk. Slides are listed on the debian-efi list below:

https://lists.debian.org/debian-efi/2018/07/msg00015.html

https://meetings-archive.debian.net/pub/debian-meetings/2018/DebConf18/?