cellular baseband vulnerability for Nissan/Infinity/BMW/Ford

Advisory (ICSA-17-208-01)
Continental AG Infineon S-Gold 2 (PMB 8876)
ATTENTION: Remotely exploitable/low skill level to exploit. Public exploits are available.
Vendor: Continental AG
Equipment: Infineon S-Gold 2 (PMB 8876)
Vulnerabilities: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow, Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer

AFFECTED PRODUCTS: All telematics control modules (TCUs) built by Continental AG that contain the S-Gold 2 (PMB 8876) cellular baseband chipset are affected. The S-Gold 2 (PMB 8876) is found in the following vehicles: <see full announcement for list of Nissan, Infinity, BMW, Ford, etc models.>

An attacker with a physical connection to the TCU may exploit a buffer overflow condition that exists in the processing of AT commands. This may allow arbitrary code execution on the baseband radio processor of the TCU. A vulnerability in the temporary mobile subscriber identity (TMSI) may allow an attacker to access and control memory. This may allow remote code execution on the baseband radio processor of the TCU.

Mickey Shkatov, Jesse Michael, and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk of the Advanced Threat Research Team at McAfee have reported the vulnerabilities.





LTE modem exploitation gives attackers online access

Yesterday at DEF CON 23 this talk happened:

Scared Poopless – LTE and *your* laptop
Mickey Shkatov, Jesse Michael
“With today’s advancement in connectivity and internet access using 3G and LTE modems it seems we all can have a device that’s always internet capable, including our laptops, tablets, 2 in 1’s ultrabook. It becomes easier to be online without using your WiFi at all.  In our talk we will demonstrate and discuss the exploitation of an internal LTE modem from Huawei which can be found in a number of devices including laptops by HP.”

The slides are now available:

Click to access Intel_DC23_SPLTE.pdf


Recon 2015 presentation on firmware security available

At Recon 2015 this talk happened:

Attacking and Defending BIOS in 2015

In this presentation we will demonstrate multiple types of recently discovered BIOS vulnerabilities. We will detail how hardware configuration is restored upon resume from sleep and how BIOS can be attacked when waking up from sleep using “S3 resume boot script” vulnerabilities. Similarly, we will discuss the impact of insufficient protection of persistent configuration data in non-volatile storage and more. We’ll also describe how to extract contents of SMRAM using above vulnerabilities and advanced methods such as Graphics aperture DMA to further perform analysis of the SMM code that would otherwise be protected. Additionally, we will detail “SMI input pointer” and other new types of vulnerabilities specific to SMI handlers. Finally, we will describe how each class of issues is mitigated as a whole and introduce new modules to CHIPSEC framework to test systems for these types of issues.

Speakers: Yuriy Bulygin, Mikhail Gorobets, Andrew Furtak, Oleksandr Bazhaniuk, Alexander Matrosov, Mickey Shkatov

Check out this Twitter post for an URL to the newly-available presentation: