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Qubes: Anti Evil Maid (AEM): improved TPM support

Anti Evil Maid is an implementation of a TPM-based dynamic (Intel TXT) trusted boot for dracut/initramfs-based OSes (Fedora, Qubes, etc.) with a primary goal to prevent Evil Maid attacks. In short, AEM relies on TPM and a feature found in Intel’s vPro CPUs (TXT) to detect tampering of various boot components.

Even if you don’t use Qubes, this is a good read:

[…]To recap — you need to fully trust:
* CPU (Intel, since we’re depending on TXT)
   + sometimes over-optimizes for performance at the cost of security, see eg. Meltdown/Spectre, cache attacks against SGX enclaves, …
* TPM (various vendors)
   + few known attacks sniffing and injecting commands on the LPC bus; differential power analysis; buggy RSA key generation code
   + note that any potential TPM exploits (should) have no means of compromising your system directly — a TPM under attacker’s control can only be used to hide the fact that a compromise has occurred (ie. defeating the whole AEM feature)
* BIOS (a few vendors)
   + it’s full of holes!
* that the attacker cannot get physically inside your laptop without you noticing (see the glitter hint above)
[…]

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-antievilmaid/commit/da6c1bacfe5f8864e08efcf7903f9867d40629b3
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-antievilmaid
https://blog.invisiblethings.org/2011/09/07/anti-evil-maid.html

 

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Qubes OS 4.0-rc4 released, with Spectre/Meltdown safeguards

Qubes OS 4.0-rc4 has been released!
Jan 31, 2018 by Andrew David Wong in Releases
We’re pleased to announce the fourth release candidate for Qubes 4.0! This release contains important safeguards against the Spectre and Meltdown attacks, as well as bug fixes for many of the issues discovered in the previous release candidate.[…]

https://www.qubes-os.org/

https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2018/01/31/qubes-40-rc4/

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Qubes MSI support for PCI device pass-through with stub domains

MSI support for PCI device pass-through with stub domains
by Simon Gaiser
In this post, we will describe how we fixed MSI support for VMs running in HVM mode in Qubes 4.0. First, allow us to provide some background about the MSI feature and why we need it in the first place.[…]

https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/10/18/msi-support/

 

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Qubes and Golem

Golem is a global, open sourced, decentralized supercomputer that anyone can access. It’s made up of the combined power of user’s machines, from personal laptops to entire datacenters. Anyone will be able to use Golem to compute (almost) any program you can think of, from rendering to research to running websites, in a completely decentralized & inexpensive way. The Golem Network is a decentralized sharing economy of computing power, where anyone can make money ‘renting’ out their computing power or developing & selling software.

https://github.com/rootkovska/rootkovska.github.io/blob/master/papers/2017/Secure%20Computing%20in%20Decentralized%20World.pdf

https://golem.network/

 

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Qubes hardware compatibility tiers

OEMs: note Qubes compatibility levels. Your systems are most likely not secure enough for the high-end tier, time to improve your products.

Level 0: Qubes Compatible Laptop.

Level 1: Qubes Certified Laptop.

Level 2: Qubes Stateless Laptop

https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2017/07/08/toward-a-reasonably-secure-laptop/

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Pandavirtualization: Exploiting the Xen hypervisor

Pandavirtualization: Exploiting the Xen hypervisor
Posted by Jann Horn, Project Zero

On 2017-03-14, I reported a bug to Xen’s security team that permits an attacker with control over the kernel of a paravirtualized x86-64 Xen guest to break out of the hypervisor and gain full control over the machine’s physical memory. The Xen Project publicly released an advisory and a patch for this issue 2017-04-04. To demonstrate the impact of the issue, I created an exploit that, when executed in one 64-bit PV guest with root privileges, will execute a shell command as root in all other 64-bit PV guests (including dom0) on the same physical machine.[…]

https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-212.html

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1184

https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/pandavirtualization-exploiting-xen.html

 

 

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