Absolute included in new Microsoft Surface devices

Excerpt from press release:

Absolute to Support New Microsoft Surface Pro 4 and Surface Book

Absolute(R) Software Corporation today announced support for the upcoming Microsoft(R) Surface Pro 4 and Surface Book devices. Persistence(R) technology by Absolute will be embedded into the firmware of these devices at the factory. Once activated, Absolute Data & Device Security (formerly Absolute Computrace(R)) will deliver a reliable two-way connection with all endpoints, regardless of user or location, enabling IT to maintain control of these devices and the data they contain.

Full press release:
https://www.absolute.com/en/about/pressroom/press-releases/2015/absolute-to-support-new-microsoft-surface-pro-4-and-surface-book

Windows Trusted Boot bypass

Microsoft: Trusted Boot Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
CVE-2015-2552
Product: Windows NT series 8.0+
Affected versions: See “systems affected”.
Reported by: “Myria”

An attacker with administrative access to a Windows machine with UEFI Secure Boot enabled may bypass code signing policy checks by putting intentionally-malformed configuration options in the boot configuration database (BCD).

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms15-111.aspx

http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2552

http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Oct/70

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/3096447

 

Mike Terrill on Windows 10’s Secure Boot and Cfg Mgr

Mike Terrill has an article on using Windows 10 and Secure Boot, and using Configuration Manager to show the state of Secure Boot:

Inventory Secure Boot State and UEFI with ConfigMgr

Now that Windows 10 has been released, you are probably starting to take a closer look at the new OS and the related security benefits that it has to offer.  Secure Boot is a supported security feature in Windows 10 that secures the boot process by only allowing the loading of drivers and boot loaders that are signed with a trusted signature.  The first versions of Windows to support Secure Boot were Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012.  Secure Boot requires computer systems to be running UEFI 2.3.1 (or later).  Legacy ROMs or compatibility support modules (CSM) must be disabled in order to enable Secure Boot. In this blog, I will show you how to extend the Configuration Manager hardware inventory so that you can report on the state of Secure Boot in your environment.  This will not only tell you which systems have Secure Boot enabled or disabled, but it will also help you detect systems that are not currently running UEFI (the ones running in BIOS mode).  Identifying these systems will be helpful when determining the deployment method that you will select when moving to Windows 10.  If it is a requirement of your security team that all systems running Windows 10 must also be running Secure Boot, it will give you an idea on how much effort will be involved during the deployment process. […]

Inventory Secure Boot State and UEFI with ConfigMgr

 

Clarification of Matthew Garrett’s Linux fork

Some irresponsible bloggers have been commenting about Matthew’s fork of Linux:

Matthew Garrett’s new Linux fork

MJG on Linux securelevel

ZDNet has a story with comments from Matthew explaining things:

“I wouldn’t say I’m forking. I’d say that I’m doing my own development work away from LKML. Right now it’s got the securelevel work in it because that’s the only code I have that I feel is ready for public use, but it’ll pick up other bits of code that I’m working on as they become mature.”

http://www.zdnet.com/article/matthew-garrett-is-not-forking-linux/

I guess I look at Matthew’s fork is like the GRSecurity patch for Linux kernel: Matthew’s got the patchset that enables UEFI Secure Boot to be secure on Linux. I hope Tails, Qubes, and other security-minded distros use Matthew’s kernel, at least in builds for UEFI-based systems.

[One of the causes of the above issue is Linus having to deal with Microsoft as a CA. UEFI Forum could also deal with this by putting in place a CA that is not an OSV/OEM. OEMs could be making Linux-friendly sytsems, not just Windows- or Chrome boxes, where Linux is an afterthought second install, which is a lot harder to do with UEFI/Windows Secure Boot — and even Chrome Verified Boot. Linux Foundation could also be helping, by working with OEMs.]

Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016 released

Microsoft has updated their Threat Modelling Tool. It appears to be a few years since the last release.

This latest release simplifies working with threats and provides a new editor for defining your own threats.  Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool 2016 has several improvements: a New Threat Grid, a Template Editor, and Migrating Existing Data Flow Diagrams.

If you don’t have a Windows box, you can at least use their EOP card game. 🙂

http://blogs.microsoft.com/cybertrust/2015/10/07/whats-new-with-microsoft-threat-modeling-tool-2016/
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/adopt/eop.aspx
http://threatmodelingbook.com/

Windows 10’s Compact OS feature

Anandtech and other sites have information about Windows 10’s Compact OS feature.

Image from TechNet blog:

Excerpt from MSDN:

Windows 10 includes tools to help you use less drive space. You can now compress the files for the entire operating system, including your preloaded desktop applications. Compact OS lets you run the operating system from compressed files (similar to WIMBoot in Windows 8.1 Update 1), and single-instancing helps you run your pre-loaded Windows desktop applications in compressed files. The new processes helps maintain a small footprint over time by using individual files, rather than combining them in a WIM file. Compact OS installs the operating system files as compressed files. Compact OS is supported on both UEFI-based and BIOS-based devices. Unlike WIMBoot, because the files are no longer combined into a single WIM file, Windows update can replace or remove individual files as needed to help maintain the drive footprint size over time.

More information:
http://www.anandtech.com/show/9676/windows-10-feature-focus-compactos
http://www.windowscentral.com/how-reduce-windows-10-footprint
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/dn940129%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
http://blogs.technet.com/b/mniehaus/archive/2015/09/16/windows-10-reducing-the-disk-footprint.aspx

Bromium Labs on Microsoft Control Flow Guard

Rafal Wojtczuk has a new entry on the Bromium Labs blog, on Microsoft’s Control Flow Guard security feature, and evading it.

http://labs.bromium.com/2015/09/28/an-interesting-detail-about-control-flow-guard/

http://blogs.msdn.com/b/vcblog/archive/2014/12/08/visual-studio-2015-preview-work-in-progress-security-feature.aspx

Intel EFI Disk Utilities

Intel has a set of disk utilities, for creating/checking GPT partitions and FAT file systems. They aren’t included in TianoCore’s EDK2 with the other BSD-licensed UEFI Shell commands. These tools ship separately, with a separate license, presumably due to the tool’s knowledge of FAT file system format. Here’s a brief description of the tools, as excerpted from the download license:

Microsoft EFI Utilities: The term “Microsoft EFI Utilities” shall mean the Guided Partition Table utilities Diskpart (Disk partitioning utility), Efifmt (EFI Format utility) and Efichk (EFI Check Disk utility) stored in a file named GPT_UTIL.zip.

To get the tools, you have to agree to the license on this page, if so you get to download a zip. Then you have to read the readme in that zip, to get the password for the other included zip, which contain the actual tools. Lawyer-designed.

http://www.intel.com/technology/efi/agree_diskutil.htm

The tools come with source, not just binary. They didn’t compile for me, this morning: I think they require a much older EDK2 environment to build. But at least they ship with source, though it is not BSD-licensed Open Source. The tools are old enough that they still use “EFI”, not the newer “UEFI” term.

I wish Intel could donate these tools to the UEFI Forum, so that Intel- *AND* ARM-based users could benefit. TianoCore already has a FAT license, for it’s file system driver. Adding these tools to that package would eliminate one FAT-centric license, and bundle FAT-centric tools along with the FAT-centric file system driver. It would be nice for TianoCore to be able to fix/create ESPs, not just run from ESPs created elsewhere. Perhaps use the Disk Util common code for some other UEFI-based file system diagnostic tools for file systems that UEFI ships, eg UFS, maybe UDF.

Security focus of next Linaro Connect

Linaro Connect is happening in 4 days in San Francisco.

“The theme for the week is security.”

The security track:
* Security requirements on ARMv8-A boot architecture
* Linux kernel generic TEE driver
* OP-TEE Content Decryption with Microsoft PlayReady on ARM
* Expanding security choices: DRM & CA interoperability
* Expanding security choices panel
* Secure storage in OP-TEE
* Lessons learned on migrating open source Chromium-OPTEE to 96Boards
* TBD
* TBD

More Information:
https://www.linaro.org/news/keynote-speakers-lined-up-for-linaro-connect-sfo15/
http://connect.linaro.org/sfo15/

MalwareTech on Microsoft Device Guard

The MalwareTech blog has a good article on Microsoft Device Guard for Windows:

https://twitter.com/MalwareTechBlog/status/644175089173442561

Excerpt:

Everyone is probably already familiar with x64 driver signature enforcement (64-bit Windows systems can only load signed drivers); Well, now Microsoft has introduced a similar feature for user mode code, which is a huge deal when it comes to malware (Currently the feature is only present on Windows 10 Enterprise, but I’m fairly certain as it matures it will make it’s way to home systems). Device Guard not only adds customizable user mode code integrity checks (UMCI), but re-works a lot of the kernel mode code integrity (KMCI) allowing far more flexibility than just allowing all signed drivers. The policy can either be deployed locally by and administrator or from a domain controller, making it scalable for enterprise networks. Something I was actually quite surprised by is the fact that the user mode code integrity is not simply limited to executable (I was expecting Device Guard to be just another throw away pseudo-security feature like UAC, but it’s clear some real thought has gone into this).

Full post:
http://www.malwaretech.com/2015/09/device-guard-beginning-of-end-for.html

Microsoft Device Guard

Thanks to Matt Graeber’s Twitter post, I became aware of Microsoft’s new documentation for Device Guard, a security technology for Microsoft Windows.

https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/643817965620588544

Microsoft Device Guard is a feature set that consists of both hardware and software system integrity hardening features that revolutionize the Windows operating system’s security. Windows 10 employs Device Guard as well as code integrity and advanced hardware features such as CPU virtualization extensions, Trusted Platform Module, and second-level address translation to offer comprehensive modern security to its users. This guide explores the individual features in Device Guard as well as how to plan for, configure, and deploy them. […]

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/mt463091%28v=vs.85%29.aspx

DbgKit 1.3 released

Andrey Bazhan has released version 1.3 of DbgKit, a GUI extension to WinDbg, the Microsoft Windows system debugger, included in the “Debugging Tools for Windows” package. Given that most Windbg extensions are command line, a GUI extension to Windbg is fairly impressive!

“DbgKit is the first GUI extension for Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg, KD, CDB, NTSD). It will show you hierarchical view of processes and detailed information about each process including its full image path, command line, start time, memory statistics, vads, handles, threads, security attributes, modules, environment variables and more.”

http://www.andreybazhan.com/dbgkit.html

Microsoft and ARM collaborate on DRM/secure media solutions

ARM and Microsoft have announced support of integration of technologies that enable DERM on ARM systems, using Microsoft PlayReady and W3C Encrypted Media Extensions (EME):

Press release excerpt:

The major development in this solution is the integration of Microsoft’s PlayReady DRM with W3C EME, OpenCDM, Chromium and Linaro’s Open Portable Trusted Execution Environment (OP-TEE) on ARM TrustZone® technology. The secure media solution has been implemented on an STMicroelectronics STiH410 SoC with an ARM Cortex®-A9 processor at its core. The new solution integrates the following key components: W3C EME, Microsoft PlayReady DRM Porting Kit v3.0, OP-TEE, OpenCDM, and Chromium v43.

“The Linaro Digital Home Group is extremely pleased to deliver this open source secure media solution to the embedded developer community” said Mark Gregotski, Director of the Linaro Digital Home Group. “This collaboration demonstrates how a commercial DRM, such as Microsoft’s PlayReady, can be integrated into a security framework comprised of open-source components, including the Linaro Open Portable TEE running on ARM TrustZone. We hope this will be the catalyst to accelerate the deployment of secure DRM solutions employing open source software.”

“This is a key milestone that showcases how Microsoft PlayReady DRM works cross-platform in a standard way. We are excited about the collaboration with Linaro, ARM, OP-TEE and OpenCDM. This reference implementation simplifies and accelerates the ability of partners to build rich experiences to deliver secure media solutions, while providing market leading content protection using Microsoft PlayReady” said Dave Bossio, Group Program Manager, Windows Devices Group, Security at Microsoft Corporation.

“Trust is key to future media business models, as valuable content must be protected from server to screen,” said Shiv Ramamurthi, Director, Home Segment Marketing, ARM. “The pay TV ecosystem will see immediate content security benefits from the integration of ARM TrustZone and Microsoft PlayReady DRM technology. This latest open source initiative led by the Linaro Home Group is a milestone in the enablement of next-generation secure content and media experiences for consumers.”

“ST has been a strong contributor to the Open Portable Trusted Execution Environment (OP-TEE) in open source, a key enabler for this integration. As a natural step forward, ST is pleased its STiH410 platform is being used as a vehicle for this effort and for an exciting demo at IBC 2015,” said Yingchih Yang, Advanced System and Security Officer of the Consumer Product Division in STMicroelectronics. “Such Linaro contributions will facilitate premium content consumption across various devices including smartphones, tablets, and set-top-boxes, meeting strong market expectations.”

http://www.linaro.org/news/linaro-and-microsoft-collaborate-on-secure-media-solutions-for-arm-based-socs/?sf40842573=1
http://www.microsoft.com/playready/
https://github.com/fraunhoferfokus/open-content-decryption-module
https://github.com/w3c/encrypted-media/
http://www.w3.org/TR/encrypted-media/
https://github.com/OP-TEE

Linux Foundation IT Security Policies: firmware guidance

A  few days ago, the Linux Foundation released new guidance for securing Linux systems. Since the Linux Foundation has mostly remote workers, there are currently 2 documents: one on hardening Linux Workstations, and one for secure group communications, the latter something like a CryptoParty Handbook. Here’s an excerpt of the Hardware/Firmware/Pre-OS section from the Workstation document:

Choosing the right hardware

We do not mandate that our admins use a specific vendor or a specific model, so this section addresses core considerations when choosing a work system.

Checklist

    System supports SecureBoot (CRITICAL)
    System has no firewire, thunderbolt or ExpressCard ports (MODERATE)
    System has a TPM chip (LOW)

Considerations

SecureBoot

Despite its controversial nature, SecureBoot offers prevention against many attacks targeting workstations (Rootkits, “Evil Maid,” etc), without introducing too much extra hassle. It will not stop a truly dedicated attacker, plus there is a pretty high degree of certainty that state security agencies have ways to defeat it (probably by design), but having SecureBoot is better than having nothing at all. Alternatively, you may set up Anti Evil Maid which offers a more wholesome protection against the type of attacks that SecureBoot is supposed to prevent, but it will require more effort to set up and maintain.

Firewire, thunderbolt, and ExpressCard ports

Firewire is a standard that, by design, allows any connecting device full direct memory access to your system (see Wikipedia). Thunderbolt and ExpressCard are guilty of the same, though some later implementations of Thunderbolt attempt to limit the scope of memory access. It is best if the system you are getting has none of these ports, but it is not critical, as they usually can be turned off via UEFI or disabled in the kernel itself.

TPM Chip

Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a crypto chip bundled with the motherboard separately from the core processor, which can be used for additional platform security (such as to store full-disk encryption keys), but is not normally used for day-to-day workstation operation. At best, this is a nice-to-have, unless you have a specific need to use TPM for your workstation security.

Pre-boot environment

This is a set of recommendations for your workstation before you even start with OS installation.

Checklist

    UEFI boot mode is used (not legacy BIOS) (CRITICAL)
    Password is required to enter UEFI configuration (CRITICAL)
    SecureBoot is enabled (CRITICAL)
    UEFI-level password is required to boot the system (LOW)

Considerations

UEFI and SecureBoot

UEFI, with all its warts, offers a lot of goodies that legacy BIOS doesn’t, such as SecureBoot. Most modern systems come with UEFI mode on by default.

Make sure a strong password is required to enter UEFI configuration mode. Pay attention, as many manufacturers quietly limit the length of the password you are allowed to use, so you may need to choose high-entropy short passwords vs. long passphrases (see below for more on passphrases).

Depending on the Linux distribution you decide to use, you may or may not have to jump through additional hoops in order to import your distribution’s SecureBoot key that would allow you to boot the distro. Many distributions have partnered with Microsoft to sign their released kernels with a key that is already recognized by most system manufacturers, therefore saving you the trouble of having to deal with key importing.

As an extra measure, before someone is allowed to even get to the boot partition and try some badness there, let’s make them enter a password. This password should be different from your UEFI management password, in order to prevent shoulder-surfing. If you shut down and start a lot, you may choose to not bother with this, as you will already have to enter a LUKS passphrase and this will save you a few extra keystrokes.

Full information:

https://github.com/lfit/itpol

https://github.com/lfit/itpol/blob/master/linux-workstation-security.md

http://linuxfoundation.org/

PS: The Linux Foundation also just started a Core Infrastructure Initiative, which has security implications, which I’ve got to find out more on, and will blog on later.

WPBT attacks from the past: Alex at SyScan12

The recent Lenovo LSE blunder made most of the world aware of Windows WBPT ACPI table and how the firmware injects an executable into the OS, a feature of Windows that all OEMs are likely using. While the media is wondering about WBPT and why it’s not prominently displayed on many web sites, Xeno of LegbaCore pointed out that Alex Ionescu gave a talk at SyScan 2012 on this specific topic:

ACPI 5.0 Rootkit Attacks Againts Windows 8
Alex Ionescu
This talk will disclose certain new features of the ACPI 5.0 Specification which is now public and was primarily designed to support ACPI on ARM Embedded SoCs for the upcoming release of Windows 8. Some of these new features have important security considerations which have not been traditionally monitored by security products and/or users, specifically in the areas of covert code execution at Ring 0 privileges.

https://www.syscan.org/index.php/download/get/a722b1acb9396d82323da3a78235fdc0/SyScan12Slides.zip
https://www.syscan.org/index.php/archive/view/year/2012/city/sg/pg/program
https://www.syscan.org/index.php/archive/view/year/2012/city/sg/pg/speakers#004
https://www.syscan.org/index.php/download/previous
http://www.alex-ionescu.com/

Thanks for reminding us, Xeno!

OTA releases draft IoT Trust Framework spec

As found on Dark Reading, yesterday the IoT Working Group of the Online Trust Alliance (OTA) released a trust framework draft.

Internet of Things Lacks Safety Today, Opening Door to Major Threats Tomorrow, Warns OTA

BELLEVUE, Wash. – The Online Trust Alliance (OTA), the non-profit with the mission to enhance online trust, today released its Internet of Things Trust Framework, the first global, multi-stakeholder effort to address IoT risks comprehensively. The framework presents guidelines for IoT manufacturers, developers and retailers to follow when designing, creating, adapting and marketing connected devices in two key categories: home automation and consumer health and fitness wearables. In the spirit of collaboration, OTA openly invites industry leaders to review the document and provide feedback. With members that include ADT, AVG Technologies, Microsoft, Symantec, Target, TRUSTe, Verisign and nearly 100 other subject matter experts, the OTA IoT Working Group was formed in January 2015. Through extensive research, this taskforce concluded that the safety and reliability of any IoT device, app or service depends equally on security and privacy, as well as a third, often overlooked component: sustainability.

IoT Trust Framework – Security, Privacy & Sustainability

The Internet of Things (IoT) moniker is being applied to 1000’s of devices, offering increased utility, functionality and other consumer and business benefits.  In the rapid race to bring products to market, many lack basic security protocols, privacy considerations and related safeguards.  Others have insecure processes and appear to be failing to consider fundamental privacy principles. While it is recognized there is no “perfect security” or “absolute privacy”, the lack of standards and controls increases the risk of exploits, data breaches and abusive data use policies to consumers and businesses worldwide.

https://otalliance.org/initiatives/internet-things
https://otalliance.org/news-events/press-releases/internet-things-lacks-safety-today-opening-door-major-threats-tomorrow

Click to access iot_trust_frameworkv1.pdf

http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/iot-working-group-crafts-framework-for-security-privacy-/d/d-id/1321708

DMTF Redfish 1.0 released

Redfish, an IPMI replacement, has shipped the first release of their spec. Quoting the press release:

DMTF Helps Enable Multi-Vendor Data Center Management with New Redfish 1.0 Standard

DMTF has announced the release of  Redfish 1.0, a standard for data center and systems management that delivers improved performance, functionality, scalability and security. Designed to meet the expectations of end users for simple and interoperable management of modern scalable platform hardware, Redfish takes advantage of widely-used technologies to speed implementation and help system administrators be more effective. Redfish is developed by the DMTF’s Scalable Platforms Management Forum (SPMF), which is led by Broadcom, Dell, Emerson, HP, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Supermicro and VMware with additional support from AMI, Oracle, Fujitsu, Huawei, Mellanox and Seagate. The release of the Redfish 1.0 standard by the DMTF demonstrates the broad industry support of the full organization.

http://dmtf.org/standards/redfish
http://dmtf.org/join/spmf

Don’t forget to grab the Redfish “Mockup” as well as the specs and schema.

UEFI 2.5 has a JSON API to enable accessing Redfish. HP was first vendor with systems that supported UEFI 2.5’s new HTTP Boot, a PXE replacement.  Intel checked in HTTP Boot support into TianoCore, so it’s just a matter of time until other vendors have similar products. JSON-based Redfish and HTTP-based booting makes UEFI much more of a “web app”, w/r/t security research, and the need for system administrators to more closely examine how firmware is updated on their systems, to best protect them.
https://firmwaresecurity.com/tag/uefi-http-boot/

Microsoft Windows HSTI (Hardware Security Test Interface)

I just noticed that Microsoft has a “Hardware Security Testability Specification”, still at version 1.0, which defines the Microsoft Windows “Hardware Security Test Interface” (HSTI). The Windows Hardware Certification Program is a self-testing and certification process for Windows OEMs and IHVs. The OEMs/IHVs run some tests, pass them, upload the test log output showing the passing, the vendor gets their code signed and/or they won’t get their marketing logo. Though the test name and the group  name have changed, these tests have been around since the beginning of Windows NT. The tests have grown over time to cover more system components, and certification and logo requirements have gotten more tied to passing test results. As these tests are only useful for Windows-centric IHVs and OEMs, I’ve not paid much attention to what firmware tests are available. These days, there are tests for chip vendors and for IBVs (Independent BIOS Vendors), in addition to OEMs and IHVs. It looks like they have a few UEFI-centric tests regarding Secure Boot, and dealing with system suspend/resume.

Jeremiah Cox of Microsoft gave a talk at the Summer 2013 UEFI Forum plugfest (Summerfest): “Validating Hardware Security Through Firmware Interfaces“, see below for URL to slides.

Excerpts from the MSDN web page:

HSTI helps avoid misconfiguration of security features on devices running Windows. Thus, HSTI provides better assurance of compliance with Windows Hardware Security Requirements. HSTI aims to simplify the interface for designing tests to ensure compliance, reducing the effort required to comply with Windows Hardware Security Requirements. The results of HSTI tests will be consumed by Windows Certification Tests and can be used to verify that devices have been properly configured to enable supported security features. These tests may be used to identify unsecure engineering devices in the field; for example, engineering devices which may contain unsecure test keys. The results of these tests may be used by the Windows operating system to display a watermark (or similar indicator) on unsecured devices. The IHV will develop reference security designs for their platforms that comply with the Windows Compatibility Requirements. In addition, IHVs and IBVs will also implement programmatic tests that verify proper enablement of the reference security implementations and report the results via the Hardware Security Test Interface. These tests are delivered to OEMs & ODMs as compiled modules (not source) and should work without modification. If an OEM/ODM deviates from reference security designs, these test modules may report failures, and the OEM/ODM will need to contact Microsoft to review the modifications and implement an additional HSTI instance that reports these exceptions. OEMs should be able to leverage these security modules with no modification required by following the reference design and documentation. OEMs who wish to add additional security modules, or modify the behavior of any security module, must undergo a design review with Microsoft. Silicon suppliers and IBVs who support Connected Standby systems must implement the platform independent interfaces for querying the respective hardware and firmware security states of their reference platforms. These implementations must be delivered as compiled modules. It is recommended that these modules be signed, and that a signature check is performed when they are run. The purpose is to query the hardware and firmware designs and states to report proper security provisioning of the platform. If an OEM wants to provide an alternate implementation of HSTI tested security features the OEM may provide additional tests. OEM security checks must at least fully cover one IHV or IBV security test. Before use, OEMs must submit to a design review by Microsoft and are subject to the same Documentation and Tool disclosure requirements as other HSTI test providers. Upon approval from Microsoft, the OEM may include security tests that extend upon the IHV and IBV tests. Note that OEM attestation is not required as part of the HSTI design. HSTI is not a list of requirements for OEMs; it is an interface to guarantee effective programmatic security testing of firmware, hardware, and configuration parameters. Silicon and firmware suppliers should make available to Microsoft all necessary security-related reference documentation and tools that they provide to OEMs. This documentation and tools should be made available no later than they are provided to Windows OEMs. This should include, but is not limited to, all documentation and tools related to fusing, installing and updating firmware, firmware and boot recovery, hardware diagnostics, firmware diagnostics, & boot diagnostics. This documentation and tools provided should be fully sufficient to perform HSTI checks in a lab environment.

Beyond Canonical’s FirmWare Test Suite (FWTS) tool for Ubuntu systems, I wonder if Linux Foundation (and FreeBSD Foundation) have anything close to this testing and certification policy for (not just a test), to help encourage silicon vendors, IBVs, IHVs, and OEMs to best (and most securely) work with Linux (and FreeBSD). In addition to passing FWTS, Intel-based systems should also have to pass current CHIPSEC release before Linux or FreeBSD should touch the platform.

This also reminds me of my last blog post, about getting CHIPSEC results more widely available for consumer’s pre-sales knowledge, depending on the strength of these Windows tests, Microsoft may have some OEM/IBV test results that I wish they’d share (but they never would share that kind of data about their Partner, of course).

For the good of all OSes, not just Windows, I wish Microsoft would add CHIPSEC to their test suites, to force OEMs to pass CHIPSEC. I wonder if CHIPSEC works using IronPython when run as an OS-level app on Windows. 🙂

More Information:

Click to access UEFI_Summerfest_2013_-_Microsoft_Hardware_Security_Test_Interface.pdf

http://www.uefi.org/learning_center/presentationsandvideos
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/dn879006.aspx

Windows 10 and Secure Boot

Microsoft made Windows 10 available today, free upgrade for v7 and v8 users. The spec says:

“Secure boot requires firmware that supports UEFI v2.3.1 Errata B and has the Microsoft Windows Certification Authority in the UEFI signature database.”

For more information on Window 10’s firmware/hardware security requirements, look at Microsoft’s talk from the last UEFI Forum plugfest, from May: “Overview of Windows 10 Requirements for TPM, HVCI and SecureBoot“, by Gabe Stocco, Scott Anderson and Suhas Manangi (Microsoft):

More Information:

http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/windows-10-specifications

Click to access UEFI_Plugfest_May_2015%20Windows%2010%20Requirements%20for%20TPM%2C%20HVCI%20and%20SecureBoot.pdf

http://blogs.windows.com/bloggingwindows/2015/07/28/windows-10-free-upgrade-available-in-190-countries-today/